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PREFACE
In order to provide a convenient forum for assessing the technolo_'
available to cope with turbojet engine rotor failures and to obtain advice
from engine manufacturers, airframe mmnufacturers, and airline operators
on information needed in the 5-10-15 year future period to enhance safety
with respect to engine rotor burst fragments, the NASA Lewis Research Center
requested the MIT Aeroe]astic and Structures Research Laboratory to host
a Workshop on An Assessment of Technology for Turbojet Engine Rotor Failures.
This Workshop was held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, >_ssachusetts during March 29, 30, and 31, 1977. The meeting
agenda was essentially as shown in Appendix A. A list of attendees is given
in Appendix B. The Workshop consisted of four sessions.
Session i was devoted to restating the nature and scope of the safety
problems posed by turbojet engine rotor burst fragments; also, design con-
siderations, objectives, and various approaches taken to cope with this
safety problem were discussed.
Session 2 was devoted to examining the current state of the art for
providing protection from engine rotor burst fragments. Included here were
the use of layout arrangements and redundancies to provide continued safe
operation in the event of fragment penetration following non-containment,
selective escape of fragments in harmless directions, and local shield
protection of aircraft components exterior to the engine casing. Pro-
tective structures consisting of single-layer metals, fiber composites,
or layered multimaterial configurations were considered; experiments in-
volving the responses of such structures to fragment impact were reviewed
as were theoretical methods already developed or in the process of being
developed to predict the attendant structural responses. (Current pre-
diction capabilities and experimental data as well as anticipated needs
in the 5-10-15 year future period, both experimental and theoretical, were
considered.) The need to evaluate the effects of typical operating on- I
vironments on newer containment/deflection materials and concepts was _
emphasized.
Session 3 centered attention on a variety of measures intended to
prevent or to reduce the frequency and severity of engine rotor bursts.
Design concepts tailored to insure that the first failure to occur (if at
. i all) will produce small rather than large energetic fragments The use
of non-destructive test/Inspection techniques to improve the quality of
delivered items as well as vigilant inspection procedures which the alr-
line operators can employ were indicated to be particularly effective
measures to reduce failure incidence. Improvements in both access and
inspection techniques for in-service monitoring of engines to detect
_ trouble before a severe failure with large energetic fragments occurs were
urged.
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Session 4 was devoted to summarizing the main points raised in the
three earlier sessions. A. K. Forney and J. J. Shea of the FAA presented
a Summary of Design Considerations, Objectives, and Approaches. S.A. Sattar
of Pratt & _itney Aircraft was asked (with his associates) to summarize
the status of Analysis and Experiments, Prospects, and Needed Research
pertaining to Rotor Burst Protection. B. L. Koff and his GE colleagues
presented a Summary of Status, Prospects, and Needed Research pertaining to
Rotor Burst Prevention. At the conclusion of the Session 4 discussion,
Mr. Solomon Weiss of the NASA Lewis Research ]enter closed the Workshop,
expressing NASA's appreciation to all speakers and participants for their
generous sharing of their experience and views for coping with engine rotor
burst safety problems.
Included in these Proceedings are written versions of the presentations;
in some cases, only an abstract and/or copies of the presentation slides
were provided. Following each paper in these Proceedings are the questions
and answers which followed each presentation in Sessions i, 2, and 3 at the
Workshop. These questions and answers were transcribed as well as feasible
from tape recordings, and have been submitted to the persons involved for
editing, clarification, and elaboration as deemed advisable; the purpose is
to convey and to transmit information, not to have simply a verbatim account
of those discuss ons.
Information from Session 4 (the "summary session") is not included here; _]
there was no recording or reporting of the discussions in Session 4.
Emmett A. Witmer,
Workshop General Chairman
: and Proceedings Editor
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FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO ENGINE ROTOR INTEGRITY
A. K. FORNEY*
INTRODUCTION
Close review of the record shows that aircraft engine failures are not
a major contributor to commercial aircraft accidents today. This
position has been arrived at by the concerted effort and resources of
the entire industry, and the results are such that everyone in the
industry can rightly have a feeling of pride and a sense of accomplish- 4)
t
ment. That is not to say, however, that now is the time to relax
the effort. Engine problems, while not major, do occur occasionally.
These include engine surge at or soon after rotation on takeoff_ the
need for engine shutdown after ingesting birds and an occasional rotor
i
disk failure.
_.-y •
*Chief, Engine Section
Propulsion Branch
Flight Standards ServLce
FAA_ Washington_ D.C.
._ t ' ,
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Even though engine failures are not a major contributor to airline
accidents, the FAA is intensely interested in engine rotor integrity.
This interest is demonstrated by the fact that there are several active
programs under FAA sponsorship relating to this subject. Of par-
ticular interest to the FAA is the NASA Rotor Burst Protection
Program. It is hoped that this program will result in a significant
reduction in engine rotor failures.
The approach of the FAA to the protection of aircraft from uncontained
engine rotor fragments is threefold. First, design and test require-
ments are imposed on engines for the purpose of ensuring to the maxi-
mum extent practicable the integcity of the engine rotor. Second,
because the possibility always exists that the rotor will fail, design
and test requirements are imposed on the engine to ensure some con-
tainment capability. Finally, b_cause complete containment of all
high energy fragments has heen considered inpracticable up to now,
design requirements are imposed on transport type aircraft to mini-
_ mize the hazard to the aircraft from uncontained engine rotor fragments.
r/
ENGINE DESIGN AND TEST REQUIREMENTS
The engine design and test requirements are covered in the United
States Code of Fede=al Regulations, Title 14, Aeronautics and Space,
Z
I
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Part 33, Airworthiness Standards; Aircraft Engines. There are several
sections of these Airworthiness Standards that contribute to rotor
,?i
integrity.
Section 33.14, entitled "Start-Stop Cyclic Stress (Low-cycle Fatigue),"
presents the low-cycle fatigue requirements. At the present time the
engine manufacturer is required by this section to determine the
predicted safe life of each rotor disk and spacer in the engine.
An initial service life is then established at one-third of the pre- j
dicted safe life. The section also describes the procedure to be
used if it is desired to extend the initial service life to some
higher value. To do so, three disks and spacers of each part number
that have reached the initial life in service must undergo an additional
• number of cycles equal to at least twice the number of cycles comprising i
the increase in the limit desired.
Section 33.27, entitled "Turbine, Compressor, and Turbo-Supercharger
Rotors," presents the overspeed design and test requirements for these
engine components. The overspeed required is 120 percent of the
k_
maximum limiting rpm if the rotor is tested on a rig, or 115 percent
of its maximum limiting rpm if it is tested on the engine.
4 '
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Section 33.62, entitled "Stress Analysis," requires that a stress
analysis be performed on each turbine engine showing the design safety
margin of each turbine engine rotor disk, spacer and rotor shaft.
Section 33.75, entitled "Safety Analysis," requires it to be shown
by analysis that any probable malfunction or any probable single or
multiple failure, or any probable improper operation will not cause
the engine to:
(a) catch fire;
(b) burst (penetrate its case);
(c) generate loads greater than those specified in §33.23; or
(d) lose the capability of being shutdown. 0
Section 33.83, entitled "Vibration Test," requires that each engine
must undergo a vibration survey to determine the vibration stresses.
" This section further requires that these stresses may not exceed the I
endurance limit stress of the material from which these parts are made.
f
CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS
"_ ' Section 33.19, entitled "Durability" requires that "the design ol _.he
" compressor and turbine rotor cases must provide for the containment of
damage from rotor blade failure." Traditionally, the demonstration
4
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of compliance with this requirement was accomplished in an evacuated
spin pit. In October 1974, as part of a major revision of the engine
airworthiness requirements, a change was made to require that demon-
stration of compliance with the containment requirements be accomplished
o_ an engine.
AIRCRAFT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The requirements relating to transport type aircraft are covered in
the United States Code of Federal Regulations_ Title 14, Aeronautics
i
and Space_ Part 25, Airworthiness Standards; Transport Category Air-
planes. Section 25.903(d)(I) reads: "For turbine engine ins.._-
lations design precautions must be taken to minimize the h_zards to
the airplane in the event of an engine rotor failure...."
This requirement is very general and gives no guidance on what to do i
to comply with the requirement. In such cases, the general practice
is for FAA Headqua=ters to prepare and distribute what is called
: "guidance material" describing one or more ways of complying with
, a general requirement. Guidance material has been distributed for '
., this requirement and includes such considerations as:
!
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1. Location of the engines relative to each other and to critical
portions and systems of the airplane.
2. Location and separation of critical components and redun-
dant systems.
3. The strategic location of protective armor and de/lector
shields.
More details on what is actually done in any given airplane to meet
the FAR 25.903(d)(1) requirement can best be obtained from the air- -
plane manufacturer. 4
CURRENT FAAACTIVITY &
The aircraft industry is not a static industry. Consequently, the ,
FAAregulations are rot static. We have underway, therefore, study
contracts that will help improve the regulations. One of these
contracts is with an engine company and will determine the weight Z
penalty for two different levels of increased containment. The
other contract is with an airplane company and is studying the penalties
associated with protecting critical structure and systems, the pas-
., senger cabin and the flight deck by strategic location of armor shields 4
or deflector plates. Results of these two contracts are not yet avail-)
able, but they will be used to propose revisions to the regulations
as appropriate. _
6
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CONCLUSION
The FAA has watched the NASA Rotor Burst Protection Program with
interest for several years. In fact, the two contracts mentioned
above require the contractor to evaluate and use to the degree practicable
all the reports published under the Rotor Burst Protection Program.
It is our hope that this workshop will somehow provide what is needed
to make a significant reduction in uncontained rotor failures.
¢
•' 7
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DISCUSSION
J.C. Wallin, British Aircraft Corporation
I am interested in your comments on the studies that you had done on
looking at the weight penalty for increased levels of containment on the engine
as against improved methods of protection on the airframe. In the UK, we were
getting together a similar study with the CAA and Rolls Royce to put to our
government for some funding. I'd be interested to know, how soon you expect
to get some results from your present study, whether in fact you already have
some results which are leading you to conclusions, and whether it is worthwhile
trying to press my goverrdnent for additional funding to do a study of this sort.
Intuitively, I think we believe that the aircraft protective methods are likely
(in the majority of the present day aircraft configurations) to result in the
lightest form for improving protection. We think that increased protection in
the engine is likely to lead to weight increases which are unjustified, on the
whole, on typical North American subsonic configurations. I think perhaps in
the case of special configurations, particularly of the Concorde kind, increased
containment on the engine might be the lightest way of doing it. We had to add
on something like about a thousand pounds of additional weight on the Concorde
to look after non-containment problems.
A.K. Forney, FAA /'
Well, we should have reports available for distribution within three to
six months on both of our projects. I'm not sure of the exact schedule. ForL
one of them we do have the draft final report for review now, so the report
should be available fairly soon. Our objective is the same as yours, it's to
determine the trade-offs between increased containment on the engine and doing
it on the airplane. And we just had no studies in hand that gave us any indica-
tion at all; that was the purpose of undertaking them. We confined the study
to a wide-bodied jet with a high bypass ratio engine. You are fully aware of
the current status of SST activity in the United States so we did not _ddress
that question. The draft report that I've seen (which was from the air °ame _study) does recoEmend continued effort. The results of the work to dat_
uncovered fruitful areas for further work. So I would heartily endorse your
continuing to try to press for effort in that area because, apparently it would
be fruitful. Does that answer all your questions?
Guy Mangano, Naval Air Propulsion Test Center
7 / I'd like to comment on Ken's statements regarding the conclusions that
i we drew in the cited report.
It's a matter of interpretation. The report means to imply that of all
the different types of fragments generated at burst (disk and fan blade fragments)
constitute the major threat to the welfare and safety of passengers. Taken out
< of context, as Mr. For,ey has, this can of course be misconstrued to mean that
"... disk and blade fragments (are a) major threat to welfare and safety of
passengers". The intent wan simply to identify which fragments present the
worst threat. Whether or not rotor burst fragments or the incidence of rotor
burst is a major threat in commercial aviation is a judgment that is clearly
beyond the stated purpose or scope of the report being discussed.
8
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A.K. Forne_, FAA
The problem, Guy, of course, is that that report got some distribution
and there was reaction, and we had to respond, you see. I don't know how much
you got but I know we did, and it's difficult to respond to. Your statement
claims to be based on FAA data, and so it is kind of difficult for us to answer
the criticisms that we got. Clearly if your intent is what you have just stated,
you can't tell it by reading that report; that's my point.
G.J. Mangano, NAPTC
All right, we'll take these recommendations under advisement and perhaps
be more explicit in our future statements. Again, the intent of the report was
to identify the extent of the problem, that's all. The conclusions made are
so generally stated that they are subject to different interpretations by
different people. I just wanted to explain what was meant by a major threat.
By considering all of the fragments that were generated, the disk and the fan
blades were the major threats, not that rotor burst per se is a major threat.
I think we'll leave it up to the FAA to make that judgment. All that we do is
to present the statistics of the situation. If I interpret Ken's words correctly,
rotor burst is not a major threat. Again, I'll leave that judgment to the
regulating agencies.
J.H. Enders, FAA
One might note that in these comments on the first paper we've exposed a
very basic and common problem in research: human factors. Communication
difficulties between human beings are increasingly recognized as a culprit in
our business; one group trying to understand the other, whether it's the lay
public vs. the technical community, or segments within the technical community
itself.
Gordon Gunstone, CAA-UK
I just wanted to say that perhaps to save time on that particular point,
if y_u'd comport yourselves with patience for ten minutes, I have some figures
which I hope will illustrate exactly what the problem is or isn't.
I
&
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iENGINE NON-CONTAINMENT -- THE UK CAA VIEW
G. L. Gunstone
Head, Power Plant Department
UK Civil Aviation Authority
SUMMARY
_r_sent turbine engine non-containments happen too frequently for comfort,
although fortunately the world-wide fatal accident level from this cause
has not been excessive•
By ar the majority of turbine engine induced accidents lie in non-containments,
and therefore if the engine industry is to contribute to improved airworthiness, .
, t/,i: is the problem it must tackle.
d
Because -
(a) the world-wide non-containment rate shows no sign of
diminishing over the last decade,
(b) there seems to be no immediately obvious engineering :
' avenues which will confidently lead to a quick reduction
of incidents, _
(c) the weight penalty of total containment is high,
_e only valid solution for the immediate future seems to be to provide an I
• adequate level n? aircraft invulnerability. _
This the CAA has attempted to achieve by introducing a requirement which it
believes to be objective and capable of rational analysis. It can be applied
to new designs without undue economic penalty and will enable an acceptable
level of airworthiness to be achieved.
&
-I
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PART 1 The Perspective
At first sight, the reader may wonder what FIG 1 has to do with the title
of this paper or the purpose of this 'Workshop'. In fact it shows that for
more than 200 years we have been throwing pieces of hot metal at each other.*
FIG 2 shows that we are still at it. We Cans of courgep take comfort from
the fact that the prosmlt situation is -nintentional and not done with
'malice aforethought', but it must still be obvious to anyone closely
. engaged An the aviation business that not infrequently an aircraft hazard
is created by t£a energetic debris arising from an engine rotor disintegration.
This hazard was introduced at the ease time am turbine engines and may
perhaps be regarded an fundmntal to them, since the rotation at high speed
of the sort of •us typical of modern engine spools ties up huge amounts of
energy. Some idea of the destructive potential is given by the realisation
that the energy of rotation of a large modern engine can now ba reaching
20 sLtllion ft.lb, and that across an aircraft can be approaching the energy
rejected into the brakes during an abandoned take-off. (FIG 3).
The potential for hazardotm damage is thor•fore obvious, although 1¢ will be
shown later that this particular hazard has not been re•possible for large
numbers of fata____ll accidents. _erefore while it is proper, in fact necessity,
that the Industry and Authorities should look into the whole situation, it is
important that perspective is maintained so that in a world where resources
are not infinite, a good balance of effort will be •Lint•teed.
Let us therefore spend a few ninutea putting the whole problem into some kind
of perspective. FIG 4 shows an analysis of a large nunbor of 'accidents' to
public transport (is air carrier) turbojet aircraft. It is not an exhaustive
survey but it is based on world-wide accident records to a given list of
aircraft over • period f_ 1966 to 1976 inclusive. _
(An accident here is that deflnod in Annex 13 of ICAO Standards
and Reconianded Practices, is, on• in which - _
(a) any person suffers death or aerioluJ in;Jury 88 •
result of bean8 in or upon the mass, raft or by
direct _tut with the aircr_t or anything
atta_had thareto,
or
(b) the aircraft receives substantial don•p). _
!
,_. The total number of accidents in tha survey is 513, and the eat/••tad aircraft
hours Involved, 105 Ltllion. The torsi _cidemt rate is thus running at about
_' 6 l_r lO 6 _Lrcra_t hou_ and the fatal rate at 1,4. The accident causes may
he broken down into -
!_ 299 due to operational rean_ (5_)
• i34 duo to •i_worthlnoss reuoas (H_)
80 due to other (or undetermined)
12
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The airworthiness accidents, which are the sort oZ prise intel_et to this
Workshops _hus account tar rashly a quarter of the totals at a rate of
1.3 per 10 _ aircraft hours, sad which My again be broken down (FIG 5) into:-
55 duo to poworplunt re_ (41_ of the airworthiness
accidents)
79 due I_o other than pover- (591; of the airworthiness
plant reasons accidents)
FIG 6 then subdivides the povorplent z_ssong into further details the chief
message of which, for the purpose o_ this psper_ t8 that by far the _ority
of powerplent cetusod accidents are attributable to or directly involve an
engine non-containment of ease form. The non-containment oaused accident
rate is 0.4 per 106 atrCl_ft hoursj the rate involving fatalities being
fortunately lover at O.03s thtm _a£ling to moot our ¢urz_nt eugiPsJted
o41_eorthinosa target of 1 per 10 V o£rcz_t hours (for a mingle engineering
cause) by s factor of 3.
This leads to the £arst s_Ln point I wtsh to make (FIG 7) vlz that -
"any significant tmprovoamnt to the overall smoldent scone by
virtue of action in the pOVOl_plent ares must beet 11e tn the
direction of diminish/rig the dmq_er suriling from Don-coatalamnt."
PART 2 Enllne 8tatletioa
Having decided (sad I am sure s_ 'lorkghep' haste gall he I_ratLtted to hear ;it.*) that we have s problem worth streaking, tt Is nov neueseary to dig deeper i •
to sue if we can ascertain whore the problems mm arising. For s nmher of i
years nov, the Power Plant Dop81_mont o£ the C££ has kept s record of 811 non- ,_
contsannsnt incidents _t could llY 1to hands on. For UK pl_dUeod on_Jtoee vo
have oooplete roeorda0 but o£ oourse our acour_y Is less _or other oountrios.
h 81_ however 0 fld.Zly OUl_ /;hit the hot_J used for detea_Ltala_ the ltatiltton
SaW sccttrste snatch to allow _i_trly _ideat _se to he aade of the date.
FIG 8 she the _xa-_t_tnlmat _te, world-wide, £or the p_t lO yam or so.
Tuo obvious _onolusSoms etrJJm omo immediately _ the data, te that the rate
is sbo_t I non-_ta/aomt pe= 10_ _etne het_e, and that the rate has been
reanonably _tant over the por:Lod. _
FIG 9 shove the ssms data broken down ante in¢_demte s_lsln8 fl_m compressors
(inoludtn_ fro) am a_pkt_st tJ_e 81_ei_ _ t_blooe. The ou_vos show that
there Is little to ehooge bot_seu _so m, thoq_h perhsps in vie_ o_ the 18a_or
nuebo_ of _oopawuor st_o8 soaped v_th _u_Mnos., St oould be sa_d that '.
individually turbine rows ave mm pa_mo to fsllm thsa ooapmssor rotors.
13
Non-containments involving only blades represent to some _xtent a failure
to meet existing international engine requirements which all demand blade
containment. However, the tests conducted are only required to demonstrate
containment of one blade, and obviously many real failures involve more
than this. Additionally, some non-conta/J_ents of blades are produced by
the blade being punched through the cuing rather than breaking through
ballistically, and these types are of a less dangerous nature, since the
emergent energy Is low. As might be expected, and as t8 borne out in
practice, non-containments involving a failure of some part of the disc :
are generally more dangerous than those involving blades. FIG 10 shows the
rate of such failures and FIG 11 the same data divided again as between
conpressors (with fans) and turbines. The conclusions to be drawn are that
about half of non-containments involve • failure of some part of the disc,
again that the compressor/turbine rates are not diset_ilar, and again that
there is no great sign of inprovement over the years.
There are two other data that might be useful. FIG 12 shots non-containments
grouped by 'phase of flight'. The criterion of prior to or post V1 Is not
always detemlnable from incident reports, but the volume of statletl¢s Is
probably enough to swamp m/nor errors. The data nay be interpreted in a
crude way as showing incidents divided into four roughly equal flight phases,
viz prior to V1, V1 to power reduction, cltnb, renalnder of flight.
_ Paragraph (f) below gives the data more accurately but In 8 way less easy to /"
remenber. FIG 13 attenpte to show the underlying causes. Here we are on
much more difficult ground, since causes are treated very subjectively. For
example, It nay be easy to see that a fall_re had Its orlgin In coabustlon
_ chamber distortion, but whether the cause of that was duo to poor operation,
faulty notarial, errors of overhaul, fundanontal do•ten, etc, is often not
close" and Can depend on who is making the Judgement! It is. of course,
._ almost always the fault of seasons else.* However, the Figure is attached
for what It Is worth, and prlaarlly because of one m_tn conclusion which can
be drawn fren it - that ts that there is no obvious single item which if 4
. tackled successfully would in ttaclf produce a drausttc /mpl_Voment in the I
non-containnont scene - a point to which we shall a_tuasa later.
All the above data wee recently presented to 8 UK connittoo _npristng the
UK engine and aircraft industries as well as the CAA, and I append below the
conclusions of that _mittoe in at, mary foe. (In ease you think I ms
passing the buok. I should _orheps say X was 8 member of the _umttteo). T
- / (e) The everqo (world-vide) non-contstnnont rate _om 811
/ / causes is 1 Per nlllton engine hours. This ttSu_o has _'
"_ been fairly constant for 10 ye_e.
6
Not...._e _ou_hly one-4uarter of these no_-mtaln_ents have
caused aircraft demsKo outside the aanfinos o_ the nacelle.
The 'slplfloant' non-_ts£n_ont rate _y thelwfoa_ be
regarded am about 1 per million alroa_ft hours. It m/Jht
be noted, by _erring hank to FIG 6, that about half the :
'sl_nlfloant' non-_t_in_nts m serious onon_h to be
clusstfled as repoz_ablo s_eldonts.
' 14 i/
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(b) Of all non-containments, about halZ involve s disc failure of
some degree. The non-containment rate for disc failure Is,
therefore, 1 per 2 million engine hours. As mzght be expected,
discs contribute more 'significant' non-containments than blades,
in fact twice as many.
(c) Of all non-containments about one-eighth have resulted in the
release of debris approaching or equal to s third of a disc.
The major fragment rate Is, therefore, about 1 in 8 million
engine hours (say 1 per 2 million aircraft hours).
(d) Compressors and turbines make about equal contributions to non-
containments. Fans provide perhaps 10_ of the total (base_. on
less experience obviously).
(e) Although depending on • sonewhat subjective Jut_eaent, it appears
that about half the disc failures are of • secondary nature.
Of the primary failures, nearly half are attributable to HCF
(High Cycle Fatigue). No other single cause stands out on either ;
the primary or secondary failtwos.
(f) As to phase of flight, the follGwlng is broadly true (although .:
with the advent of engines whoso a_m increase with altitude to
the extent that cruise rpm nay exceed that of take-off, this _'
broakdo_._ may be -od4fled),
Phone: T O before VI V I to power reduction Cllnb Renalndor
% : 35 20 22 23
(g) No single prodoILinant cause e an be Identified the cure of which
would give a drausttc do,roans in non-containment Incidents.
However HCF sccouuts for a high proportion and should therefore
be given special consideration.
pART 3, Possible Solutions
In conaider£n8 what night be done to u4nJjLtgo potemtisl accidents duo to non-
containnont, there al_ tJIroe JJemodtatoly apparent soluttGna (FIG 14) -
(1) We nay work on the l_Ot clntses of the failures mad sttelpt
to eltJLtnsto them.
4.
(1t) We My assuno that the fslltume w£U aontlnue to occur at a
' rate hlghqw than is tolerable, and 8ttu_t to contLtn all the
debris within s strenlthoned ons/ne osslns.
; (111) We nay accept that uncontatned debris w111 co•tines to be
8enarntod sad sake the air.raft denton s_ccptably /nvulnarablo
to the debris by such am•no aJ deflection, the Judicious sAt/nl;
of critic81 parts and structure, suitable duplication whore
appropriate, sxwour/nl, etc.
1S
.......................
- + •
\ n , •
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The first solution, being basic, seems right and attractive but as will be
shown later, a reduction in present non-containment rates of at least an
order of magnitude is necessary for this solution to be viable.
Unfortunately, as FIG 13 Indicates, something like a thiz_/ to a half of all
disc failures are from causes to which the disc failure _s _econdary, and we
felt it would unr_allstic to believe that any ove._helmlng Improvement
could be made to such a large number of unrelated prime causes. Even taking
those cases where the disc failure is itself primary, thex'_ _e still six or
seven fundamentally different causes, none of which carries any obvious
promise of easy solution and cure. Perhaps the r_J _ttvely low number of
basic LCF failures is interesting since this is a subject t_ which0 after a
few early failures, a groat deal of attention has b_en paid, obviously to
good effect. However, HCF, which now probably accounts for more failures
than LCF_ is much more difficult to cater for, since it tenths to arise in
much less predictable ways. I hope some other papers at this Workshop will
be devoted to tha_ subject.
It was therefore reluctantly concluded in the CAA that there could be little
con_idence £n the engine industryts ability to produce engines which within
the foreseeable future (by which we neso_ the next ten years) would achieve /
4
s_.gniflcantly reduced levo_.s o_ non-containment incidents, and nowhere near
the order of magnltude reduction we would need. I say reluctantly in the
sense that regarding myself as a mesaor of the engine fraternity, I an
disappointed that ws cannot _antee to del&ver engines free from this :_
endem/c disease. However, we must be honest enough not to tz7 to avoid the
: truth and to aduttp even wi_h red _aces, our inability to be certain of doing
such bet'_er in the tnmedlate 2uture. (And I hope nothing here suid will in
any way dlaihtsh the desire s_d intent o_ this Workshop to prove me completely
wrong). !
Movtng to the second soSutton, this i8 also an attractive one to an
Airworthiness Authority since i_ we cannot stop the debris belng generated, it
would be almost as good to keep it inside the engine. It also has norit in
lessening the danger arising £a_s such" unavoidable incidents as large bird _•ingestion where the benefit st total containment is obvious. Unfortunately,
after numerous discussions with both the on.no end alrars_t industries, we
were loft with little hope0 in the present state o_ the art, of o_ecting
containment without swingelng Incro_s in engine weight, except possibly on
quite amall engines or APU's. Est_aates o£ I pound per I0,000 _t.lb. o_
energy to be absorbed or 2/3 pound per pound o_ bladed disc weight have been
/ variously calculated, the _tnal results /nplyins an inereuo o_ bare engine
_' welght st anything up to _, Of cour_ containment does not have to be total,
_ and it is interesting to look into pswtial o_ta/_ment, _or oxsmple o_ tbe miler
debris, toKother with possible do_lection. HAPTC nay be abl_ to suKgest ways
st reducing these _tgures, and I will be intel_sted to hos_ st their recant
work, but o_ oou_so i_ the c_msidorntion o_ the larger pieces dictates the
design, contaln_nt of the shallot ones nay be _eas attrsoti_.
"" However, the conalus£o_ ws rolu_bed, in assooiatlon with our sumufacturors
was that the meet _llable, practicable and nost-_£_ootiw_ solution is the
thlrd, lo to sake the a_a_r_t relatively /nvulnorablo to any likely debris
which nay a_oot it. (Though this deotsicm was one _nioh we felt vo had to
• take in the t/_o 84_ale we _o_o considering, it would be quite premature to
abandon all hope _ soneday achieving solutions one or two, end such ef£orts
as are be/hi nado by this Workshop J_o to be em@ou_aSod to keep this dl££1oult
task in aotlvo play).
16
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?ART 4 The UK Re_:luirements
The CAA, having reached the conclusion that the only practicable requirement
for _he immediate future was to achieve a reasonable degree of aircraft
invulnerability then gave thought to the form which the requirement should
take. Phrases like "Shall pinimise the risk'* are very easy to put into
requirements and are attractive in that they can be agreed with industry
without too much argument since the broad principles involved are so
obviously sensible. Unfortunately, when the crunch comes, it soon becomes
apparent that there is a considerable conflict of opinion as to where
minimising should stop;
The aim of the requirement in its simplest form i8 clears viz, that unless
an engine will contain any likely debris that it might generate, the chance
of catastrophe occurring to an aeroplane from being struck by such debris
should be something less than lO'8/airoraft hour. While this prov2des a
good aim_ it was much more difficult for the aircraft industry to see a way
of being able to denonstrate compliance in a convincing ways since of the
two components contributing to the risk, ie 1) the probability of debris
being generated and 2) the probability of the debris causing catastrophic .damage,
the former and more critical component was completely outside the competence
of the aircraft constructor to assess. It was therefore decided to write
the requirea(,nt such that only the latter term would be quoted, the former
being eros,aged by the CAA and appearing only implicitly In the requirement. J
I have already shown that a ftgur,a for debris generation of 1 per 106 engine
hours wag well founded as an avozage, and not subject to a particularly wide
vsziation over a range of current engines. Knowi,_g that about a quarter of
the incidents caused 'significant' aircraft damage, ie damage outside the
nacelle, the 'significant' rate may be expressed as being in the order of
1 per 106 aircraft hours. Stazting from this precept therefore, the aircraft
constructor needed to provide an additional factor of about 1 per 100 against
s 'significant' engine non-containment ending in catastrophe.
Thus the aircraft constructor would be left with an assessment to make which
was well within engineering Judgement. The only further point renaintng to him
was to have a definition of the sort of non-containment debris that he had to
consider, 2e a freedom from catastrophe of 1 in 100 against what7 We again
decided that this _udgoment was also outside the area of knowledge of aircraft
designers and in _act we doubt if oven the engine designers can do much in the
j way of valid prediction since their avowed intent is to produce engines which
_ nove_.___rfall in this way,
We therefore decided that past oxpertance was the only valid Ku_de available
to us, and although the requlawmont should be written in a way flexible enoch
to allow any peculiarities of an ong£ne to be taken into account, the failures
to be considered would be based on past history.
::" Thus the task was to provide a failure 'medel' with which the aircraft
•_ constructor could ass,as his design against the 1/100 factor. Initially we
tried very cooplez models which became so sophisticated that they defeated
their own purpose, in the end we decided to revert to a sJJlple erode1 even
thatch, as would be expected, it would be somewhat u_Itrary - that is to say
' 17
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th•_ we would never claim that it represents the actual way in which any
given engine is most likely to 1oil - only that it provides • yard-stick
against which the strcrslt design can be neanured.
One oI the obvious pieces o_ debris to be considered zoomed to be the 1/3rd
disc piece (this being very near the e•thosmttcslly nsxtmun energy o_
translation sector end •leo coinciding with current FAA thinking on FAR 25.903(d)).
We then studied the distribution o_ debris which had boon shed in • selection
" oI previous non-containment incidents and chose one turther piece to
represent the moan o_ all the residual pieces which could not be considered
to be covered by the 1/3rd piece.
Thus, 8tarring wi_h the distribution ot the size ot non-containment debris
_rom • number o_ Incidents whore Rolls-Royce were able to recover the debris
and szsess the mass (end this is not n common state ol stlslrs - olten, thank
goodneszj • lot ot the debris disappears into thin air') we wore able to
construct • probability c_rvo. (FIG 15). H&vtng decided already that one ol
the model pieces should be the l/3rd disco end wishing to represent the
remainder by one other arbtt_rary pieces it can be shown that this should be
o_ 1/20 disc mess. From the probability ol each ot those typez ol failure /
occurrtnge we could then devise •ttgure which described the desired level
o_ Invulnerability oi the aircraft design such that tt engines continue to
/ _811 st the sort o_ rate which has applied in the paste the strcrslt will have
an acceptable level oZ airworthiness sgstnst _his particular hazard. /"
e
• Re_erenco bsck to the data shows that the probability oi the smaller (1/20
disc mass) piece to about twice that o_ the larger piece. We therefore had
the equation : there ts s signltlcent non-contslnnont (to one csustng dsmsge e
outside the n'scelle) every sdllton slrcralt hours, two out oi thlwo o2 which
nay be regarded as releasing s 1/Re piece, and one in three s piece getting
Into the 1/3rd disc size ballpark.. 8 I_ the target risk _rom this cause tot
catastrophe ts to be lose than 10 per aircrstt hours simple mathematics
show that the invulnerability getters tg tb allowance t8 equally proportioned
nuJt be 1/133 1or the ssutller end 1/66 1or the larpr pteoo respectively.
te _(1 -6 1 1 -6 1 1x 10 ) z_-_ z 10 ) z_--_ 1 • 10-8
We tooted theme Zsctors 88e_n|t sum much eXperteuoe as we could end we
concluded they yore • bit tough sInes even olrerstt which had good records
could usa meet then. We 1elf that this was probably beosuso in ostlnstlng
# 'catastrophe', honest people wore 1stood to be somewhat possim4sticp and
/ that aircraft did _ occasion survive Incidents which any prudent anelneer
would have paded cstastrophto. As • result we issued & paper _or d4scusston
with 1actors o_ 1/100 and 1/30_ to test u tt verse the tenpersture ot the
water,
I
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PDiscussion with the aircraft industry still left doubt whether these
figures were within the 8ta_e of the art. Fortunately, in the course of our
general work in dealing with incidents of a type which were potentially
catastrophic when they occurred but which could be expected to occur at a
lows unpredictable, 2requency (is of a type which have become to be described
as 'unlikely though possible') we had been developing the idea that they can
be dealt with hy ensuring that if the unpredictable low frequency event does
occur, there must be a 'reasonable* chance of a survival, enabling the
problem to be exposed and corrected so as to avoid any possibility of a second
occurrence. The choice of a number for such a 'chance' 1, arbitrary and
subjective and depends to some extent on the average risk applicable to the
'unpredictable' event, but we had concluded that a chance of survival of 19
out of 20 was not unreasonable.
Taking the above into account, it wag therefore decided we could reduce the
in 30 figure to 1 in 20 end the 1 in 100 to 1 in 60. It is this figure that
now appears in our Requirements. It is expected that it will result in
airworthiness risks in line with our target, but it cannot be too strongly
emphastsed that the risks are not intended to apply for the life o_ the
a_rcraft, but assume that IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVB ACTION WILL BE TAKEN SHOULD
ANY INCII_ENT OCCUR. There must be no question of continuous exposure, or o_
living ,_tth a problem once it is exposed.
Of course, we would be naive if we assumed that in roe'. Ix-to _atlures will
, cause debris like our model. We are not, and they won't. What we have done
is' created a requirement against which a non-subjective estimate of a design
can be made. It is no more likely to represent the exact truth than an
, aJrcratt £s likely to fly through a flock of exactly 4oz birds all perfectly
spaced at 1 per 50 sq in. We do feel the requirement will act as a _ood yJwd-
stick against which the non-contalnawnt danger can be assessed.
One or two further refinements serve to make the requirement complete :-
• (a) Dimensions. In many cases the debris will not be s_.opped
but will lead to what I call the infinite hole - that is
the part passes through all intervening structure. In this
came, the c_oee section area of the hole is important, and Can
of-course in theory be ag l_rgo am the section of the failed
rotor. Koaw as&in we have been arbitrary end assumed that
some blade bend_ng will take place and that aS a sea- the two
model pieces should be assigned maximum dimensions of R and _R
/ (R being the bladed disc radius) respectively. FIG 18 summarises
In pictorial fo_ the sort of analysis which results.
_., (b) Energy. We have made the eIIplli._ed assumption that the
prescribed ple_s will leers the eng£no with their fullp
theoretical, energy o£ translation intact. This means that we
have struck a rough balance between the cuing absorption and
the neglected energy of a_tation. I would be glad to have any
ideas Zor improvement on this l_ better generalised assumptions
" would be pz_ersble.
I
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(c) Averaging. Since the non-containnent rate used has br_a per
engine and not per disc, we are saying that a disc will fail
a'; the frequency quoted, but vo donet know which. It therefore
seemed fair to allow a certain 8mount of averaging in usess/ng
the overall risk, allowing a disc presont4ng a relatZ/ely high
vulnerability to be offset by one with a low potential. Further,
the sane sort of thinking seemed pozsLlaSiblo_ and is alloeed,
over the various phages of £1LKht, whereby the risk ehich varies
depending for example on whether the fusolJq_o is pressurised or
not can be avoraipsd over the various regimes provided the through
flight total moots the requirement.
(d) Dispersion. FIG 17 shoes a distribution Jade of paz_icle sizes
against the angle through which they had bo_n deflected during
their flight from the engine. We chose  3_or the 1/3rd disc
miss piece and + 6 ° _or the 8naller one.-- These may appear a
little on t_e snail side, but we _eol that do_lection is likely
to he greatest as the spud and onol_y d_ops_ and that the
degas/as energy is likely to be confined with 4n these liLttP
f
(e) Duplication. One last consideration conpletes the model.
Since we have Jettied for a stylised failure involving only single
_ pieces_ it is obvious that en automatic solution would be to /
duplicate eny vital part. To prevent this being poswtble in a
foolish way, va have added J further clause requiring consideration
of three pisces_ dispel_Jed a.andomly to each ethel% in l_spect of
duplicated irons only. The required factor Zor the 3 p: _ce cage hag
, been ad_Juated accordingly.
2O
SUIAR_
Prelmt turbine engine D_*e_tl/niInt| hlp]_ln too ta_l_lmntly £or
coI_ort, althouSh fortunately the _rld-_do _atIl accident levol
_roi th/_ caeso has not boon oxeosslvo.
6y t_r tl_ IaJoHty 02 ruth/no e_g/no /nduoml ICetdontl lto /n
non-_tainISnts. Id thmfo_ it tho II/no /nduIt_ ill to
c_tr/buto to /I_rOVld i/avorth/neij, this Am tlm probl_i it iust
tae_lo.
Bocl_io -
(8) tho erld-w/_ n_I-c_mti/nIont za_ ihovI no gII_
o£ d/i/nlsh/ng ov_P the l_t docado.
Co) tJ_re soems to be no lmoodtatoly obvious on_tnoor_J_
sw_ ._s _l_eh w/ll _tldItly load to • quick
• reduotion o£ /ncldaat8.
(¢) tbo w01Iht penalty ot totI_ ooa;I/nI_t 18 h/Ih,
the only _811d soluttma £or b /msod/st_ _utm _ to be to
p_owJLdo I Idlquatal lovol o£ i_oa_$t /nwiln_lbtlAty.
A
Th/s the _4£ hill attllIpted to lu_lLovo by /ntl_lla@_ 8 x_lu/_oIIimt
= u_a/._h it bollovos to bo obJoctlvo Ind eapIblO of rational saIlyg/s.
It cm bo Sppllod to nov dog£I_I without mduo ooooo_to psaalty I_d
v/11 euIblO an ac_optIblO lovol of i_mz_tnoJs to bo 8ch/ovod.
I
/
. l would liko to ths_t Oo G_i for porsissi_ to publish this papor. It
is oosvemtt_aal to dlssoolat_ _ao's mployors _rom may vim osprossed.
In this _so I In hippy to ss_ X do not hood to. I gould bo_vor osproel
s_ tkssks to all s_ oollosSuee who ka_ omtrtbu¢od _botbor dirootly or
,. tha_m_ t_oir aoa_al work, to _hstovo_ IOI_ th/s pspo_ Iay po_soss.
' •. , -
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i l?urn 2. - Debris circa 1975. 
Figure 3. - Comparison of Energy of Rotation of Engines wi th  Energy 
Rejected to Brakes on Abandoned Take-off. 
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F_ure 9. - Combined(World-Wide)& US(USARegister)EnginesTotal
Non-containmentRate(showingratesforturbinesandcompressors
separately).
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"ESGRIIq'IONOF FAILURE UK ENGINES USENGINES
% %
MATERIALDEFECTS 6 )
MANUFACTURINGDEFECTS 0 I 25
>. MISASSEMBLY 0 10
< HIGH CYCLEFATIGUE 33 )
:E ) iS
_., LOW CYCLEFATIGUE 9 )
a. COMBINATION HCF/LCF 3 )
OVERHAULFROCEDURES 16
OVB_TEMPERATURE 9 ))
FOREIGNOBJECTDAMAGE 3 )
,,, DETACHMENTDUESHAFTOR 3
< BOLTFAILURE 50
° iZ RUBBINGAGAINST STATICPARTS 9OU OVI_SPEEDING 3
.., au Iu_ HCFDUEELOCKAGE 6
NOTE: FORUSENGINES, 20_ 'UNKNOWN CAUSES'HAVEBEEN _.
ALLOCATEDIN THEABOVESUB'DIVISIONSIN THESAME
FROPORTIONASFORTHEKNOWN ONES.
Figure11 - Causesof DiscFailures.
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Figure14. - AcceptableAimorthinessSolutionsAgainstNon-containmentProblem.
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Figure17.- DeflectionfDebrisversusDebrisMass.
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DISCUSSION
Tom Horeff, _gA
Gordon, in your statistics you referred to 55 accidents due to power-
plant reasons, of which 75% involved engine non-containment, or roughly forty
in the period between 1966 and 1976. A rather simplistic view would be to say
four non-containments per year. You added that one in four non-containments
penetrates the cowl, or roughly one per year. My question, Gordon, is do you
have corresponding data for passenger fatalities pertaining to the non-contain-
ment cowl penetration accidents that you referred to?
G.L. Gunstone, CAA-UK
s
Well, I think that we have just a slight misunderstanding of my figures.
I know that it's been very unfair to push so many figures at you all at once
but there are copies of my paper available which I'm sure you'd like to study _,
later. What I would say, Tom, is that in my definition an accident is not 'i
necessarily a non-containment and a non-containment is not necessarily an
accident. An accident in the ICAO definition is one which causes a serious
w
injury to a passenger or substantial damage to an airplane, and there are very
many more non-containments than there are accidents. I think that goes part
way to answer your question. I have studied about a hundred million engine
• hours in the period taken, and in this hundred million engine hours (which
, could be perhaps 30 million aircraft hours) there have been 41 non-containment
accidents and three fatal non-containment accidents. I did not, in the charts
show those non-containments which did not become classified as accidents.
J.H. Enders, FAA
/ Gordon, I have a question that was posed by the "no-improvement" charts
T
you showed• I don't interpret thau data as implying that there has been no
' improvement in engine technology from a containment point of view. Rather,
the growth in engines: that is, the larger diameter and larger thrust engines
: have continually posed a tougher problem to the designer to solve, and he's
really improving in an absolute sense. To put it another way, he's really
keeping up with the problem, not letting it get worse. Now some people might
not agree with me, but truly the large diameter engine of today pose tougher
containment design problems than did the smaller aircraft engines of a decade
ago •
31
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G.L. Gu_stone, CAA-UK
I basically agree. But I think there is in all aircraft engine design
a process of "brinksmanship". That is to say you push the design as far as
you dare. Your constraints are economics, thrust, ...and so on, and you do
not (unfortunately) apply all of the knowledge which you've acquired from
previous experience to making an engine or aircraft safer. You use some of
it, but the rest goes into making it cheaper. It is a matter of some judgment
as to where the proper balance lies, and I was simply quoting what the facts
are.
: Could I just say, gentlemen, that I could bring only about 30 or so of
these papers with me. They are up there for distribution. If anybody can
easily share with a colleague I would ask him to do so for the moment. But
I will get a clip-board put next to them, and if anybody fails to get a copy
but would like one, if he will write his name and address I will have one ,
posted as soon as £ get back.
q
!
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!AIRCRAFT ENGINE CONTAINMENT -- SAE COMMITTEE FINDINGS
S. A. Sattar*, Chairman SAE Ad Hoc Committee
ABSTP_.uT
This presentation summarizes the study made by the Ad Hoc Committee
on aircraft turbine engine containment under the auspices of the SAE. The
committee is composed of individuals in the fields of engine and aircraft
design, and airline operation. The study was directed to commercial air-
craft service and covered the period from 1962 through 1975. The uncontained
rotor data were gathered and analyzed for their cause, the consequence of
failure, and mode of flight. The resulting aircraft damage for all the
incidents were categorized by degrees of damage ranging from just penetra-
tion of the affected nacelle to severe aircraft damage. The committee also
evaluated the penalties and benefits for aircraft systems to achieve greater
levels of containment.
b
_ Commercial Products Division, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group, United
Technologies, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108
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DISCUSSION
A. Holms, NASA-Lewis
How did you know which failures were high-cycle fatigue, and which were
low-cycle fatigue? How did you distinguish between types?
S. Sattar, P&W
Since there were four engine manufacturers represented on this committee,
we looked into our own data base and fixes that were finally _;rrived at for
these failures. We determined that these were high-cycle fatigue failures.
Some of that information is on the public record; the others, we were able to
get from the engine manufacturers on the committee.
J. Gausselin, Rockwell International
I noticed your study paralleled the National Transportation Safety Board's
study. I was going to ask you whether you have considered information in this ,
report in your study. I think you may have answered the question when y_u
remarked that your study showed that containing three blades was not a signifi-
cant improvement, and I believe this could be a controversial issue between you
and their conclusion, where they recommended that engine containment be improved
by going to the three-blade containment.
S. Sattar, P&W
I think that the coamittee's work on the effectiveness of increased contain-
ment, three blades as you pointed out, does come from the National Transportation
Safety Board and they refer to some aircraft manufacturer's report. We believe
that increased containment (for the 49 events which involved significant aircraft
i
/ damage) would have had insignificant improvement. We would be carrying 400 pounds
J
of weight for little improvement. We asked ourselves, what are we trying to
_, prevent?
Unknown Sgeaker
When the National Transportation SafeR" Board says that 3-blade containment
?
: should be done, they are actually requesting that the feasibility of this should be
investigated.
Those recommended measures would be effective to some degree.
34
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S. Sattar, P&W
I guess the other related con_uent that I could not make because of the
time limitations was that we also made a very gross estimate of what would be
required to contain a tri-hub disk failure. The answer was very similar to
what Mr. Gunstone said. It would be extremely large weight penalty .... 40 - 50%
weight. God knows wh_t other problems we would introduce in and around the
engine.
Don Haskell, Army-BRL
I don't know much about the aircraft engine rotor fragment containment
business but I want to ask a question. What was the basis for 400 Ibs. for
this containment? Was that done by avalysis, or test data, or how do you
arrive at that?
S. Sattar, P&W
It was done by analysis. Each manufacturer used its own design system
which, in all cases, is calibrated against testing different size fragments.
But it was done by us strictly on an analytical basis.
G. Gunstone, CAA-UK
Just eyeballing those numbers of yours, it seemed to me that about one
th__rd of the failures were attributed to quality control, misalignment, manufac-
turing defects, so on and so forth. Was there any attempt to correlate these
failures with a lea_lling curve? Is there any trend with calendar time in this
particular segment which accounts for roughly one-third of the total?
S. Sattar, P&W
I
/
-. We talked about it but, no, we didn't do that in the SAE study. If I may
._ wear a different hat right now. We had made such a study at P&W and have found i
that indeed there is a significant downward trend in terms of failures due to I
!
material defects primarily due to the quality control, vacuum melting, titanium
.:
and so on. Result: a significant downward trend. As a matter of fact, no
non-contained disk failure due to material defects has occurred in disks that
were shipped after 1967.
' 35
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Tom Sta_liano, MIT-ASRL
You looked at the problem of containing the three blades and two posts
and came up with a 400 pound weight by analysis. Did you look at t/me problem
of deflecting these blades and posts away from the area you're trying to
- protect, when they were not contained within the engine?
S. Sattar, P&W
No, we did not. We limited our study to the engine portion and the scope
that I showed you earlier was part of our work statement we had agreed upon.
We did not include that.
G. Gunstone, CAA-UK
We have bad to wait 20 years for data like this, and we need good data to
make good decisions. I would strongly recoHaend that you in this country consider
very carefully the possibility of creating a centralized source for this informa-
tion. The data can be made "nondimensional", in the sense that companies need
not be mentioned and also the type of engine need not be mentioned. We gain _
i "nothing by secrecy, in fact, we all lose by it. One of the big problems in
this overall problem is the lack of feedback. We need a permanent source of
accurate well-founded information from the engine and airframe oonstructcrs.
!
S° Sattar, P&W i
I think that this is a very good suggestion.
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ROTORBURSTPROTECTIONCRITERIAt' !MPLICATIONS
RALPH B, MCCORMICK
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY
- ABSTRACT-
Due to the high energycontentof the rotatingcompressorand the turbine
assembliesin a turbineengine,the possibilityof an engineburstwas
recognizedas a potentialhazardfromthe earliestdevelopmentdays. Recog-
nitionof the potentialfor engineburst has led to definitiveFAA certifica-
- tion regulationsand specificconsiderationsin the designof currentaircraft.
This designphilosophyis continuedtodayand historicallyprovedvery effec- /
tire. However,rotorburst protectionmust be consideredan importantelement
of overallaircraftsafetyand continuedeffortto reducethe frequencyand
_ minimizethe consequenceof non-containedrotorfailuresis justified. This
paperreviewscurrentaircraftdesignpracticesto minimizethe hazardfrom -'
rotorbursts,and discussesthe consequencesof non-containedenginefailures
and the impactof rotorburstprotectionsystemson aircraftdesign.
' t
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INTRODUCTION
The high energycontentof the rotatingcompressorand the turbineassemblies
in a turbineengineand the possibilityof an engineburstwas recognizedas
a potentialhazardto turbinepoweredaircraftfrom the earliestdevelopment
days. For this reason,the FAA has developedstringentregulationsfor engine
certificationwhich requiresspecialtestingto substantiaterotorintegrity.
Recognitionof thispotentialfor enginebursthas also led to definitiveFAA
certificationregulationsand specificconsiderationsin the designof current
aircraft.
This designphilosophyis continuedtodayand historicallyhas proved very
effective. The U. S. commercialair carrierrecordof one fatalityattributed
to non-containedrotorfrageentsin over 400 millionturbineenginehoursof
flyingshowsthat enginerotorfailureis, in fact,statisticallya very small
hazardto the welfareand safetyof commercialaircraftpassengers.
However,to furtherimproveflightsafety,it is necessaryto continuallylook
for meansof eliminatingor reducingthe potentialfor accidents,including
the non-containmentof turbineenginefragments. Considerationof the potential
hazardof an enginerotorburst is an importantfactorin overallaircraft
safetyand continuedeffortsto reducethe potentialhazardis warranted.
CURRENT DESIGN PRACTICES
I
Althoughconsiderableeffortis beingexpendedby enginemanufacturersto reduce
the numberof enginerotorfailures,it is believedthat the ratewill not be
• reduced to zero. Rotor failures may continue to occur at a rate near the
current level of approximately one non-contained failure pet million engine
hours. Therefore, continued effort to minimize the hazard to the aircraft of
non-contained engine fragments is required. !
Currentdesignpracticesto minimizeti:ishazardincludeconfiguringthe air-
craft to reduce the risk of: (1) loss o_ additional thrust, _2) fuel fed
fires, (3) loss of critical systems, and (4) loss of structural integrity.
These objectives are accomplished by: (1) controlling the relative location
and spacing of engines and critical systems, (2) use of redundant systems,
(3) use of dual load path structure, and (4) use of fire protection systems.
/ In addition,where configurationpeculiarityindicates,considerationis given
to special shielding of critical components. The application of these concepts f
is of course very dependent upon the basic airplane configuration. The success
:' of this design approach is a matter of record. ,
CONSEQUENCEOF AN ENGINE BURST
Boeing has recently completed a study to identify the consequenceof engine
non-contained failures and to determine if there is a correlation between damage
i 38
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severityand fragmenttype. Infomationon aircraftdamageresultingfrom
non-containedenginefragmentswas obtainedfromFAA,NTSB,and CAA reports
{ReferencesI through5). All currentBoeingaircraftmodelswereincludedin
the studyas wellas availabledataon DC-8,DC-9,DC-IO,CV880,cvggo,and
L-lOllaircraft.Damagedatawerecollectedon 366jet enginenon-containments
thatoccurredbetweenJanuary1964and February1976.
For thisstudy,"non-containment"was definedas the releaseof inte_l parts
of an enginewithsufficientforceto punctureor splitthe engineoutercase
withor withoutfragmentspassingthroughthe case. _nerally,non-containments
thatinvolvefragmentsthatexitthe nacellewiththe potentialto damage
aircraftstructureotherthanthe affectednacelleareof primaryconcern.
However,the broaddefinitionof non-containmentusedin thisstudywas selected
to giveconsiderationtoall non-containedoccurrences.
Variousotherstudies{References6 and 7) haveexaminednon-containedengine
failuresfromthe standpointof the causeof failure. The Boeingstudywas an
atteq_tto analyzethe consequenceof non-containedfailureswithrespectto
the hazardto the aircraftand its passengers.Sinceall commercialaircraft
certified underFARPart 25 are capable of continued safe operation after the d
loss of thrust from one engine during any phase of flight, this study was
concernedwith damageto the aircraft other than the affected nacelle.
A methodwasdevelopedwhich attempted to relate the aircraft damagecausedby ,'
an engine non-containment to the potential hazard to the aircraft resulting from
that damageand to the class of fragment causing the damage. The method
generated a "relative damageseverity rating" for each occurrence. This rating !
was in the form of a numberby which the hazard associated with one occurrence .
could be comparedto that of another occurrence. The rating has no absolute ( _
meaning. It was offered only as an aid in relating occurrences to each other.
The relative damageseverity rating is a subjective measureof what could have
happenedin a particular occurrence, given the actual damagecausedby the |
. engine non-containment. Thus, it is a meansof identifying the potential
hazard. Since it is subjective, each occurrence could be rated differently by
different analysts. However, it was felt that by applying the samecriteria
by the sameanalyst to all occurrences, a reasonable picture of the criticality
could be obtained. After the numerical values for the relative damageseverity
were determined for each occurrence, the data were divided into four general
categories shownin Table 1. It is apparent that Categories 1 and 2 damage
severity presents no hazard to the welfare and safety of the commercialairline
/ passenger. It is also apparent that if a meaningful reduction in the hazard
/ to the aircraftfrom non-contained rotor failureis to be achieved, Categories
3 and 4 type damagemust be significantly reduced.
3
It should be recognized that Boeing has no first handknowledgeof the vast
majority of these occurrencesandwhile for purposesof this study the informa-
tion reported and the conclusions Peachedby the investigating authority or
; operator involved are assumedto be correct, they maynot be so.
The results of the study are summarizedin Figure 1. Of the 366 non-contained
occurrencesclassified, 283 were judged to have causedminor damageseverity,
53 moderatedamageseverity, 19 significant damge severity, and 11 extreme
39
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damage severity. These data indicatethat a relativelysmall percentageof
engine non-containedfailuresresult in significantor extreme damage severity.
Only limited data was availablecovering the number of blades released,the
size of the rim or disk segmentor how many pieces were involvedin a failure.
For this reason only general categoriesof fragmentsize were used in plotting
the data. The fragmentcategoriesused are: single blade, multiple blades,
rim segments,and disk segments. Only occurrenceswhere measurableaircraft
damage occurred and where the fragmentclass was known are plotted. The
figure shows that the majorityof non-containedoccurrenceswith high damage
severity ratings (significantor extreme) involved large fragmentswith high
energy levels (rim or disk segments)while very few smaller fragments•(blades)
were involved in significantor extreme damage severity. Thus to measurably
reduce the hazard of non-containedrotor fai'uresby the use of containment
would requirecontainmentof the majorityof the large high energy fragments.
These analyses indicatedthat the majority of non-containedengine bursts released
fragmentswith relativelylow energy levels. Although the installationof
increasedcontainmentcapabilitycould significantlyreduce the number of non-
containedengine bursts to which the aircraft structureand system are exposed,
reducingthe number of non-containedburst does not directly imply an equivalent
reductionin hazard to the aircraft. The hazard to the aircraft is a function
of fragmentsize and energy. Containmentof only the low energy fragments
would not significantlyreduce the hazard to the aircraft and could result
in a significantweight penalty.
' IMPACT OF .ENGINE BURST PROTECTION
'
Substantialdesign effort has been expended by aircraft companiesto retain a
high degree of flight safety and at the same time minimizethe penaltiesto
the aircraftdue to current design practicesfor engine burst protection. Any
considerationof changes to the current design practices,such as increasing
the containmentcapabilitymust be evaluatedon the basis of overall improvement
in flight safety. The impact on air carrieroperatingcost must also be deter-
mined.
Improvingthe engine fragmentcontainmentcapabilityor providingdeflection
capabilityin order to further protect vital aircraft areas impacts almost a11
aspectsof aircraftdesign. The impact could include: nacelleweight,
airframeweight, nacelle performance,nacelle and engine thermalbalance, engine
maintainability,aircraftweight and balanceand aircraftstructure including
/ flutter. The amount of impact is dependent upon the configuration and the
design of the specificaircraftbeing considered.
Increasing the containment capability presents an additional problem. Containing
fragments within the engine case can cause increased damageto the rotor system
and cause the release of more and larger fragments. This in turn could result
in a greater hazard t.o the aircraft than the release of the initial fragment.
.
CONCLUSIONS
The Boeing study of non-contained turbine engine rotor failures resulted in the
fol 1owtn9 concl usi ons:
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1. Current design practices to: (1) reduce the numberof turbine
engine rotor failures, and (2) to minimize the hazard of a
rotor failure to the aircraft has resulted in an outstanding
safety record.
2. There was significant or extreme damageseverity to individual
aircraft in a relatively small percentageof engine non-contain-
ments.
3. The majority of non-containedoccurrenceswith high damage
severity ratings (significant or extreme) involved large fragments
(rim or disk segments)with high energy levels. Containmentof
only low energy fragments (blades) would not have significantly
reducedthe hazard to the aircraft.
4. Any measureto reduce the hazard of non-contained engine fragments
must be evaluated in terms of overall aircraft safety. In addition,
economiceffects must be evaluated.
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DISCUSSION
E. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
Ralph, you talked about the occurrence of secondary damage that might
develop as the result of primary fragment release. Are you suggesting that
perhaps the use of deflectors rather than containers might be a preferable
alternative?
R. McCormick, Boeing
I didn't mean to imply that. I suppose that may be a consideration.
I intended to suggest that perhaps small fragments would do less damage by
exiting out than if we contained them in the engine.
Unknown Questioner
Are you in a position to do more of a systems study of the effect of
containment on these items that you talked about: flutter, increased weight,
fuel consumption, those sorts of things?
R. McCormick, Boeing
We haven't done that type of study because we haven't looked at a
containment system installation in an aircraft and we have no immediate
plans to do so.
J
J
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ENGINE NON-CONTAINMENT -- UK RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS
J. C. Wallin
Chief Propulsion Engineer
British Aircraft Corporation
Commercial Airplane Division
SUMMARY
L
In order to establish compliance with recent changes to British Civil Air-
worthiness Requirements it has been necessary to develop methodology for
assessment of catastrophic risks resulting from uncontained turbine engine
rotors.
The methodology was developed during the course of the Concorde SST certifi-
cation programme, utilising an engine failure model for the Olympus 593.
[[
In essence this work is applicable to any aircraft type, but it has been
established that some of the data used produces unrealistically pessimistic
assessments.
Work continues to develop realistic guideline data for use in these assess-
ments, which can be used for future aircraft design.
i
, /r
r,_.%
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1 • Introduction
Gordon Gunstone in his paper "Engine Non Containment -
The U.K.C.A.A. View" has explained the thinking which has
led to the latest British Civil Airworthiness Requirement
in respect of en_.lne non-containment hazards.
Alan,s.ida this one has had to develop nmuerlc methodology by
the use of which compliance with the requirement can be shown.
As will be appreciated new requirements cannot be imposed
overnight, and in fact the present B.C.A._. Is the culmination
of some years of Joint work between CAA an_ the British Aircraft
industry, so that the methodoloKy has tend_t to be developed
alongside the developing requirement.
Beinc a numeric method, somewhat greater precision can be given
to answering the question ',where should minimising the risk atop?"
However it must be emphasised that a numeric answer is an aid to •
engineering Judgement and can never entirely replace it. For
_. example, if an assessment showed compliance with B.C.A.R., but
one particular risk, which could be reduced without excessive.
penalties, constituted a major part of the total risk, it would
be expected that design action to reduce this risk would be
taken.
_- A sugary of the foregoing appe_s in Figure |.
It oannot today be claimed that the methods are perfect and
indeed considerably more work is required to establish _
_tlsfaotory dat.8 values in certain areas which require the ' '
use of Judgements. However it Is hop_fully of interest to i
members of the workshop to have some idea of the present
position, i
2, Bapk_round : 1
I
The current B.C.A.R, Is summarised in FigUre 2, and employs a 1
relatively elmpl& failure model.
This was not always the case, and the story of the practical
development of the new requirement and its associated
methodology really began with the Concords, Here, because of
•. the relatively unorthodox layout of the aircraft, the degree of
hazard minimising required for parity with subsonic types was
'_ not _uediately obvious. Additionally, _Lthough the aircraft
, in its conception In 1962 had accounted for the possibility of
1_ _ J turbine rupture, accumulating evidence over the years indicated
the necessity for considering compressor debris as well. Not
unnaturally argument developed between the conetruoters and the :
: ARE (88 the CAA then was) as to the reqtdred precautions. Since
numerical methods of airworthiness analysis were a fundamental
wt of Concords certification, it seemed logical to extend
•; this to consideration of engine non-contalnment risks. It was
therefore a_reed to mike an assessment auslnst an en_rlne failure
model to be derived by Rolls-Royce as the most probable failure
dolzia b@sed on previous non-containment experience and the
knowledge of the Olyopus construction. "/'his resulted in the
Bodel shown in Fi_twe 3, which took throe years and numerous
meotln_s to producer
The requirement was that the probability of catastrop.,e
should not be worse than 10 °8 per aircraft hour, and in
order to achieve this a number of changes were made to the
aircraft, primarily as a result of the inclusion of
compressor debris. These changes are shown in Figure 4 and 5
the former indicating the armour plate necessary to prevent
penetration of the fuel tanks and the latter showing systems
layout and fire precautions modl.icat_.ons.
It will be noted tlmt the model 4id not include _ compressor
disc pieces, since at the time the model was agreed, no
Rolls-Royce axial engine had ever had a major compressor
disintegration. Subsequent events, however, led CAA to review
the situation and to require an assessment of the effect of the
random release of two _ compressor disc pieces. Since there
were insufficient statistics to define the probability of the
event, it was not possible to include these pieces in the model,
and a new requirement criterion had to be developed. At this
;" stage, a requirement akin to the present DCAR was introduced
for the compressor _ disc pieces, such that the probability of
catastrophe per event, averaged across the flight should not
be worse than a given number. Originally CAA would have liked
to see I in 20, but this was not possible to achieve, the actual
_- value being something like half of this. Ilowever an assesmnent, :
by the same methods and to the same standards, of 8 number of
established aircraft showed that these aircraft had no better
probability of catastrophe, and In some cases considerably worse.
It was therefore apparent that parity at least with olLrrent
aircraft types was established.
The final result of this effort, over a period of some six years
; was 8 certification report two inches thick and working
doctunentation and drawings occupying over 50 cubic feet.
In retrospect this model was probably much too complicated and
the precautions taken would have been similar had today's DCAR
model been used, since _ disc pieces and disc rim fragments
dominated the exercise. Nevertheless it did result in the
development of methodology which with further refinement can
be applied to any aircraft.
3. tlethodolo_
.--*/ 3.1, Basic Work
,_ The lniUal stages of the mss essnent consist of the
following steps,
8) _tabllah a hazard tree (Flt_wo 6). This will
_ _ essentially be the same for all aircraft, but
my vary In detail, particularly where methods
of operation of flying controls differ.
b) Establish debris slze for each st4qTe of the
enBlnt (Figure 7),
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c) Draw plan view of fly off zone (Figure 8) for
each stake, identifying potential risk items
(e.g. systems, fuel tanks, other engines etc.)
d) Draw section through fly off zone (Figure 9)
establishing _.isk angles for each item potentially
at risk. It is assumc_i that _ disc pieces will not
be stopped, but in the case of the disc rim pieces,
structural analysis is required to determine whether
at some structural interface the piece will be
stopped. The example in Figure 10 shows that engine
controls and fuel tank Are potentially at risk but
that flying controls and electrtcs _re not.
3.2. Data and Assumptions
3.2.1. Flight Phases
It will be remembered that the hazard assessment ,
is avL._ra_ed throughout the flight, and there will
be some risks which are onlT present during certain _'
phases of flight. Hence it Is necessary to break
: d_m the flight to well defined phases, and while
this breakdown could vary with the aircraft mission, ,_
it )ms been found so far that th._ three phases ,_.
shown in Ftf_are 11 are suitable for Jet transport
types, r.
3.2.2. Fa!lure distribution b_ fl!_ht phase _,
In assessing the overall risks it is necessary _
to consider the percentage of failures occurring
In each phase. In practice this can only be
established statistically and Fibre 12 show: 4
the values obtained from three sources. So far, [
in DAC's assessments, the Eolls-_oyco values have
been used_ but these are identical with HTSB for ?
'- the phases In use. CAAts analysis gives a sllchtly
higher weighting to the take-off phase and some
' re-thinking here may be necessary.
/ 3.2.3. Guidelines
In conslderin_ the potential hs:ards froa
,:, lnd'.vldual contributory factors, some 1terns can
. be dealt with as matters of fact. For example in
. systems areas the design of the aircraft will *
establish clearly whether a catastrophe can or
: cannot occur due to the lois of a given system
or systems.
In other areas, notably loss of adoqtmte thrust,
fire, and structural dlmaRo an element of Judgment
Is required. In these cacao guidelines have been
discussed and provisionally agreed with CAA.
1978002125-054
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3.2.4. Loss of adequate thrust
Figure 13 shows the probability of catastrophe
(i.e. of not being able to land the aircraft
safely) for the loss oi multiple engines.
Apparent inconsistencies will be noted, and
these have resulted from CAAFli_ht Department
knowledge of the handling of the particular
aircraft types considered. It is thought that ,
for design assessment of new types, a more
conslstent set of nunbor, needs to be established.
3.2.5. Fire Hazards
Figure 34 shows the factors considered in establishinR
. fire hazards. In this IR. the ignition probability
is a powerful factor and Figure 15 Elves the CAA
guideline values.
3.2.6. Structural damage /
Figure 16 shows the CAA guideline Ior the minimum
static ultimate strength requirement to be used
in considerin_ the size of catastrophic holes in _!
primary structure. |
3.3. Calculations
I_ving completed the basic work of section 3._. .
(establishing the risk angle) and assessed the risk
factor for each hazard, using where appropriate, the
assumptions from section 3.2., it is now possible to
draw for each flight phase and each stage a diagram of
risk an_le versus risk factor as shown in Figure |7.
" (In practice it will probably be found that one dia,.oram {covera several s'_ages, all producing the same angles
and factors.)
The individual risks are then summed aa shown at the
bottom of the figure, usinR success theory for summing
_ overlapping risks, I.e.
Thereafter the averaging method shown on Figure 18,
_, will result in the mean catastrophic risk to the 0
air_._aft across a typical flight mission.
t
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4. Results
In _rder to validate the above Methods and assumptions, BAC have
been analysing a range of current aircraft to evaluate the
catastrophic risk level due to _ disc pieces. The results appear
on Figure 19, and are indeed surprising, with risks varying from
| in 6.9 for an under_In_, narrowbody twin to ! in 27..8 for •
wldebody trijet, with only two of the types considered meeting
BCAR'.
The actual in-se_vlce world wide record derived from the number of
fatal accidents compared with the n.mber of major disc releases
gives • value of •pprox/utely i In 30. In can be argued therefore
that current sutrcraft on average nust in practice be complying with
BCAR, and hence the •ssesl,_ents must be pesshnistlc.
Work is contlnuinc to Id_.ntlfy and study the areas of pessimism,
with the objective of modifying the _uldellnes where necessary.
PJ an end result it is hoped to a_ree a set of realistic ground
rules with CAA wh/ch wall be suitable for future aircraft design
_/_ t.
Reference to FiL_u'e 19 w_ll show tht the most recurrin_ major
ceataributory factors awe structural damage and f/ros, and hence
thue are receiv/ng aider attention.
W/th particular regard to crltlc&t cut le_rths-in fuselage
structure, work Is leading to a more sophisticated mmlysis of
. the reslduat structural strength based on the fracture toughness
of the skin uaterial and the ncatn&t ix/a1 stress before dan•Re
(_e 20).
Even this may still be pess/aimtlc /n meeting the requ/rement of
F/guts 16, sud I_n'l_ps this requlrmeet should be further
queSt.toned. WhO, for example, cu the basis of analysis, vmuld
Imve believed that the sdz_att shown in Fipwe 25 could have
suffered this amount of _ and surv/ved - but it did;
6. Coe_.lLuslon s
IXethadolo,#,y has been estsbllshed to uselm the cstastrophl¢
risks froo oncontaJned rotor debris, but furth_ _k Is
requ/red to re_ine the lmmmpticms use_ so an to brin_ the
• results into accord with the known _aots. Whe_ this is
/ done it should be possible, us/n_ _reod standards of
/ 18Be•murat, to [_oduce cost e_fective desiEn I_e_suti_-s
a_s/nst rotor fs/lure on future a/z_r&ft types.
AmmledXm,,t.,
11_ author vish_ to ths_ British _ir_ft _ti_
for permission to _tve this _, and oollm_ues,
J_rticulawly !11". B. Tufn@ll. for h_p in i_ _l_ticu.
Op/nions expressedawethose of the auth_ and do not
neousm'ily :qremt the _lew of British Ail_att Cmqxwatlcu.
so
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• °
O METHODOLOGY DEVELOPED TO MEET
NEW CAA REQUIREMENTS.
• GIVES MORE PRECISION TO SAFETY
ASSESSMENT- BUT"
@ DOES NOT REPLACE ENGINEERING
JUDGEMENT.
Figure1. - EngineNon-containmentU.K. RiskAssessmentMethods.
DEBRIS ACCEPTABLE_ N° SPREAD
TYPE CATASTROPHIC OF ANGLE MASS REMARKS ,
RISK LEVEL PIECES
TRANSLATIONAL
ONE-THIRD ONE-THIRD ENERGY(NEGLECTING
DISC 1 in 20 1 ° 3"- BLADEDDISC ROTATIONALENERGY}
FRAGMENT MASS.
GREATEROF_)_
DISC RIM BLADED ISC TRANSLATIONAL
PIECE 1in 60 1 _-5" HASSORMASS E_ERGY(NEGLECTINGDFTWOBLAOESROTA_ONALENERGY}
WITH ROOTS
APPLICABLE10 OUPLICATEO
MULTIPLEONE- AS FORSINGLEORMULTIPUCATEDSYSTEMS
THIRD DISC 1in 10 3 -_3" ONE-THIRD ONLY.ENERGYASDEFINED
/ FRAGMENTS DISCFRAGMENTFORSINGLEONE-THIRD
_, DISC FRAGMENT.
E
_- 1, AVERAGE OFALL DISCS & ALL ENGINES ACROSSTYPICAL
FLIGHT PLAN.
2.NO SINGLE DISC MUST HAVE RISK GREATER THAN
:" TWICE THE REQUIREDAVERAGE RISK.
FigureZ - BCAREngineFailureModel.
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DEBRIS L'ONTRIBUTION
TYPE HOURS REMARKS
1. EQUAL PROBABILITYOVER
/3 BLADED DISC 360"
TRANSLATIONAL ENERGY
RIM PIECE8 BLADES
MINOR DISC SIZE g ENERGY VALUE
FRAGMENTS DEFIr.IEOFOR EACH STAGE
TURBINE BLADES
[HIGH ENERGY) MAX BLADE Fr,"_3Y
BLADES 55"/.0; NAX BLADE
(LOW ENERGY} ENERGY
MULTIPLE
BLADES BLADES I00"/.ENERGY
DISC RIM RIM PIECEgBLADES WITH
ENERGY VALUE
i PIECE FOR EACH STAGE
COMPRESSORI _--_S MAX BLADE ENERGY
I BLADES 55"1. OF MAX BLADE
(LOW ENERGY ENERGY
Figuret - Olympus593FailureModel.
,,,_----NACELLE SIDEWALL ARMOUR.
• Ft_'E .Y
... .... " • .
PROTECTIONOF FUEL PROTECTION OF HYDRAULIC
TANKSAND SYSTEM. BAYAND FLYING ODNTROLS.
Figure4. - Concorde-ArmourPlate.
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GREN/YELLOW HYORAUUCS_ _SEGN.OFiES _NTIAL7 ..,rBU._ELLOW HVDRAUUCS.
, I_,,L__E.LEClO3LES-.%,(I.,K'XI--
/_,, I.,,,_ " __1 I- " '%. I_, I "
HYDRAULIC_N
FUEl. $.0. VALVES_ SYSTEMPIPE.
' DUPLICATEDELECTRICS /HvrI_m'rF_'HOUTEE/ r--|NTUIWESCE'NT PAINT ON COVERS
TC_ SHUT-C_V_VES. / -,::__E_" _ FJe'n.u_mINTS0_ WI_\. LOWER SKIN PANELS.
SECONI:_ AIR I:X)_S.. ; /._./,F;RE EXTINGUI:_IERS I __J,L_ II . _._,"" _ ,.I.L" .
RESINFIBRE- A | I J:
" - GLASS_r.AJ..ING_I _ " _--I,,,--._ I'_IlIlI_'_NT
w.v_ IN ..I...II./I.PANELS(lOP
MATERIAL OF FLYING_ DEPTH
Cgl4_S (}IANGED rJiOiNAiR ISOLATION IMPFiOVlEO_J_UNG TITANIUM SFJ_ING
TO TITANIUM. V.lU.VIE(CLOSEOBY INT_T i:_INT. PAIxELS. _.THERMOSWITCH} N3DED
IN EACH AIR SI._Y
LINE. FIRE PRECAUTIONS
, SYSTEMS
o
Figure5. - Concorde- DesignPrecautionstoMinimiseRdorFailureDamage_
4
I
I I I II---I '--
I . I
I I I ! I'_
' _ 10a_C,E_I0_,_'_:,E1OI
IC0m'_.$]iBC_USTI
•
Figure5. - EngineRotorFailure- HazardTree.
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, f',l.;;,
r- BLADED DISC RADIUS
_ _
hr
r
_13 DISC PIECE DiSC RIM PIECE
Figure7. - BCARDebris.
4
ELEVA'IOR(1) ENGINE CONTROLS.
• FuEL_ '
, i
/ .
/
pLANVIEWOF
; REAR FUSELAGE. HYDRAULICS
I
Figure8. - TypicalFlyOffZone.
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• oQ.
ANGLE OF
IITEM AT RISK. EMISSION.
!ENGINE. 85"- 100"
ICONTROLS 99"-113"(FLYING -ENGINE]
s3:,62".oneSTRUCTURE STRUCTURE 126-_39
o"
ENGINE
STRUCTURE
Figure9. - DebrisTrajectories.
!
ENER6YINSUFFIENTTO PEIETRATE I
a .__D_/_ "_ _-_1_
Figure1(1 - StructurallyUmit=lTrajectory.
=
"___._,,_!_. _._:... , ;, .• " " """ " ? . &,_L;_ _ i," _. .,4
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1. TAKE OFF -START OF ROLL TO V1
2. TAKE OFF-V 1 TO 1.500 FT.
3. POST TAKE OFF-1500 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.
Figure1L - FlightPhaseBreakdown.
.2s'1.' 2_.1. .-I. 24"1. 9"1. 5'1. IJ ®] i " '
. 51"1, 49"1, j N.T.S.B.
55'1, /,5"/, C A.A.• 35"1, , 20"!, 22"/, 14 1, 3°1, 6"1, @
! i1
• : -.2Ji1 ,A;;'.'.;;'-;" i.....: - --- REDUCTION.Vz YR ,
TAKE" OFF CLIMB CRUISE 3ESCENT N:t:I_ACHi
(_ ROLLS'ROYCE ENGINES ( 195¢'1970 STATISTICS)
:. (_ X.l".S.S. REPORT NTSB- AAS- 74 -4.
(_) CAA-GUNSTON, "ENGINE NON CONTAZNMENT" THE UK CAA view."
Figure17. - Distributionof UncontainedFailuresOverFlightPhases.
i
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QNOOF ENGINESLOST
FLIGHT PHASE AICRAFT TYPE1 2 3 4
0 TO Vl 0 0 REAR OR UNDERWING
V1 TO 1,500FT 0 -7 ENGINED TWIN-JET.
POST 1,500FT 0 -6
u
0 TO V1 0 0 0
Vt TO 1,500FT 0 .4 -85 REAR ENGINED TRI-JET
POST 1,500FT 0 0 •75
0 TO V1 0 0 0 0
V1 TO 750FT 0 .8 -8 .8 FOURREARMOUNTED
750 TO 150OFT 0 -2 -5 -8 ENGINES.
POST 1500 FT 0 O "2 -7
0 TO VI 0 O N/A 0
VI TO 1,500FT 0 -25 N/A "7 FOUR UNDERWING PODDED
POST 1.500FT 0 0 N/A "6 ENGINES.
Figure13. - RiskFactorsfor LossofThrusL (Expressedasa fractionoft )
. /
RISK
FLIGHT_ TM TR IR HR LR ER
PHASE
GROUND ROLL
TO VI
V1 TO 1,500FT
POST 1,500 FT
4
_- TR = PROPORTIONOF FLIGHT PHASE THATFUEL IS PRESENTIN PENETRATED
; TANK.
IR " IGNITION PROBABILITY.
HR = PROBABILITYOFFIRE SITUATIONBECOMINGPOTENTIALLYC_TOSTROPHIC.
LR - PROBABILITYOF NOT LANDINGSAFELYAND EVACUATINGPASSENGERS
WITH POTENTIALLYCATASTROPHICFIRE. '
_" ER ="PROBABILITYOFA CATASTROPHICEXPLOSIONAT INSTANT OF
" PENETRATION= IR X STRUCTURALRESISTANCETO OVERPRESSURE.
PROBABIUTYOF CATASTROPHE=(TR x IR x HRX LR) + ER
, Figure14. - RiskFactorsforFuelTankFireandExplosion.
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AUTAGt Ip"
FUEL 2' " . -f/in2) ,
PIPE-'_ _ [ I REP' - ,,,'O0"F(37.8C)PYLON3_ DRY I I 60 , ", / _ AVTURIJFI)
: \/ I _ 1"0kN(0'151b_.in2) .
F_-E _--'..j I"_, \ _ \REID VPat 100°F(378C)(A_)P"P'_ENETRATING _ ,_', \ _/ ,._ \/
-. DEBRIS o40 ,\_/--/.l>"_"', _/?/'._ _'\
FUEL TEMP ABOVE LOWER FLAMMABILITY o :_._!/. ':/:.__\ k
(
LIMIT FOR VAPOURASSUME80), 830 l_'l"'l" " _l --_'_"/_\ \
PROBABILITY OF FIRE. _ i_ i _6_,_'_i .!i/'...._"FUEL TEMP WITHIN MIST REGION _2o " -
ASSUME 5"/.PROBABILITY OF FIRE AT '.,'_k'[C,_/ _,,,_,"_ \
-50"C RISING LINEARLY TO 80"/.AT 10 I,".T,C,_<'\-", _(c>/',_ \
=." "1".".'< ,.'.." //v ,,-.,\ \ ,
LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT FOR IK_, _"._ /./Y __/-'/\ \C__.", .,_i._, , , ,_, , ,
VAPOUR. -60 -30 0 50 100
FUEL TEMP {'C)
FLAMMIBILITY LIMITS FOR F'UEL VAPOUR AND MIST
DRY _-'.'VAF_LIF_ "":". :-,_" I".:;.::'[.i':"...'_:_'I'._I"::V._.'._R._:.:._:.:.T!
............ ... i.__.::.:_ _.:_ eT-_q
- !- I_IEL.'__:'Z- (_
FUEL TEMP WITHIN FLAMMABILITY LIMITS FOR
FUEL TEMP WITHIN FLAMMABILITY VAPOUR AND DEBRIS PENETRATES TANK BELOW
LIMITS FOR VAPOUR AND DEBRIS FUEL SURFACEANp PASSES THROUGH ULLAGE
PENETRATES ULLAGE SPACE WITHOUT SPACE.ASSUME 70LPROBABILITYOF EXPLOSION.
PASSING THROUGH FUEL. ASSUME gO'/. :--FUEL TEMP IS WITHIN MIST REGION ASSUMEE-/_PROBABILITY OF AN EXPLOSION AT-50"C
PROBABILITY OF AN EXPLOSION. RISING LINEARLY TO 70"I.AT LOWER
FLAMMABILITY LIMIT FOR VAPOUR.
Figure 15. - Ignition RiskFactors, IR.
A. 70_/.LIMIT FLIGHT MANOEUVERING LOAD.
.. 20 FT//SECEAS GUST (VERTICALOR LATERAL)AT Vc
_' COMBINED WITH MAXIMUM CABIN DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE (PLUS AERODYNAMIC SUCTION).
B. 1.1 (MAXIMUM NORMAL CABIN DIFFERENTIAL
_-. PRESSURE AT TIME OF INCIDENT PLUS AERODYNAMIC
SUCTION) PLUS Ig FLIGHT LOAD FREEDOM FROM
FLUTTERUP TO Vc.
Figure16.- MinimumStaticUltimateStrengthRequirement
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HAZARD 0" 30" 60" 90" 120" 150" 180"
FLYING CONTROLS
IN FUSELAGE.
FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL
RISK.
WING STRUCTURAL
RISK.
FIN AND RUDDER
STRUCTURALRISK.
FLYING TAIL
STRUCTURALRISK.
INTER ENGINE
EFFECTS.
ENGINE CONTROLS.
FUEL TANK FIRES.
a
t
f
SUMMATIONOF OVERLAPPING
RI.SKS.BYSUCCESSTHEORY
{1-(_-F,)(1-F_)--} ,',
EG 1-(1-0"4}(1-0.05)
' 1-('6 X95) ='43 60" INBOARD_ J
Figure1?. - HazardSummaryDiagram.
FOR EACH ENGINE STAGEIN EACH FLIGHT PHASE
• DERIVE POTENTIALLYCATASTROPHICANGLES(oC)FOR EACH HAZARD.
• DERIVE.RISK FACTOR(F) FOR EACH HAZARD. 4
• CALCULATECOMBINEDRISK FACTOR(Csp] FORTHE PHASE AND AVERAGE t-
OVER 360"(n RISKS) !
c_=Dpx(=,F,,d,F,....=.Fn) Dp=PHASEF_LUREnISTR_nON
THE.___.NN
• SUM COMBINEDRISK FACTORFORTHE STAGEOVER THE TOTALFLIGHT
' ('P'PHASES) TO OBTAINOVERALL STAGERISK(Cs}.
;_' i CS = CSP14"CsP2.... CSPp
': ,_ • AVERAGEALL STAGESOVER THE TOTALENGINE('S'STAGES)10 OBTAIN
_ MEAN ENGINE RISK(Cs)
,, CE= Csl+ Csz..... Css
* " S
" • AVERAGEALL ENGINES OVER THE NRCRAFT(E'EN6INES) TO OBTAIN
MEAN AIRCRAFT RISK (CA)
:. CA = CE1 "1"CE2.... CEE
E
FigureI& - EngineRdorFailure- RbkEvaluation.
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CATASTFC.aHIC
AIRCRAFT TYPE R!SK RATIO MAJOR CONTRIBUTARY FACTORS.
TWO REAR ENGINES - ,Ct. LOSS OF ADEQUATE THRUST.
:1 IN 23.3 ;
NARROWBODY "2.FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TWO UNDERWlNG ENGINES- il. FUEL TANK FIRES.
NARROWBODY 1 IN 6"9
THREE REAR ENGINES - 1. FUSELAGE/FIN STRUCTURALDAMAGE
I IN 9'2 2.FIRE.
NARROWBODY 3.LOSS OF ADEQUATE THRUST.
FOUR REAR ENGINES - I.LOSS OF ADEQUATE THRUST.
I IN 12'?
NARROWBODY
FOUR UNDERWING ENGINES- I.WING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
1 IN 15.8
NARROWBODY 2. FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
ONE REAR, TWO iJNDERWlNG ,,---,--,/-,--,-.,-,-,-,,,1.FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
E._GINES- WIDE BODY I IN 2?'8 _'2.WING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
FOUR UNDERWING ENGINES 1.WING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
1 IN 15.9
WIDE BODY 2. FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, :
STATISTICS 1 ZN 30 I
Figure19.- Summaryof BACAssessmentsforSingle113DiscPiece.
AN APPROXIMATION OF CRITICAL CRACK LENGTH FOR
CATASTROPHIC CIRCUMFERENTIAL FUSELAGE DAMAGE IS
GIVEN BY THE FOLLOWING, AND HAY BE USED FOR
CRACKS OF UP TO 100 INCHES IN LENGTH.
2
,,. CRACK LENGTH 2ac= 2 (I.74Kc )
"IT 5
WHERE Kc=FRACTURE TOUGHNESS OF SKIN MAT LI,
:-, 6 = NOMINAL AXIAL STRESS BEFORE
_; DAMAGE UNDER CRITICAL LOADING
CASE
Figure20. - Catastrophic113DiscFuselageDamage.
' 6O
I,
I
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Figure 21. - Fuselage Damage - BAC 1-11. 
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DISCUSSION
John Meaney, Rohr
I have a question on the armor plate slide that you showed on the
Concorde. What material is that and what total weight impact was it, and
what was the largest energy magnitude that your're trying to absorb?
J.C. Wallin, BAC
The material was titanium. We looked at a number of different
materials including non-metallics and so on, and found in the end that
titanium was the lightest that we could use. For our testing the fragment
that we dealt with was a full energy single blade which in the failure model
was the equivalent (in energy terms) of a disk ring piece plus _ couple of
blades, (which having penetrated the casing, will have lost some energy).
From the point of view of armor design, the single blade was a critical
s
piece because; of course, you had the highest impact pressure (acting on'the
small area). We designed on that criterion. The actual weight we added to
the airplane was something of the order of a thousand pounds. I said earlier
/ (when I was commenting on I think it was Ken Forney's talk this morning) it
could well be that in the case of an airplane of this particular configuration _
that the extra containment within the engine to cope with a rim-and-three-blades
• piece might have been more cost-effective. But I think that is applicable only
to this configuration of airplane. 0
J. Meaney, Rohr ,
What titanium metal alloy was used? For these pieces that you tested,
what weights and velocities were used?
J.C. Wallin, BAC
The material is commercially pure titanium. The biggest piece we had to
deal with was an LP 1 blade, which was five pounds in weight, with a velocity
of 680 fps.
J. Gausselin_ Rockwell International
•_ / In 1972 you people conducted tests, firing projectiles into fuel tanks, _
_-- to simulate the fan blades you were talking about. These were preliminary
tests and the conclusions were preliminary. You may be doin_more testing.
I haven't seen anything further in this program. Are you doing anythingO
further and if so, where can the results be obtained?
J.C. Wallin_ BAC
At the time we had to deal with the fuel tanks because we thought that
blades being fired into fuel tanks (where the blade passed through the fuel
before it got into the vapor space), was probably not a very high ignition
risk. So we started doing these tests to try to generate some data to prove
our case if you like. Now, in point of fact wh_t we came up with was that
_ 0 °
within the first six firings, we generated four explosions, due to titanium
blades nicking structure. We had been looking at the prime ignition source
as being the blade temperature. What we found was that when we fired the
blade into a representative tank, as soon as the blade hit the structure inside
the tank, even though it passed through the fuel in the first place, we actually
generated sparks of sufficient magnitude to set off the explosion. At that
point we abandoned our original line of thinking and, therefore, abandoned the
tests. I think in that respect, even if we had been right in our original
thinking, the cost of the testing we would have had to have done to prove our
case would have been so high that we would probably have abandoned it anyway.
This was because we would have needed to do it a thousand times or so with no
ignition to prove the case statistically. Since we could, in fact, get explosions
in the tank if titanium blades were being fired into it, we faced up to the facts
and decided to deveioF our armor for the tanks.
One other thing that we found in general, both in the case of firing into
tanks and also doing our armor testing, was that a lot of the information which
you get from ballistic firings (typical of military projectiles) is totally
irrelevant to the engine burst case where one is dealing with non-uniform shapes
and sharp corners. With things of that sort, the results can be very different
from those derived from bullet firings.
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TYPES OF KOTOR FAILURE AI_ CltARACTERISTICS OF .FRAGHENTS
D. XcCarthy
Rolls-Royc _ Limited
Aero Division
Derby, United K:h_dom
INYRUGUC_ION
There are three obvious ways of reducin8 the hazard of non-contained
ensine failure. One is co find vays of preventin8 the types of
failure that lead to non-containment, anothez is to make the ensine
¢asinss sr_on8 enoush co prevent the release o£ high-enersy debris, at
least in harmful dicections, and a third is to desi8n the aircraft in
such a way cha_ the probability of hish-energy debris creatin8 a hazard
is scc_ptably Iow.
The proven:ion of pr/n_cy failure, particularly of the type that _.3y
escalate to non-containment has always been a natural aim in enslne
design and development and lc will continue Co he so. Prevention of
non-containment by provtdin 8 ensine casinss stwon8 enough co contain
Clue highest energy frasments u_uld require an increase in ensine weight
chat is generally resarded as quite unacceptable and uould create
problems of Cbermal la 8 in the casinss and substantially increased
loads in the ensine mountinSS. Limited strenschenin8 of casinss,
especially loc:l strenschenin8 desiSned Co prevent the release of
debris in hanaful dfxections, misht ozfer some advantase provided chat
containing larger or more numerous bodies did not cause 8reate_ probl_as
• do.stream. _
The re_mininS action open to r_e ensine mmufacturer is co provide the
nircrafc des/shot with the most accurate inforemcion available upon the
probability of non-contained failure and upon the type of debris a 81ven
enSine is capable of releasing. This infomation can be taken into
account, along with all ocher consr_alnts, when the positioning of
-: / e_ines and the location of vital services are being determined for a
t
nov nircr_t. In the case of ear.hi/shed aircraft, a re-apprnisal of
current precantions qainst non-contal_t can be conducted with a
view co amkins any adJusUmencs chac miliht improve on the current level
of safe_.
-. In this pres4ntation I propose Co concentrate upon the types of non-?
: contained rotor failure experienced in U.K. enslnes and upon rbe
ch_sctertsCics of fronts _eleased, includin8 choir size, shape,
veisht, velocity, enerjy an_ direction, l_tvIlopmmnts in r_e prevention
6S
Of rotor failure and in the technique of conta£mnent or deflection of
fragments comes up for discussion later at this meetinS, therefore
they are not included here.
SAFETY RECORD
Although non-contalned failures account for only a small proportion of
alrcra_t accidents, their spectacular nature makes non-containment an
emotive subject. Anyone who has been near a turbine engine when it
has produced a non-contained failure rill know why. It is an alarming
experience. The explosive release of energy appea_s to have enormous
dest:uctive potential. Yet in nearly all cases of non-contained ensine
failure in c¢_ercial service the aircraft landed safety and no one was
hurt.
This record is partly due to aircraft/engine layout geometry which, to
varying degrees in di££erent aircraft L_pes, minimises the chances of
a fragment from ehe engine sr=.lking a vulnerable pare o£ the aircraft.
It i_ also pa_ly due to the ability of the aircraft to withstand the
impact or to deal vith r_e consequences o£ any damage caused by the
impact in all but r_e most serious cases. Less than one non-containment
in 10 has caused injuries o¢ _fected the airworr_iness of the aircraft.
This is in 146 million hours of service operation.
To puc r_e parc played by non-containment in aircrafC accidenCs inco
perspective for U.K. engined aircraft, FIG.1 lists r.be kno_ causes of
Am,rdsefAkc kddem&Fetdfles1954-1976IIcksive
PB¢IIITJUI£0F CAI 0FIll011T IHINTI 0F
": // i_ ACCIHITS FATNJI"IES
--I_BI -_ /. 0.40
q,ILIS'/ I _iII i_h 2J4"
u.oo k_COtLma I_
_II
_I S_ITU_m Imm_ _Jl
I
_i --_ _ I 411.1I
IlI. IINI
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aircraft accidents (defined as involving damage co wing, fuselage or
vlcal services) expressed in the left band column as a percentage of
total accidents and in the right hand column as a percentage of total
fatalities. IC illustrates chat non-contained engine failure accounted
for 2.95_ of accidents and 2.04% of fatalities from the beginning of
commercial flying co the end of 1976. These are not large numbers
but it is clear chat research and development to elin_nate non-contaln-
ment or to n_inlmise its effect must continue at high priority.
FAILURE RATE
In a machine based upon high energy rotating masses carried inside
relatively lightweight casings, a degree of risk of non-contained
failure is bound to exist. The level of that risk does not appear
to have changed very much since the early days of gas turbine flight.
FIG.2 illustrates that during the initial three years of gas turbine
Nonn-ConntaimedFailmRatoVYear
6 _NUMBER OF[FAILURES IN
FAILURES
PERMILLION
HOURS
I •
0
, 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976
_ / YEARS
I:
FIG. 2
operation r_here was one Category O (i.e. not contained wLthln engine
- or cowling) failure per year. The rate looks high because the running
t/me was low. Thereafter the rate was generally below 0.5 per million
engine hol_rs. In spice of the progressive elimination of the causes
67
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of earlier non-conrair_ents, engines conclnued co find new ways of
producing non-contained failure. The hump in the curve in the 1969
Co 1973 period was not due to the introduction of new engines , Ic was
the result of a crop of new modes of failure appearing on 1ong-
established engines.
It would be unrealistlc to expect the rate of non-contalned failure to
be apprecilbly better than 0.5 per million hours in the foreseeable
£uture, the constant demand for higher engine efficiency and reduction
in weight involves increasingly arduous engine conditions and the
development of new materials wlr_out any substantial background of
service experience. These factors tend to offset the benefits derived
from the elinLtnation of the causes of past non-contained failures.
Further, it should be remembered that the figure of 0.§ is an average
for all engines and r_ere could be considerable variations in the rate
between different engine types.
TYPES CF ROTOR FAILURE
In this presentation we are concerned vLth the fra_ents released by
engines when non-contained engine failure occurs, rather than with the
causes of failure, and for this purpose the types of rotor failure, as
affecting the shape of fra_ent, can be divided into three categories.
J
I. Low cycle fatigue (LCr-)
I
2. LCF wlth superimposed high cycle fatigue (HCF)
3. Failure due to overheatln8 and/or overspeedin s
_, / _ CYCLE FATIGUE
Cracks which pr pagate to eventual failure at a rate related to flight
cycles and not to total running thne are categorised as LCF failures.
The resulting fracture surfaces cm be expected to exhibit fatigue
_ striations indicating an extension of the crack for each flight cycle
_ after crack initiation. For the purpose of this study the category
includes LCF failures initiated by defects in material, manufacture or
assembly, as well as r_ose _t occu_ed where no such defects existed.
68
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FIG.3 shows the types of rotor failure known to have been caused pre-
dominantly in LCF. DLagra_ A shows a failure from an origin in the
l Tylmof Rotm'Failure-LowCycleFetkm
A B C
FIG. 3
hub of a disc. This mode of failure, which can release the most +
pol:encially descrucl:ive fragment an engine is cspable of producin8, is
forconacely extremely rare because the cyclic life of a given disc can
be predicted with reasonable accuracy in terms o£ disc bore life, when
based upon calculation and the results of riK and engine cyclic tests
carried out ac appropriate levels o£ st_cess in the disc bore. Occasion- |
ally a disc has failed from the hub in service huC all such failures
have been traced co defects in the disc material or processinK.
l_e measures taken co eliminate them make similauc problems less likely
co occur in the future. But it is impossible Co 8uaucanCee chat there
/
/ will never be anothe_ failure from a disc hub.
j_
' Die,cams B and C illustrate LCF failures from an origin in Chin disc
dieplucagm. I_LtS failure can be in/eLated in a region of high radial
stress when some additional £sccor has increased the stress beyond a
" tolerable level. For example, natural concentration of stress in a
disc neck can be unacceptably increased by ehe presence of machinLn 8
6g
".,, , *._ ..... _.,, ,,_" . ; ,. , ,
I
1978002125-074
marks or handling damage or by the unintenCional axial displacement
of the disc hub relative to the rim. As a result, a crack may initiate and
develop Into the disc rim (Diagram B) or propagate right round the disc
to release the entire disc rim either in one piece or in series of
lengths (Diagram C).
Diagram D is a type of failure of which only one has occurred. A
compressor drum carrying pin-fixed blades cracked from an orIg_.n in the
bore of a pin hole. The crack ran Into the bore of the dr'n whlch
proceeded to break-up into a large number of pieces.
Die.gram E shows a type of I_F failure experienced on discs wi_ pin-
fixed blades. Cracks propagated from hole co hole in one of the two
flanges on the disc rim eventually releasing blades and a local piece
of disc flange.
LCF WITHSUPERINP_ED HCF
/ Under engine conditions all rotor discs are subject to some degree of
alternating stress superimposed upon the speed-related steady stress.
The steady stress is reasonably predictable but the level of alternating
stress has to be arbitarily a-s_uned at the design stage on the basis of t
previous experience and measurement on other discs. Its level depends
upon the dynamic characcer£stics of r.he bladed disc and the likely
magnitude and frequency of the exctcinS £_tces. When alternating |
stresses are low enough for ehe cycles to failure to be related only to
flight cycles, the failure mode is labelled LCF. When the superimposed
alternating stresses are high enoush to propngate fatigne cracks ac a
rate related only to the number of alternating cycles, it is • case of
/' HCF. Buc t_ts is an over simplification because both LCP and HCF play
•_ ,, a part in most disc fatigue failures, one or the ocher being predoa£nant
during _e whole or part of th_ crack propasacion process. FIG_
Diagram F shows an early •lure centrifugal impeUer rich a fatisue origin
in a region of high alternating stress created by • vibration mode in
•he impeUer. The 'striation count, method of inspecting fractures
had not been developed at •he t/me but it is likely that, as the crack
propasated invard, the initial pradoatnance of _F was superseded by
LCF as _ crack moved into the hub resion which is l£ttle _factad
7O
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FIG.4
by impeller vibration but is subject to a high steady hoop stress. The
; crack proceeded to propasaCe into r_e bore, to release a larse sector
of the /mpeller.
DiasramG _llustrates an impeller failure initiated in a similar way
buc in this case the crack turned circumferent£ally under the influence
of low cycle radial stress combined rich ehe high cycle bendin S stress
arisin& from the /mpeller vibration mode. The crack eventually ran
outwards and released a relacively light piece of disc, compared _ich
_e previous case. Similar cracks developed in compressor and turbine
discs rich dovetail or firtree fixings (DiaaramH).
, DiaSramJ shows a more serious type of failure, predominantly in HCF.
Cracks initiated in the tinS of holes in the disc hub, run around _hoir
J pitch circle and radially outwards thtoush the disc r/m, releasins
three large sectors of disc but leavin8 the hub, inboard of the holes,
in posicion in the engine. 3_Ls failure and otJ_er s/miler less severe
failures occurred when the wake created by local blockase of nozzle
suide vanes excited diametral-m0de resonance in the bladed disc. Similar
vibration can be caused by the disturbance created when • nozzle 8uide
71
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vane is missing, or when a fuel burner becomes blocked, or even when
a local rub occurs, say an axial rub on the blade tip shroud, and such
failures may release a substantial piece of disc. The cure is to
design low diametral mode resonances out of the running range because
disc failures in such modes tend to release large fragments. Disc
failures in higher dian_tral modes, say 5D and over tend to release
much miler fragments and they are also more difficult to excite.
Another way in which high levels of alternating stress have been
generated in discs is the repeated deflection of a bladed disc in an
umbrella mode due to engine surge. Each surge causes a cycle of
stress urucelatedto flight cycles by contributing to the accumulation
of fatigue. The result can be the detachment o£ the disc rlmresult£ng
in the release of pieces of disc rim with blades, as in r_hecase of
LCF failure in the disc neck.
.l
Diagram K shows a turbine disc nearing tlme-explry which was judged co I
have been exposed .o a degree of high-cycle alternating stress for a
": long period due to a mlnor blade vibration problem. Fatigue cracks
perdominantly in I_F but with indications of superimposed HCF, developed
in the hottomof a large number of disc grooves. Disc failure occurred
shortly before the fuU service life of the disc had been achieved. One
of the cracks p_opagated inwards far enough to become critical, and the l
disc broke into six pieces, the largest fragment being almost half a
disc.
Diagrm L is an example of disc failure in blade-excited fatigue in which
a group of disc lobes failed in the neck and released the lobes together
/
_ // with the corresponding group of blades. D£agrem M shows a case in which
_ firtree teeth on the disc failed and released blades, In both types of
failure the largest fragment likely to be released by the engine is ai
single complete blade.
:_ DISC FAIL_I_E DUE TO OVERHEATING(FIG.5)
Three types of disc failure have occurred as a result of loss of material
properties due to overheating. The causes were_-
72
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(a) Loss of cooling air
(b) Rub against a static part
(c) Internal o11 fire
"  111 I/ II I
2. RUBAGAINST I II il II li II I /I I / I
--c.,,  LL// // /
¢
Disc failures under these headings have occurred only in turbines.
Turbine discs in UK engines are traditionally cooled by enveloping
them in cool air which exh_sts into the gas annulus fore and aft of
the disc. It has the dual purpose of cooling the discs and of t
preventing the ingress of hot gas into spaces surrounding them. (kl
rare occasions this system has been disrupted by loss of cooling air
.- pressure, in a typical case due to the £a/lure of an external cooling
air supply pipe and in another due to the loss of interst.ge seals
. / following turbine blade failure. In both cases the result is over-
_ heating of the disc due to the inglov of hot gas into spaces adjacent _-
to it. The form of failure depends "_pon the desiSn of disc and blades.
In some cases the overbeated disc stretches and releases all its blades
and the largest fra_ents released are single complete blades. In
other cases the disc fails first in the neck, releasing the disc rim
_th blades attached and the largest fr_ents a_e pieces of disc rim
_r£th blades. The latter failure is much more serious, In te_ns of the
73
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llkely energy of the largest fragment released, than the loss of blades
alone, the fragments being capable of cutting r__ough the engine
casings throughout the entire circun_erence of the engine and proceeding
to inflict heavy damage on a_y aircraft parts in the llne of flight.
Disc failures due to axial rubs were typically rubs between the disc
diaphragm and a stationary co_¢nent such as a static seal. This
cause_ overheating of the dlaphra_n at the se_" dls_eter and the release
of the portion of the disc outboard of the rub which includes the entire
disc rim and some of the diaphra_n. The result is similar Co the
previous case.
The third cause of overheating, the oil fire, again results in stretch-
ing of the disc which either releases the blades or fails in the
diaphragm.
MULTIPLE BLADERELEASE (FIG.6)
In addition to disc overheating, multiple turbine blade release has
been brought about in two oCher ways -
(a) Shelling-out of blades
(b) Overspeed of turbine i
liLAIMIUW[ASlIELOWNAIFOILM
OItINFIXING OVlEIISMID _ F_WIg ASO_NJLlrFOIIM
• _ OVIUU¢IAlr
"" _ IKADI.¢ONlrJUNIO SINGLI_ * CONlrAINID
: MULnIKAOl.NON.CCMI',*INID MUi.11iL481*¢ONIrNNIO
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IN. Ilmll
FIG•6
74
1978002125-079
Im. ",°
If sufficient tangential force be applied to a blade it will bend over
or break, or it will be w_enched out of Its fixing. The result
depending upon the relative strengths of blade and fixing. In some
cases the fixing will fall first so that an obstruction in the blade
path or a heavy rub against adjacent vanes w£1L cause the complete row
of blades to shell out of a disc. If such a failure be non-contalned
the largest single fragments to be released by the engine are likely to
be single .complete blades.
In the event of turbine overspeed to failure the result is that either
the disc bursts, probably from the bore, or it stretches sufficiently
to release its blades. The outcome depends upon factors such as the
ductility of the disc material, the fineness of the firtree teeth and
the stress distribution in the disc. Clearly, the release of the
blades is preferable to the disc burst in terms of the destructive
potential of the fragments released, but multiple blade release provides
the greater probability of st_ikil,g any vulnerable aircraft item in
the general plane of the rotor.
The requirement that engine casings shall be capable of containing a
single blade released from immediately above its fixing, determines the
/' minimum strength required.in the casings. I£ the casings Just meet
this requirement we would not expect twe adjacent blades released
together to be contained but we n_ght expect two blades 180 ° apart,
and perhaps four or more blades, 90 ° or less apart, released sinmlt=
• aneously, to be contained up to the point where the bulge in the
1978002125-080
casing caused by one blade did not encroach upon the bulge created by
the next. The energy of a contained blade is used up in stretching
and bulging the casing and if a second blade attempts to use up energy
in the same bulge the casing is likely to fail. In virtually every
case of multiple turbine blade release from below the platform the
blades have been non-contained, even where casings have been substant-
ially thicker than the minimum required for single blade containment
because of structural or pressure requirements. Multiple blades
released from above the platform, £n the aerofoil, normally have been
contained, presumably because of their light weight compared with
complete blades. It _uld be useful to know how strong a casing
would have to be to conta£n the multiple release of complete blades.
The release of all blades from a disc does not normally result in their
emerging uniformly from the engine in 0Catherine Wheel' style but
rather in the release of groups of blades through random arcs o£ casing,
typically as shown in FIG.7, presumably because the first blades to
0
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touch the casing tend to interfere with following blades. The result,
from the aircraft point of view, is that the assumption must be made
that the engine may throw complete blades either singly or in groups,
and a number of impacts may occur almost slmultaiLeously within a
small target area.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ROTOR FRAGMENTS
At an early stage in the evolution of the design of a new engine the
:. approximate diameters, speeds and weights of compressor and turbine
rotors can be defined• From the information generated by all non-
containment incidentss the3e three parameters can be used to predict
the range of fragments the new engine could conceivably release s
; including weights size s shades velocity and directions together with
" the probability of release of given fragments. The prediction should
give the aircraft designer the best chance of minimising the possible +
effect of non-containment upon aircraft safety.
_;
An analysis of all UK engine failures not contained within engine I
t casings or cowlings, since turbine engine flying began in 1953 is given
, below. '
SHAPE OF FRAGMENT '
Diagram R in FIG.8 shows the shape of fragments released when a compressor
• t
Sha_ofFrngmnt
+ / ,,
? +"' V
; Ill, I1_1 --
FIG.8
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disc fails through the bore. It could equally well be a tu_blne disc.
The origin of failure might be anywhere along the llne of fracture in
the fatigue case or it might be _rom the bore in the overspeed case.
?_ sectors of rotor are released with very high energy, capable of
s_icing through almost any aircraft structure in their path, each
ro_atlng about its own c of g and travelling along a line tangential
to the circle described by its c of g before release.
Diagram S shows a failure where the fragment released comprises a
group of blades held in a piece of disc, additional separate blades
are released at the same time. This type of failure is likely to be
the result of low oY hlgh cycle fatigue or a combination of both. The
fragment again rotates about its own c of 8 and travels along the
. appropriate tangential line. It has a much less energy than a half
disc and it may strike its target in any attitude probably the most
damaging being when a jagged piece of disc rather than the relatively
flexible blades, make first contact.
; Diagram T shows the case where the complete rlm of a disc is released
'_ in a number of lengths. This type of failure can be the result of ,
_.
fatigue cracks in the diaphragm propagating clrcumferentlally right
1
J round the disc. A failure with similar results is the circumferential
failure of a disc diaphragm due to overheatin_ caused by a local rub
on the diaphra_a say by a static air seal or due to general overheating
• due to loss of disc cooling air. This type of failure can cut an t.
engine in half in the case of a disc with a heavy rim section. But
rims of light section, when released from discs, have often been
contained by the casings, no_ably in the case of H.P. compressor disc
: rims. In other incidents the rim has penetrated the casing locally
and unwrapped itself to e@e.rge from the engine in a straight line, like
._ //
A a spear. )
-?
Diagram U shows tim fatigue break up of a disc into a number of irregular
fragments. This type of failure has been observed particu.!:.cly in
the case of discs reaching the end of their fatigue life. It prr.sents
:_ some formidable fra_uents, distributed around the engine.
Diagram V shows other _ypes of fatigue failures in blade fixings,
includ£n$ failure through the firtree neck ar.d failure of the firt_ee
78
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teeth. These failures release one or more blades which may or may not
be contained, but the largest fragment relea._d is a single blade.
The failure of a turbine disc due to o,erspeed, say due to shaft failure,
w£11 produce a type of failure dependent upon the disc design. In
some cases the disc wil! fall from the bore and release sectors at
higher velocity than the no_al maxi_nn but in most enKines the design
aim is to release blades rather than allow the disc to fail in the
ultimate overspeed case.
SIZE OF FRAGMENT
With regard to the size of f_a_nents, the maximum dimension of a missile
__ affects the probability of its striking a 8iven part of the aircraft and
an analys£s of fragment _zes has been carricJ out.
FIG.9 shows a breakdown of al 1- n_n-contatmnencs in terms of number of
! Ihx _ of LnrgestFragant esPercemle'. d lllededDiscDimeter
]' oDm_ssmls
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FIG. 9
: incidents aSainst r_e :aximum dhwnsions of the largest front
expressed a_. • percentase of the bl•de_ disc diameter, tSUOrin8 che
-' effect of be=c-over blades which is unpredictable. Compresscrs and
turbines are sbo_ separately, lC can be seen that for compressors,
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fraKmenCs with a _axlnn_ dimension equal to the ovezall di_eter of
the bladed disc, i.e. a half-disc and above, less the effect of bent
blades, tend to predomina"e. The shaded areas in r_he figure show
the incidents r.hat c:_used injuries or affected the airworthiness of
alrcrafc. Noc surprisinK1y the large fragments did the most damage,
not the least because s in the case of compressors, large frasments
were released more £requently than small ones.
In the case of turbines, about t_Lce as many non-containments overall
have occurred (althouah in recent years compressors and turbines have
produced approximately equal numbers of non-containments) and the
te tency has been for turbines to release small fragments more often
than large. The small pieces include single blades or part blades
or smaU pieces of disc wtr_ blades attached.
Clearly, large £raa_ents are more likely to damage the alrcraft and,
based upon the llmlted number o£ incidents for which fragment sizes
are known, r,hls tendency is confirmed. But small £raaments have beeh
released in far more incidents than large and they have caused service
aircraft problems in a greater total number of cases.
WEIGHT OF FRAGMENT
FIG.IO shows the number of incidents in u_Lch the heaviest £raament
Wdded hamw
|
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released was a given percentage of the bladed disc weight. The weights
are taken in 5_ steps. The heaviest fragment is chosen because it
has the greatest destructive potential of all the fragments released
in a given incident. In this plot the heaviest fragment in a non-
contairanent in which all the blades in a disc are released, is taken as
a single blade.
i
The shaded areas show "-e number of incidents in which injuries were
caused or the airworthiness of the aircraft was affected. In r_he cas_
of compressors the release of fr._oauents weighln_ up to 51_ of r_e bladed
disc weight was not, in this experience, responsible for creating any
hazard. Incidents involving the release of heavier fragments weighing
more than 5_ of bladed disc, proved co be hardous or non-hazardous
t
in a random way, probably because the aircraft/engine layouts provide
favourable odds against single heavy fragments striking a vital part i
of the aircraft. i,
p
In the case of turbines, of the total of 50 incidents in which the
$
_ weight of fragments released is recorded, 32 involved the release of
fragments weighing not more than 51v-of their bladed disc weight and 5
of the 32 caused sufficient damage to affect the airworthiness of the
aircraft. Larger fragments in the range 10 to 50_ of the bladed disc
weight appear in only 7 incidents but, as might be expected with larger I
fragments, they proved more likely than small fragments to affect
alr_orthiness and this they did in 3 of the 7 incidents. I_)okln 8 more
closely at the. manner in which the aircraft was affected in these
events we. find that the incidents involving the release of fragments
4
weighing no more than $7. of the bladed disc weight were all cases of
/" multiple blade release, two causing damage to aircraft hydraulics, one '
dmuging an adjacent engine, one startin 8 an extensive fire and one
, causing cabin depressurisation. In the case where the heaviest
fragment released welshed _ of the bladed disc the result was
penetration of the fuoelage and of a _Lng tank causing a fire. In
-- one case of full disc release the pressure hull was punctured and an
: adjacent engine was damaged but in the ocher t_ cases dmMge was not
seriOUS,
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On this evidence heavy fragments present an occasional serious threat
and lighter [ragments present a less serious but more frequent threat
capable of causing enough damage to create an aircraft hazard in some
cases. This experience involvez some of the older aircraft and the
results might be different with later designs, but it shows that there
are two vital factors affecting airworthiness in the non-contalnment
case, the first is the aircraft/engine layout and the way it affects
the probabillty of damage to vita[ parts of tlm aircraft and the
second is the number of fragments released in a non-contained failure.
Clearly there is a need to pay a lot more attent£on to the problem of
multiple blade release.
VELOCITY OF FRAGMENT
In deafening armour or deflectors co provide protection against missiles,
iC is i_portant to have some knowledge of the likely approach velocity
of the miss£1e as this will determine the type of armour or deflector
required. FIG.It gives the maximum rLm speeds of rotors in UK engines.
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Rim spe-.ds were chosen because a £rasment is released at approxtmate1_
the tp.ngen_ial velocity of _Lts centre of $=av_Lty at the instant o£
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release and the centre of gravity of a rim piece with blades attached
is likely to be near the radius of the rim and travelling at rim speed.
Corrections can be made for fragments _rith centres of gravity at
smaller or larger radii. Note that the velocities lle between about
400 and 1300 fc/sec. _nich is within the range that can be stopped or
deflected by conventional armour like steel or titanium plate, and
does not require the more exotic armour developed against missiles
with much higher approach velocities. It will be shown later that
non-contalned fragments weighing above about 6_ of the bladed disc
weight are likely to emerge from an engine with a tangential velocity
equal to the tangential velocity o£ the c of g of the fragment at the
instant of release from the disc.
ENERGY OF FRAGhENT (FIG.12)
A fragment released from a rotor has kinetic energy along its llne of
flight plus rotational energy about its own c of g. Plotting ehe
berlly Fragmentof
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FIG.12
. translational and rotational components of energy for • disc sector
aKainst the included angle of the sector sh(,_,s that translational enersy
reaches • peak when the sector ansle is about 134 °. But the rotational
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energy increased with sector angle until at 360 ° we_have a full disc
with all £cs energy in rotation and none in translation.
Engine experience and te_ts on armour and deflectors used against rotor
fragments show that translational energy is the _ore important factor
in the case of fragments comprislns up to four blades and a piece of
: disc. Rotational energy may have a greater effect in r_he case of large
fragments _nvolv£ng half a disc or more but this has yet to be established
by test. Another point to note about the shape cf the curve of
translational energy is that any sector _ngle between 90° and 180 °
has energy _-£thln I0_ of r_he maximum. Evidently a fragment of near-
maximum translational energy _uld be produced if a rotor released
anythin 8 between a quarter and a half of a disc.
In passing through an engine casing, a fragment uses up energy in damaging
itself and the casing. Recent containment tests in which representative
fragments were released from a rotating arm inside an engine casing showed j,
i that a fragment wlth an energy level just beyond the containment
capability of the casing lost 907. of its translational energy in getting
through the casing. But when a portion of rotor, comprising four blades
and a piece of disc weighing 6.5_ of the bladed-disc weight, was released |
inside a casing designed to contain a single blade, the fragment passed
through the casing without measurable loss of translational energy. It
was thought at the eime that the energy expended by the fragment in t
bursting through the casing was too small to be measured in terms of
frafg_ent velocity before and after penetration. But on further study
of high-speed films of the £rasmenc passing ehrough the casing, it was
' observed chac although no translational energy was lose r.here was a I07,
/ to 20_ loss of zotational energy and this would account for the energy used
: / up in damaging the fragment and the casing. There is no evidence that
this loss of rotational energy would reduce • otential dmnage to the
aircraft.
It is notable that when complete discs _mre released, usually as a result
of heavy unbalance due to blade or other failure, in the majority of
cases no serious aircraft damage was sustained. Any disc released with
virtually all its energy in rotation is unlikely to develop more than a
small amount of translational energy, say by being t.hro_ sideways by
84
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friction between rotor and static parts. The main danger of a free
disc is its ability to act as a cutter, capable of severing vital
services in its path.
DEFLECTION Of FRAGMENTS BY CASINC
When a fragment passes through an engine casing it tends to be deflected
from its path. The deflection is equally likely to be in an axial
or in a circumferential direction as shown in FIG.13. Observations of
DebrisSpread
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damage to surroundings caused by actual non-conr_nm-_nt incidents show
i
that heavy fragments tend to remain within +5° of the plane ol the rotor [
FIG.14. Much greater deflections have bee_ recorded with lighter
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fragments but those def lected by more than 33' appear t o  have l o s t  
v i r t u a l l y  a l l  t h e i r  energy. 
I f  we assume tha t  i n  s t r i k i n g  the cas ing ,  a  fragment loses  the component 
of ve loc i ty  perpendicular to i t s  f i n a l  l i n e  of f l i g h t ,  t h i s  does no t  
wholly account fo r  the l o s s  of t r a n s l a t i o n a l  energy observed i n  p r ac t i c e  
0 
when def lec t ion  exceed; 33 . There must be another f a c t o r  and t h i s  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  be the dece le ra t ing  impulse induced by f r i c t i o n  between 
fragment and casing. We can der ive  t h i s  f r i c t i o n a l  f a c t o r  from the  
knowledge tha t  t he  f i n a l  ve loc i ty  is v i r t u a l l y  zero when de f l e c t i on  
0 
ex-"-4s 33 . FIG.15 shows the t r a n s l a t i o n a l  energy of f r a m e n t s  f o r  
Energy after Deflection v Angle of Deflection 
100 7 
va r ious  degrees o r  de f l e c t i on  derived i n  t h i s  way. From the  a i r c r a f t  
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po in t  of view the po t en t i a l  spread of deb r i s  i s  a s  shown i n  FIG.16. 
Direction & Energy of Emerging Debris 
FIG.15 
ZERO 
ENERGY 
ZERO 
ENERGY 
The distribution of energy can be established for a given engine. High
energy fragments emerge within±5 ° of the plane of the rotor, fragments
deflected beyond 5° have energy that diminishes with angle of deflection
and fragments deflected bymore chart 33 ° have zero energy.
SUNNARYANDCONCLUSIONS
1. The race of non-contained engine failure in UKengined aircraft
has remained sensibly constant at 0.5 per million engine hours
for the past 20 years. The progressive elimination of tangible
causes of non-contaimnenC has been offset by the development of
new modes of failure. To reduce the race of non-contained
failure, or even to hold it down to the present level, requires
work on the prevention of rotor failure to be continued at high
4
priority. In addiCion_ research and development in the field
of containment of hish-enersy debris should continue to be pushed
.l
ahead and measures taken in aircraft design to minimise the "7
_: hazard of non-concair_ent should begin co reflect a more complete
c knowledge of the characteristics of fragments likely co be released
' by a given engine.
!
2. Types of rotor failure leading to non-containment include low and
high cycle fatigue, disc material and processing defects, disc
overheating due to rubs or loss of cooling air and disc ov_r- ;
" speeding due to sha_c failure or engine overspeed. It is not
possible to guarantee _he permanent elimination of them all.
3. Rotors are capable of breakins up in a wide variety of ways,
producing non-contained debris rangins from maxhnumenergy
. sectors to single blades or part blades. Complete discs have ,
_ been released in some cases of shaft o¢ bolt failure, sometimes
;: precipitated by the primary failure of another rotor.
&. Large heavy fragments released by an engine are nacuraily more
prone co damage the aircraft chart small fragments and the dm_se
_ rends to be mere extensive. But small _ragments are also capable
of doing enough demase co create airwnrthiness problems, they
are released more frequently than large fragments and because
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of the 8rearer number released per non-contairanentj the
probability of impact on a vulnerable item in the aircraft is
increased. Multiple blade release has proved to be particularly
damaging and this type of non-containment calls for special
attention.
5. The velocities at which engine fragments are released fall within
the range that can be arrested or deflected by armour developed
to provide protection against low velocity projectiles. There
would be no advantage in ,,sing advanced a_muu, d_:l_d for
use against very high speed projectiles.
6. Large fragments, certainly those weighing over 6% of the bladed
disc weight, tend escape from the engine without losing any of
8
the translational velocity they possessed at the instant of
their' release from the disc. But they lose a small proportlon J
of their rotational energy. Small fragments lose some .'_
translational energy in getting through the casing unless they
escape through a previously created hole.
7. Large fragments tend to emerge from the casing wlehin_5 ° of the
plane of the rotor but small fragments can be substantially
deflected axially end circumferentially and they lose energy in
the process. They appear to lose virtually all translational I
energy if deflected more than about 33 °.
8. From these results the distribution of possible fragments and
the energy with which they are likely to emerge from any 81yenp
// engine can be predicted with reasonable accuracy and used in
: assessing the threat _o the aircraft.
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%DISCUSSION
H. Rubel, Lockheed-Georgia
Thank you for a very enlightening discussion. I have a question on the
very last statement that you made with regard to multiple blade release and
I wonder if the turbine blade release you referred to is associated with the
retention of the turbine blade and not necessarily with the difference inherent
between compressor and turbine. What I have in mind is your Fig. 6 -- how many
of these cases, five, were category three and four (if I may use the SAE Ad Hoc
Committee terminology) and were due to overspeed or overheat causing shelling
of the fir tree because of the retention having small teeth? Specifically, in
the designs discussed because the teeth were very fine, a slight overspeed
causing yielding of the disk would permit the whole blade to come out. By the
same token, if there were a fatigue failure and the retention was very fine,
the impact from the failed blade could cause other blades to snap out or unlatch.
Whereas, in America, we have gone to two or thr_e fir trees and, normally, have
a failure above the attachement in the first fit tree or airfoil. With this
type of failure (similar to the compressor), energy is used up in breaking all
the other blades. So, the question I raise is, do you really need to beef up
the turbine case for multiple blade release or should we prevent the unlatching _i
of the multiple blades?
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
Our experience is that breaking up blades absorbs very little energy. We
design blades so that in the event of a blade being bent over it will break in
the shank or in the aerofoil before it breaks in the fir tree fixing. Some r_ '
our turbine discs are designed with fine fir tree teeth so that, in t/_e event
of overspeed, the disc releases its blades before bursting speed can be reached.
This blade-release is achieved only after very substantial plastic growth of
i- the disc, jltst short of ultimate failure. The situation is quite different I
under normal running conditions when the fir tree teeth are fully engaged and
the difference between fine and coarse fir tree teeth is like the difference
between fine and coarse screw threads.
Our reference to blade "shelling" in early engines covers cases where
blades were successively wrenched out of their fixings by a tangential force,
/ like shelling peas. Later blade fixing designs do not have this problem.
-_ Turbines tend to release blades more frequently than do compressors
because turbines are open to overspeedinG or overheating whereas compressors,
in general, are not.
H. Rubel, Lockheed-GA
i. Energy can be used up in breaking blades. Is it better to have blades
_ break off before releasing? Should we put more weight into the aircraft to
protect against multiple release or should we work on preventing multiple
release?
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D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
We should be doing both. There are some things the engine man can do to
avcld known problems but he can never guarantee that non-containment has been
entirely eliminated. The aircraft man should protect vulnerable items in his
aircraft and he should not ignore small fragments.
In Mr. McCormick's paper the statistics showed that in a total of eleven
serious (SAE definition) accidents, six were due to the release of disc sectors
but no less than five others were due to impact from small fragments. I suggest
that the aircraft man cannot afford to ignore the cases involving the release
of small fragments.
S. Sattar, P&W
One question I had concerns fan blades. Could you comment on those designs
where one has the same mode of failure below the platform at the dovetail where
some designs tend to result in multiple blade loss failures and others don't?
Have you in your studies come across some significant parameter (say there's
something about a particular airfoil configuration or airfoil geometry) that
makes one more prone to a multiple blade loss failure than others, assuming that
both fail below the platform?
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
We have experience of a fan blade failure in the root releasing the blade
which leaned upon the adjacent following blade and caused it to fail in the
fixing due to asymmetrical loading. The process did not go beyond the release
of the two blades. The problem was overcome by strengthening the fir tree
teeth and by improving the circumferential support of the blades at the plat-
form. It was later demonstrated that a failed fan blade no longer dislodged
its neighbour, nor any other blade in the rotor.
: Alan Weaver, P&W
You showed fragment impact velocities between 400 and 1200 feet per
second in your armor design work. Are these blade tip or disk rim velocities?
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
Rim velocity is plotted because the centre of gravity _ _. Lm-piece
with blade attached is approximately at the rim radius. A 9_zo_ would be
used in the case of a fragment with a centre of gra_-ity at. ?_t_eren_ r_dius.
2 p/*
J.C. Wallin, BAC {
%"
Damage depends on t2_e way that engines actually can break :u <_ aa_
broken up). From the point of view of the assessment methods t_ x ,as
describing earlier, we consider one-third disk piece, or a piece _ rim with
a couple of blades. If we take blade shelling, the assessment would be the
same as if you were using a one-third disk. Indeed, the one-third disk might
•i be a bit over-pessimistic, so I don't think there's an inconsistency here.
_ The one particular inconsistency that one sees is perhaps the question of the
blades which will come out over a 33 degree fore and aft sector and which in
the CAA model we don't take account of. Again, I think that one perhaps doesn't
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have to take account of that because the energy gets lower as you move away
from the five degrees. One hopes that there won't be single articles in the
way of a single blade that could in fact lose the airplane. I'm quite sure
that if we did Concorde over again today (and bear in mind e're talking
about airframe design that's really fifteen years old) we would not put a
f3ight co, trol system in, where all three hydraulic systems came together at
a single point. I'm sure my colleagues in the aircraft design industry would
agree, we just wouldn't do that today. So in that case you don't really need
to consider the single-blade effect because you wouldn't have single vulnerable
articles.
%
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
In the case of multiple blade release, some of the blades are deflected
in passing through the engine casing. The likely spread of emerging debris
has been indicated, together with the likely energy of the fragments. These
factors affect the provision necessa_, in the aircraft. Beside affecting the
extent of the target area, the amount of deflection given to a fragment may be
important in determining the angle at which to mount a deflector to ensure that
all fragments that strike it will be deflected in a harmless direction.
i
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
Do you have any data on the r_tge of residual velocities that the fragments
have in the case of multiple releases? j
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
¢ In the event of multiple blade release, the blades that first strike the
casing can lose as much as 90% of their energy in penetrating the casing. The _
remaining blades tend to come out through the hole or holes created by the first
impacts. A few blades may emerge with full energy, having come through the J
casing without touching i_. But the majority will lose energy in sliding round
inside the casing and the measured residual translational energy in these blades,
when they emerge from the casing, is not more than 55% of their original energy.
J.H. Gerstle, Boein_
i
Would you suspect that the rotational energy lost would be a function of
the fragment type -- that a rim fragment would lose a greater fraction of the
rotational energy than a pie-shaped fragment?
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
/
_ _ We have released a fragment consisting of four blades and a piece of disc <
_: from a rotor rotating at full speed inside a casing designed to contain a single
., blade. On that test we measured a zero _oss of translational energy and a 10%
to 20% loss of rotational energy in the fragment when It emerged from the casing.
Presumably the rotational energy was absorbed in bending the blades and deamging
the casing. We would expect the corresponding loss of rotatlonal energy in the
case of non-containment of a high energy disc sector to be proportionally less,
because the casing las limited energy-absorbing capability.
In the case of a small fragment like a single blade, its rotational _nergy
after release is unpredictable.
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J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
I might just remark on a very slender piece of evidence that we have from
som_ films taken at the Naval Air Propulsion Test Center involving impact against
a Kevlar shield by a rotor disk burst with six equal-size fragments, the portions
of rotational and translational energy loss were roughly comparable. This sur-
prised us.
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
Were you using a metal drum with a Kevlar wrapping?
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
Yes.
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
So the angles %;ould be somewhat different from the case of going through
a casing close to the bla4 -_
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
That's correct.
I
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BLADE FRAGMENT ENERGY ANALYSIS
M. A. O'Connor, Jr-1
Douglas Aircraft Company
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Douglas effort in the field of blade fragment energy analysis has dealt
primarily with two classes of fan blade fragments. The first is of
relatively small size (.15 [_und) and energy, and tends to rebound from
the fan and case when liberated in an FOD encounter. These small frag-
ments have relatively low secondary damage potential and are less demand-
ing in terms of protection. The larger fan blade fragments are ejected
in a more direct release trajectory with higher energy and hence can
represent a higher potential hazard. Using available empirical and
analyti_ ' techniques, plus additional Douglas analysis and testing,
protcc;. ,_has been developed for both classes of fragment.
Some of the more basic work accomplished includes evaluation of the
penetration resistance of composites, determination of armor coverage
and weights if protection were aircraft furnished (FAA contract), and
development of lightweight local protection concepts.
Simplified analytical methods have been used to describe blade fragment
energy transfer kinematics, establish fragment energy levels, evaluate
damage potential and configure protection. The approach, methodology,
, and application are discussed as a possible building block for other
applications. Development of effective local protection using Kevlar
is also discussed. Analysis methods developed and applied to the
rebound fragment problem and to the large direct release fragment problem
are described. Douglas testing yielded useful data on the capability of
existing structures and verified the GE Waterto%m Arsenal energy absorp-
: tion curve and British Aircraft Company empi ical energy absorption curve 4
and British Aircraft Company empirical energy absorption relationships
as "u_able tools.
1
With the necessary tools available, an assessment of aircraft "designed-in"
protection was made. This included assessment of the consequences of pene-
tration of the engine section ahead of the inlet flange and assessment of
the probability of penetration outside the nacelle. Areas of concern and
/ protective features provided to handle failures from whatever cause, are '
t
reviewed. It was concluded that the fan blade fragments did not constitute
an airworthiness issue but that, for an aft engine installation, fuel line
protection of some form would further complement fire safety even though
completely within a designated fire zone.
Analysis and testing of large high velocity fan blade fragments were also
conducted to determine energy and penetration characteristics. This
evaluation again resulted in the conclusion that damage potential was
within design margins. However, as for the smaller fragments, additional
protection for systems traversing the zone ahead of an aft engine inlet
flange can substantially reduce the exposure to seeondazydamage and was
considered a desirable improvement.
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In examining design concepts for protection of the aft engine inlet area
it was concluded that there had to be a better approach than plain metallic
armor. A "flack jacket" concept using Kevlar cloth as the energy absorbing
medium was selected as offering the most promise. By using a complete belt
around the inlet bellmouth, the uncertainties and design and installation
complications of armor support were avoided. The concept also offered a
potentially lighter weight installation.
Because of the extreme variation in vendor design data and claims, a
decision was made to undertake an in-house development program starting
with the basic purchased cloth. The number of lamina required for contain-
ment was detezmined using a compressed air gun firing I.i pound "design
fragments" at the selected 900 fps design velocity. Additional firings
were made with the final thickness and construction to assure repeatability,
and to demonstrate successful containment with respect to protection of
adjacent systems.
Additional firings were accomplished to determine the energy absorption
characteristics of commonly used honeycomb inlet materials. Firings were
also made with steel plate targets to check the Watertown Arsenal curve
and e_irical energy absorption equation.
In summary, we believe that we have developed a simple analysis methodology ,
adequate for our needs, added to the experimental data base, _nd developed
an efficient and effective concept for local protection of areas ahead of
the engine flange.
• t
.
DISCUSSION
A. Holms, NASA-Lewis
What did you mean by dynamic shear strength? How is it measured?
M.A. O'Connor, Jr., McDonnell-Dou@las
This is a property that differs from the normal static shear strength
of a material; it is determined by actual ballistic testing. It is the shear
strength exhibited by a material under dynamic penetration conditions (as
against static shear}. Eachmaterial has a characteristic value: e.g.,
steel = 188,500 psi, aluminum= 30,450 psi, titanium = 145,000 psi. It is
the constant derived by dividing the energy loss of the test projectile by
the product of the impact perimeter of the projectile and the squ_re of the
thickness of the material penetrated. Maybe the BAC folks can shed some more
light on the actual testmethodology they used; I believe they pioneered this
approach.
!
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DESIGNING THE L-lOll TO MINIMIZE
ROTOR FAILURE EFFECTS
J. E. Wignot
Lockheed California Co. "
Despite the considerable emphasis on containment, and the effort spent
in analysis, research, and design development testing in attempting to achieve
]
same, the experience of the aircraft industry is that an uncontained fragment
of significant size and energy is to be anticipated at some time in the life
of an aircraft type. In recognition of this fact, the Federal Aviation Regula-
tion Special Propulsion Condition P-I states, in part: "The airplane must
incorporate design features to minimize hazardous damage to the airplane in
the event of an engine rotor failure ..." The L-1011 incorporates numerous
design features that provide a high level of protection against rotor fragments.
Some of these features are reviewed herein.
Protection against rotor fragments may be provided in one or more of the
following ways: (i) By incorporating design features into the rotor that tend _
!to pro_ te small fragments if failure occurs, (2) By containing the fragments
within the engine shell or greatly reducing the energy content of those fragments
that are eventually uncontained, (3) By shielding vulnerable elements or systems
. / with heavy structural members that tend to stop or deflect high velocity fragments,
i _ and (4) By incorporating redundant and/or "backup" systems into the basic design
and separating these systems so as to minimize the probability that more than
O
one system will be damaged by an uncontained rotor fragment. The L-1011 utilizes •
all of these design philosophies.
_. Some of the design features that have been incorporated into the Rolls-Royce
$
RB211 engine are discussed briefly and two in-service experiences are considered
in order to illustrate the practical operation of these features. The penalties
l.eJl rK)TFOLIIW
1
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that would be imposed by trying to design for 100% containment are assessed.
Designing for 100% containment is found to be: (i) less effective than a
rational integration of all technique_ and (2) prodigally wasteful of our energy
resources.
The aircraft systems such as flight controls, engine controls, fuel, hydraulic,
and electrical control systems are considered and shown to be located and multipli-
cated so as to maximize the protection and availability of these vital systems.
Special attention is given to the location of fuel lines, fuel shut-off valves,
and the fuel valve control systems to minimize fire hazard.
Secondary equipment possessing high speed rotating elements are reviewed
to illustrate the design philosphies followed, the design features utilized, and
the in-::ervice results attained.
The L-1011 has, to date accumulated clos_ tu a million flight hours with
an excellent safety record showing the viability of the design philosophy
utilized in designing the L-IOll to minimize rotor failure effects.
I
/
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DISCUSSION
G. Gunstone, CAA-UK
I would like to ask Mr. Wignot if he could give some indication of the
cost he feels has been allocated in the i011 design against meeting the frag-
ment protection requirement. In other words, trying to estimate the cost
effectiveness of various solutions, what penalty is he paying now for having
had to design the airplane the way it is, or would the aircraft have been just
the same without a containment requirement?
J.E. Wignot, Lockheed-California
I think that's a very fair question. I think the answer is that, to
date, the airplane proper has had very little weight added to it for contain-
ment. The additional weight that is associated with containment lies primarily
in the engine.
J.C. Wallin, BAC
I couldn't help noticing that in your statement you said that there were
certain systems, I think, that were protected by the structure. Now, that would
presume based on your philosophy that you were not going to have more than a
certain size disk piece coming out. I think that in an overall assessment (even
with the best will involved and the best that Denis and his boys can do to the
engine) one is unrealistic if one doesn't allow for the fact that one day there
could be a failure of a disk piece and I don't believe that any structure, how-
ever heavy, will stop a disk piece. Having said all that, I will say that in
our assessment, the L-IOll was one aircraft that would meet the current CAA
requirements without any changes.
-f
J J.E. Wi_no.t, Lockheed-Cal.
I want to thank Mr. Wallin for his comments and to acknowledge the
_' pertinence of his question. Yes, we do have to face up to the possibility that
a large fragment of a disk may be released. But after all, it's a matter of
probability, isn't it? And here we're talking about the probability that we
_ will have a bit of a disk come out, escape with the proper energy in the correct
_ direction and do more than the damage that we have anticipated.
I would llke to add that although philosophically we have to accept a
rotor fragment size of one-third of the disk, it has been demonstrated many
99
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times that when a contributing problem is recognized, such as excitation of
the lower disk modes by partial local blockage, it is possible to alter the
design to promote smaller fragment productlon in the event of a failure. It
would be hoped that through the efforts of this group, that the technology
base and the theoretical base that is developed will tend to make the prob-
ability of the release of a third of a disk negligible. If we design so as
%
to keep the rotor burst fragments small it makes all the other design problems
that much easier.
/
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iAPPROACHES TO ROTOR FRAGMENT PROTECTION
M. A. O'Connor, Jr.
Douglas Aircraft Company
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
In recent years there has been a substantial increase in regulatory
attention in the area of rotor fragment protection. Concern appears to
stem primarily from an apparent nearly constant per year occurrence of
r
incidents involving uncontained fragments, large fan blade masses of the
large high bypass ratio turbofans, and degree of secondary damage produced
in some instances. Increase emphasi[ is evident from NASA and FAA activities
including their sponsorship of some industry activities.
It is essential that the containment question be examined in the correct
perspective. The commercial record is a fairly convincing argument that
the requirements and practices in place today are reasonably effective.
Since Douglas' entry into the jet transport field in 1956, two hulls have
been lost and a single fatality incurred in a third incident involving
rotor/blade failures. In none would additional "armor" isolation, or
redundancy have affected the outcome. However, this is not to imply that
there is no room for improvement. Some ideas that may provide insight
include review of key controlling requirements, armor as a brute force
approach, and an integrated airframe and engine solution.
As part of the approach to rotor/blade fragment protection, key airworthi-
ness design criteria considerations for fragment protection are reviewed.
Various FAA requirements in FAR Parts 25 and 33, plus interpretive 8110
orders, deal with engine and installation requirements specifically aimed
at minimizi,_g this type of hazard. These requirements cover such features
and design areas as engine isolation, containment of damage from rotor blade
failures, containment of fire, and design of other features of the aircraft
to permit continued flight and safe landing in the event of more serious
engine failures.
Armor represents one end of the spectrum of protection approaches. An FAA
sponsored study is in process at Douglas to evaluate the impact of provid-
: ing aircraft armor in lieu of engine armor for typical 3 and 4 engine wide
bodied transports. The initial area of discussion deals with protection
within the length of the engine case. Protection from fragments exiting
' / ahead of the engine inlet flange has some unique considerations and is
therefore treated separately.
' For protection within the length of the engine case, armor weight penalties,
plus fuel burned and dollar cost c_ carrying the armor protection are defined.
Immediately ahead of the inlet flange, direct tangential impacts are pre-
dominant, but further forward, rebound impacts predominate. Armor thickness
_ requirements and fuel cost impact of protection are shown.
The right answer is a balanced or "system" approach involving both the air-
craft and engine design. This approach whether formalized or not is basically
101
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responsible for the demonstrated success to date. Accomplishment involves
nothing more than the systematic recognition of the problem during the basic
design and development of both the aircraft and engine. Key steps in the
aircraft design are delineated.
Design considerations relative to a tail engine installation are delineated.
Limited armor is used for specific applications, i.e., tail engine fuel line
, protection, and tail engine inlet "flack jacket".
Results of demonstration testing and weight penalties are reviewed and areas
of engine design which might be examined for optimum overall solutions are
suggested.
This paper attempts to place the contaim_ent issue in better perspective
and is felt to show that we are not faced with problems which would justify
major regulatory and/or basic design concept changes. Based on Douglas'
experience, however, areas where future effort could be directed productively
are suggested. /
f
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DISCUSSION
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
You showed the figure of eight million dollars a year as a fuel cost
penality to carry the added containment weight on a quad-jet. Could you
amplify on the assumptions that went into that figure?
M.A. O'Connor, Jr., McD-D
Basically, there were 971 aircraft in the estimate (635, 3 engine and
336, 4 engine wide bodied transports). We assumed a representative flight
profile (based on an airline cross section) for the fleet and then merely
calculated the fuel consumed to carry the armor weight. The total armor
weights shown represent an upper bound (i.e., armor weights were not dis-
counted for inherent and/or intentional containment capability of the engine
cases. Each stage was assumed equally critical and armor weights were calcu- _
"m
lated and included for full protection).
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METALLIC ARMOR FOR BALLISTIC PROTECTION FROM STEEL FRAGMENTS
Donald F. Haskell
Ballistic Modeling Division
U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005
ABSTRACT
Perforation information for compact cylindrical steel fragments impact-
ing on each of six alloys are presented. The bulk of the experimental data,
developed by Project THOR and presented herein, is characterized by fragment
sizes from 0.32 to 53 grams, striking velocities from 152 to 3658 m/sec and
angles of striking obliquity from zero to 80 degrees. Additional tests have
also been conducted with 0.06 and 0.14 gram steel fragments fired against mild
steel and aluminum alloy targets from 373 to 2020 m/sec and 65, 194, and 324
gram steel.fragments fired at rolled homogeneous alloy targets from 367 to
1234 m/sec. Empirical formulas of a given type have been fitted to these data
to relate fragment limit velocity, fragment residual velocity and fragment
residual weight to important impact parameters. Information is presented for
the following target alloys: magnesium, _luminum, titanium, face-hardened
steel, mild steel, and rolled homogeneous armor steel. This information has _
been found useful in the selection of metallic armor type and thickness
required for a specific degree of ballistic protection.
? /
J
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tDISCUSSION
J.H. Gerstle, Boein@
Did you say that the data shown here are available?
4
D. Haskell, Arn_-BRL
Yes, from unclassified BRL reports.
6
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ROTORBURST PROTECTIONPROGRAM: EXPERIMENTATIONTO PROVIDE
GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN OF TURBINE ROTOR
BURST FRAGMENT CONTAINMENT RINGS*
G. J. Mangano
J. T. Salvlno
R. A. DeLucla
Naval Air Propulslon Test Center
Princeton, New Jersey 08628
ABSTRACT ABSTRACT
Presented are the results of a pro_am of rotor burst containment experi-
mentation that provides guldellnes for the design of optlmumwelght turblne
rotor disk fragment containment rlngs. These guidelines were derived by estab-
llshlng the relatlonshlps between a measure of the ring's capabillty to contain
fragment energy with respect to it's weight (the specific contained fragment
energy - SCFE - derived by dlvldlng the rotor burst energy by the weight of
rlng required to contain this energy) and other slgnlflcant rln8 and rotor t
variables such as the: rotor tip dla_eter; number of rotor fragments; and
ring radlal thickness and axial length. The experiments consi_'_d malnly of
bursting 14 and 31 inch diameter turbine rotors into encirclinb containment
rlngs made from centrifugally cast 4130 steel. Rules are given for achieving
optlmumwelght rlng designs.
_'-. *Prepared under NASA Defense Purchase Request C-41581-B, ._odification
.. No. 6, for the NASA Lew_.s Research Center. Solomon Weiss, Robert D. Siewert,
and Arthur G. Holms o5 the Levis Research Center served ea prosran uanasars
and technical consultants for this program. Also published 88 NASA CR-135166,
1977.
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The 9rogram of parametric rotor burst containment experimentation
being reported was developed and conducted by the Naval Air Propulsion
Test Center (NAPTC) under National Aeronautics and Space Administration
_NASA) sponsorship. The program was structured to develop guideiines
1or the design of optimum weight turbine rotor disk fragment contain-
,_ent rings. The design guidelines were generated by experimentally
establishing the relationship between a specific energy variable that
provides a measure of ring containamnt capabiliw, and several select
variables wi,ich characterize those configurationai aspects of the
contalnEent rings and rotor fragments that significantly influence the
fragment containment process.
The program consisted of a series of rotor burst containment
experiments in which rotors of two different diameters were modified
to burst at their respective design speeds into various numbers (2,
3 and 6) 9f pie-sector shaped fragments. These fragments impacted
rings made from 4130 cast steel that encircled the rotors at a radial
clearance of 0.5 inches (0.0127 m). The ring axial lengths were
varied in three discrete steps of 1/2, 1, and 2 times the rtr axial
length of the rotors used. The radial thicknesses of the rings were
varied until fragment containment was achieved, thus establishing the
weight of rZng required. The results of test provided the guidelines
necessary to design an optimum weight steel containment ring for
small rotors. The optimum weight ring was 8.6 lbs (3.9 kg) for a
14 inch (0.356 m) diameter rotor having a burst energy of 106 in-lbs
(3511.6 J) at its deslgn speed of 20,000 rpm (2094 rad/s). This wetg_.t
decreased slightly with the numbex of fragments generated at burst
in the range of from 2 to 6. The results also indicated that the
weight of steel ring required to contain the pie-sector fragments
from an average size conserclal engine turbine rotor (31 inch
(0.787 m) diameter) having a burst energy of 10 g 106 in-lbs (. "16 J)
would b__ in excess of 168 lbs (76.2 ks) for 2 and 3-fragment bursts
and in the neighborhood of 150 lbs (68 kg) for a 6-fragment burst.
Unlike the suall rotor containment ring characteristics, the weight
of ring required to contain these larger rotors was clearly dependent
on the number of fragments generated at burst.
• -/ It was also found that a coiposite ring made from boron carbide
backed with filament wound fiberglass in an epoxy matrix contained
the fragments from the small rotor burst at a weight reduction of
30% compared to steel. This represents • significant weight re-
duction configuration that warrants further exploration.
: It would appear from the results of this effort that the steel
"- rings required to contain the fragments generated by the burst of
an average size turbine rotor (the largnr of the two rotors tested)
from a commercial engine would be heavy for aircraft appllcatlon.
However, the use of optlmally configured composite rings for fragment
containment and partial rings for frapmnt deflection, which are systems
chat show great promise for light-weight protection, should be thoroughly
investigated.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a report on the Rotor Burst Protection Program (RBPP),
which is sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and conducted by the Naval Air Propulsion Test Center (NAPTC).
The objective of this progrdm is to develop guidelines for the design
of devices that will be used on aircraft to protect passengers and the
aircraft structure from the lethal and devastating fragments that are
generated by gas turbine engine rotor bursts.
Presented in this report are the results of a parametric test
program that was conducted by the NAPTC to provide guidelines for the
design of turbine rotor fragment containment rings. This program was
a sequel to, and to a large extend guided by, the exploratory testing
that was conducted by NAPTC and reported in reference (a).
CONCLUSIONS
I. Regarding tile containment of typical, relatively smll (14 inch
(0.356 m)) diameter, axial flow turbine rotors that burst at their
design speeds into various numbers of pie-sector shaped fragments
having a total energy of approximately 106 in-lbs (3511.6 J):
a. Containment of these fragments can be achieved using rings
: described as follows:
(1) Rings made from 6130 cast steel weighing 8.6 lbs (3.9 kg).
!
(2) Laminated rings consisting of boron-carbide backed with
fiberglass weighing 6.02 Zbs (2.71 kg).
b. Optimumweight for the steel containment ring configuration i
was achieved when the ring axial length was made equal to that of the
rotor; making the ring twice or half as long as the rotor axial length
resulted in containment rings that were heavier and therefore less
than optimmwtth respect to weight.
c. With the steel ring axial length at it's optimum value with
respect to weight, the ring thickness and therefore Its weight is,
/" for practical purposes, independent of the number (ranging from 2 to
_ 6) of equal pie-sector shaped rotor fragments generated at burst.
2. Regarding the containment of typical relatively large (31 inchL_
(0.787 m)) axlal flow turbine rotors that burst at their design
speeds into various numbers of ple-sector shaped fragments having
a total energy of approximately 10 X 106 tn-lbs (35116 J):
_, 109
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a. Rings made from relatively brittle 4130 cast-steel weighing
in excess of 168 Ibs (76.2 kg) will be required to contain 2 and 3
fragment rotor bursts. A ring of the same material weighing in the
neighborhood of 150 Ibs (68 kg) will be required to contain a 6-
fragment burst.
b. The optimum weight of 4130 cast-steel ring required for con-
tainment is dependent on the number of ple-sector shaped fragments
generated at burst in the range of from 2 tO 6 fragments. The weight
will increase as the number of such fragments decreases.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Experimentation and analysis should be continued on a limited
basis to establish the baseline or reference steel ring weight
required to contain 2 and 3 fragment large rotor bursts.
2. Because the weight of steel rings required to contain the pie-
sector shaped burst fragments from an average size comercial engine
turbine rotor appears to be excessively high, the following two
facets of rotor burst protection should be further Investigated and ,°'
• design guidelines developed:
a. The use of multi-layered, multl-materlal rings for contain- '
' merit applications, and
b. The use of partial rings to control the trajectories of rotor
burst fragments (directing them away from the more vital areas of
the aircraft Into the less or negligibly sensitive areas) as a means
• of providing a "degree" of protection at reduced weight.
PROGRANDESCRIPTION
A. Concept Development
•_ 1. The program of parametric turbine rotor fragment containment
testing that is being reported was structured to develop empirical
•. j gnldellnes for the design of minimum weight turbine rotor d/sk
.._ fragment containment rings made from a monolithic metal.
., The empirical design guidelines were generated by experimentally
establishing the relationship between a variable that provides a
measure of containment ring capability and several other variables
that both characterized the conflguratlonal aspects of the rotor
_ fragments and containment ring; and had been found from exploratory
- testing to have had significant influence on the containment process.
110
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The variable that provided this measure of containment ring
potential or capability was termed the Specific Contained Fragment
Energy (SCFE) and was derived by dividing the rotor fragment energy
at burst by the ring weight required to contain this energy. The
SCFE was the dependent variable of test.
2. The four ring and rotor characteristics that were chosen for
test because of their suspected influence on the containment process,
and varied during test to establish what this influence was (as mea-
sured by the SCFE) were as follows:
a. The ring inner diameter. Two diameters, one approximately
twice as large as the other (31.64 and 15 inches) were used for test
with rotors having correspondingly larger and s_aller tip diameters
(the CWJ65 and GEY58 engine turbine rotors having tip diameters of
30.64 (.778 m) and 14 (0.356 m) inches, respectively). The burst
energies of these rotors at their nominal design speeds were
I0 X 106 and 106 in-lbs (35116 and 3511.6J) for the larger and
smaller rotor, respectively. Burst fragment energy (speed) was held
constant from test to test as a function of rotor size; the larger
rotor having the higher energy.
b. The rin& axial length. Three lengths were used that
corresponded to 1/2, I end 2 times the rim axial lengths of the
large and small rotors which were nominally 1.25 and 1 inch (.032
and .0254 m), respectively.
c. The number of rotor fragments generated at burst. The
rotors were modified to fail at their respective design speeds of
8,500 rpm (890. tad/s) (J65 rotor) and 20,000 rpm (2094 tad/s) (T58
rotor) and produce pie-sector shaped fragments having included angles
of 60" (1.0472 tad), 120" (2.0964 tad) and 180" (3.1416 tad). These
were termed 6, 3 end 2-fragment rotor bursts, respectively.
d. The ring radial thickness. The ring thickness was varied
until fragment containment was achieved for the different combinations
of ring (rOtor) diameter; ring axial length; and number of rotor
fragments.
/
The resultant test matr/x for this test program is shown
in Figure I; and the procedure for rln8 thickness variation to
._ achieve containment 18 shown sche_atlcally in Figure 2.
3. Other variables which wouId, in some way, influence the
magnitude end orientation of the forces chat create the deformations
_, end displacements of the ring end rotor fragments, and therefore
govern the containment process are as foUows:
a. The mechanical properties of the rotor and ring mater/ale.
, ' 111
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b. The fragment velocities.
c. The fragment masses and mass distributions.
d. The rotor-to-ring radial tip clearance.
e. The rotor tip-to-hub diameter or radius ratio.
Although these factors would significantly influence the contain-
ment process, with the exception of the ring material used for
containment, the variability of these factors, as a function of rotor
size, are constrained within relatively narrow limits by the dictates
of rotor aerothermal and structural design. For all practical purposes
then, for a given rotor size, these factors would be essentially
invariate and the results generated by the experiments conducted would
be generally applicable to all turbines as a function of rotor size.
This would be so because the experimental scheme presented incorporates,
either purposely through the variables of test or inherently because
actual rotors are used, all of the factors that could (with the
exception of ring material properties) significantly influence the
rotor fragment containment process.
Although the mechanical properties of the materials used to make
a containment ring can vary widely and are considered to be important
factors in containment ring design, the ring material used in most
of the tests conducted was the same from one test to another. The
. material was 4130 cast steel. This was done to generate a baseline
for materials comparison in subsequent tests, and to establish the
effects of the other variables on the containment process exclusive
of material influences. Later when these effects are firmly
establl_'_ed, the influence of ring materials will be more fully
explo=_d. In fact, during the tests conducted the use of composite
rings as containment devices were cursorily investigated.
B. Desigu Guidelines Synthesi=
/ 1. The conceptual functional relationship between the dependent
/ (SCFE) and independent (t, ALR, NF, ID) variables of test are
: / presented cunceptually in Figure 3. Once these relationships are
establt, h,_d through test,they provide all the information that is
needed to design an optimum weight steel ring £or a turbine rotor
fr_cent containment application. Given these relationships, the
pzocedure would be as follows:
a. Three basic things would have to be known about the
rotor to proceed with the design analysis:
(1) The kinetic energy (KER) of the rotor at burst
(2) The rotor tip diameter, and
112
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(3) The rotor rim axial length.
These are characteristics that are usually known or can be
easily calculated by a designer.
b. The relationships between the SCFE, the number of frag-
ments and rotor diameter, with the ratio of ring to rotor rim axial
length as the parameter, provide an indication of the worst t
combiv.,tion of burst conditions for the size rotor being
considered; i.e., the lowest SCFEo For a given analysis, this value
of SCFE would be obtained from the curves in Figure 3 (or equations
derived from regression analyses of the data points developed through
test) for the size rotor being considered; the number of rotor
_ fragments that result in producing the most adverse containment
condition with respect to weight of ring (the lowest SCFE value in
the SCFE-NF plane; and the optimum ring to rotor rim axial length
ratio (LRG/LRT -= ALR)), which is represented by the highest contour
line. The SCFE value that is obtained by this exercise is divided
" into the total antic_.pated energy of the rotor to yield the
optimum (lowest) weight steel ring that will be required to contain
the fragments. This procedure is expressed in equation (i).
?
(I) Wt = _KERSCFE
i ,
- The weight so derived is then used in the following equation (2) _ b
which expresses the thickness of ring required for containment as a
function of all the other known dimensional variables.
l
Of course the value of weight derived in equation (1) can be sub- I"
stituted in equation (2) to yield perhaps a more useful form; T
equation (Ta) [ ]'(2a) t = RI2 + I{_l - RIo,L'G
t = ring radial thickness required for containsent
: Ri - ring inner radius, which, for practical considerations,
-" equals the rotor tip radius because rotor-to-e_in8 operational
clearances and considerations of atn/mm ring weight dictate that the
? ring and rotor radius be equivalent as possible. !
i
v
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LRG = ring axial length: Derived by the multiplication of
the optimum ALR (parameter of highest contour in Figure 3) and the
rotor rim axial length LRT.
c. This data synthesis and d_slgn analysis would provide
the lightest weight steel ring configuration (IV, radial thickness,
and axial length) chat would be needed to contain the fragments
generated by a turbine rotor burst of known size and energy. The
analysis is generally applicable co axial flow turbines from aircraft
gas turbine engines because, as mentioned previously, of the inherent
operational and conflguraclonal sln_larltles between turbJ-nes of a
given size.
C. Test Procedures and Nethods of Analysis
I. Test Procedures
Testing was conducted in the NAPTC Rotor Spin Facility (RSF),
the detailed capabilities and description of which are contained in
reference (b). The test set-up and procedures were basically the
sane for each test conducted: Rings being evaltmted for their con-
tainNent capability as measured by the SCFE were sandwiched bet_leen
rigid steel plates and positioned so that they concentrically
encircled rotors that were vertically suspended (plane of rotationL
horizontal) in the spin chamber from the output shaft of the air
turbine motor used to spin the rotors to their burst speed. This _
set-up is shown in Figure 4. The radial tip clearance between the
rotor and ring was maintained at 0.50 inch (1.27 cm). The two
different size rotors described previously were modi|ied, as
shown in Figure 5, to fail into 2, 3 and 6 pie-sector shaped {frasments at their nominal operational desisn speeds.
During test, the spin chamber vas evacuated to a vacuum
preuure of 10mm HS to minimize the drive power required to
accelerate the rotors to burst speed.
i
: / 2. Nethods of Analysis
_ Because of the nature of the Cut program conducted, the
._
analysis of results was relatively strai8ht forward; it depended ,
_' on two things:
a. Whether or not the ring being subjected to test
contained the rotor frasnent_ generated. !
b. And if it did contain, what was the associated rink
SCFE (by definition no SCFS could be derived for a ring thgt did
not contain the fragmentS)o-
As previously mentioned, the SCFE for a ring is derived by
dividing the rotor fragment burst energy by the ring weight required
for containment. For the tests conducted, two axial flow _urblne
rotor configurations having different tip diameters (14 and 30,64
inches) bursting at their respective operational design speeds (20,000
and 8,500 rpm_ were used. Therefore, from test to test, the rotor
burst energy was held constant as a function of rotor size. However,
variations in burst energy for a given rotor size did occur during
test because of small unpredictable variations in rotor burst speed.
These variations stemmed from such factors as: material property
: scatter; dimensional tolerance differences; flaws or cracks (scrap
turbine rotors from high time military engines were used); and other
such inherent and induced rotor to rotor anomalies. To account for
these "experimental" variations in analyzing the burst test results,
the policy was adopted whereby results which had a speed variation
greater than + 2.5% of the design burst speed were not used for
analytical purposes; i.e., assessment of a ring's SCFE. The reason
for not using the results of a low burst speed (and therefore low
energy) test is obvious: It would _tstakenly give a lower and
therefore erroneously conservative SCFE value for a particular ring
configuration. The reason for rejecting the results of a higher burst
speed was more subtle and was based on the fact that materials exhibit strain
rate sensitivity. Under slngularly optimum conditions, it might be
possible to derive an erroneously high SCFE from a higher than "rated"
burst speed because of a favorable material rate sensitivity. Thls
would indicate that a lighter than required rlng would be suitable
for containment when In fact at rated speed it would not.
3. In this reports the results of analysis will be presented
graphically by indicating the range of SCFE based on the acceptable
speed variation (_+2.5%) and the SCFE based on the actual burst speed.?
4. The other element beside speed that established the rotor
energy at burst was the mass mement of inertia of the two turbine
rotors used for test. The values of inertia for each rotor were
determlned experimentally using the well known torsional pendulum
method (reference c).
.! / RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
_"
_ A compendium of the pertinent test and calculated data used in
this report are presented in Appendix A.
The results of test are presented in plotted form in Figures 6_
: 7, 8, 14 and 15. These plots are actually p]2me sections of ehe
conceptual three dimensional (variable) plot shown In Figure 3, but .:
,_, in these instances using the test data developed. The intent here
is to clearly show, vhere possible, the functional relationship
between the SCFE and the significant test varinbles: inner ring
: dlaneter (IDR); number of fraliments (NF)! and rlng axial length (ALR).
a. SCFE - NF Relationship for Small Rotors; Figure 6. It
can be seen from these curves that for small rotor containment the
SCFE is for all practical purposes independent of the number of pie-
sector shaped fragments generated at burst. This indicates that
rings of the same weight would be required for contalnment regardless
of the number of fragments generated at rotor burst in the range of
from 2 to 6 fragments and having a total (translational and rotational)
energy contest of approximately 106 In-lbs. A corollary to this would
be that a worst fragment number condition for small rotor contain-
ment with respect to ring weight does not exist.
b. bCFE - ALR _[elationship for Small Rotors; Figure 7. The
relationship shown in this Figure indicates that an optimum
value for ring axial length exists. For the size rotor tested, an
optimum lightweight ring for containment is derived when the axial
iengtt,of the ring is made equal to that of the rotor; that is
where ALR = i.
c. SCFE - IDR Relationship for 2, 3 and 6 Fragment Bursts
at ALR = i; Figure 8. First of all, these relationships are
_ incomplete except for the 6-fragment data because the radial thickness
required for large rotor containment of the 2 and 3-fragment bursts
exceeded that which was available from inventory (4130 cast steel
circular rings with an ID of 31.64 inches (0.804 m) and having a
'_ maximum radial thickness of 4.1875 inches (.106 m)). The relation- i
ship shown in Figure 8 indicates that the amount of fragment energy i
that a pound of ring material can contain decreases when the rotor
f
size and energy content increases; that is for the same ring to
rotor axial length ratio, ring materials and number of fragments
generated at burst, the containment capability of the larger ring,
: as measured by the SCFE (on a contained energy per unit weight
basis) is lower than a small ring. This indicates that the practice
of extrapolating small rotor containment ring results to large rotor
containment ring applications would be very tenuous. To provide some
, feel for the ring and fragment distortions that normally accompany
the containment process, the post-test conditions of rings and rotors
"' from several selected tests (both contained and uncoatained) are
: shown photographically in Figures 9 through 13./
/
_ d. SCFE - NF Relationship for Large Rotor Containment at
, ALR = I; Figure 14. The relationship in this figure, though not
o definitive because containment was not achieved for the 2 and 3
fragment burst, indicates that the SCFE is dependent on the number
of fragments (NF) generated at burst. This differs from the smell
rotor results, which indicated that the SCFE and NF were almost In-
dependent. The trend of this relationship indicates that the capability
; of a ring increases as the number of fragments generated increases
or in other words, as th,e number of fragments generated at burst
decreases the containment situation with respect to ring weight
become more adverse, i.e., more weight is required.
!
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e. SCFE - ALR Relationship for Large Rotor Containment of
2_Fragment Bursts; Figure 15. Only limited tests were conducted to
expJore this relationship because trends indicated that the weights
of ring required for containment were becoming very high. Figure 15
tends to show that an optimum axial length might exist in the
neighborhood of ALR = i. This is consistent with the results
of the small rotor results, which because of the abundance of
test data, was more conclusive in indicating an optimum ALR = I.
f. General Observations and Results:
(I) Comparison Between Large and Small Rotor Containment
Ring Deformation/Displacement Characteristics During Fragment Impact:
Figure 16 shows high-speed photographic results that depict the
mechanics of large and small rotor containment in which a 3-fragment
rotor burst is involved. It can be seen from these data that the
gross deformations and displacements experienced by the steel rings
are quite independent of size. In fact, in a general sense, the
deformation/displacement characteristics for the large and small rotor
containment rings are approximately identical. On the basis of this
data, it was anticipated that a functional relationship between SCFE
and rotor diameter/ring ID could be experimentally derived and be
generally applicable.
(2) Exploratory Tests of a Small Rotor Composite Contain-
ment Ring: Data for these tests can be found in Appendix A under
test numbers 143, 144, 183 and 208. These tests were conducted using
the smaller T58 engine turbine rotors modified to burst into three
fragments at their design speed of 20,000 rpm and impact concentri-
cally, encircling rings that were made from three types of materials
or material configurations: (a) filament wound fiberglass in an
epoxy matrix; (b) circular boron carbide segments backed by filament
wound fiberglass in an epoxy matrix; and (c) a segmented, hardened
4130 steel ring backed by filament wound fiberglass in an epoxy
matrix. The fiberglass and steel-flberglass rings did not contain
the fragments; however, the boron carblde-fiberglass ring did
contain at a weight savings of 30% over an optimally configured
/ steel ring subjected to identical burst conditions° Post-test photo-
_ graphs of these rings are shown in Figures 17 through 19o On the
basis of these exploratory tests, it appears that composite rings
may serve to reduce the weight penalty associated with rotor disk
fragment containment. To determine what these weight reductions
might be, will require an extensive program of experimentation
using multi-layered material rings.
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IO = RING INNER DIAMETER
.i(SUBSCRIPT DENOTES NOMINAL DIAMETER ,_
IN INCHES)
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Figure L - SmalllLargeRotorContainmentTestMatrix.
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Figure4. - TypicalContainmentTestSet-Up.
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Figure 5. -Typical Rotor Modifications For Containment Tests. 
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NUMBER FRAGMENTS (NF) 
Figure 6. - SCFE-NF Re1a:ionship For SmaH Rotor 
Containment. 
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Figure8. - SCFT-IDR Relationship.
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RlNG AND ROTOR FRAGMENTS IN 
PLACE FOLLOWING TEST RlNG AND ROTOR FRAGMENTS I N  
PLACE FOLLOWING TEST 
Figure 9. - Small Rotor 3 Fragment Containment Post 
Test Results. 
Figure 10. - Small Rotor 2 Fragment Containment Post Test Results. 
' , 
RING AND ROTOR FRAGMENTS IN 
PLACE FOLLOWING TEST 
Figure 11. - Small Rotor 6 Fragment Containment Post 
Test Results. 
Figure 12 - Smal l  Rotor 2, 3 a n d  6 Fragment Containment Post Test Results. 
124 
SPECIFIC CONTAINED FRAGMENT 
ENERGY (SCFE) IN-LBS 
.~ 
EST i 
-- 
CONTAINMENT NOT 
'"; ACHIEVED AT RING I 
~ ~ ~ 
/ WEIGHTS > 165 LBS I 
NUMBER FRAGMENTS (NF) 
Figure 14. - SCFE-NF Relationship For Large Rotor Containment 
Figure 13. - Large Rotor 2, 3 and 6 
Fragment Containment Post Test 
Results. 
SPECIFIC CONTAINED FRAGMENT 
ENERGY ( S C F E ) M  
LB 
TEST i 
rat A TEST 
203 
SHADED SYMBOLS DENOTE 
NOT CONTAINED 
PROBABLE 
CONTOUR 
RING TO ROTOR AXIAL LENGTH RATIO (ALR) 
Figure 15. - SCFE-ALR Relationship For Large Rotor Containment 
4130 Cast Steel Ring (NF = 2). 
LARGE ROTOR CONTAINMENT TEST (145) 
BURST SPEED: 
6311 RPM 
FRAMING RATE: 
15320 PPS 
TIME = 0 MS TIME = 1.9 MS TIME = 3.7 MS TIME = 5.9 MS 
SMALL ROTOR CONTAINMENT TEST (67) 
FRAMING RATE: 
14821 PPS mi 
TIME = 0 MS TIME = 1.7 MS TIME = 2.8 MS TIME = 5.5 MS 
Figure 16. - Rotor Burst Fragment Containment Ring Deformation Characteristics. 
Figure 17. - Small Rotor 3 Fragment Containment With A 
Fiberglass Ring Post Test Results. Figure 18. - Small Rotor 3 Fragment Containment With A 
Boron CarbidelFiberglass Composite Ring Post Test 
Results. 
Figure 19. - Small Rotor 3 Fragment Containment With A 
SteellFiberglass Composite Ring Post Test Results. 
APPENDIX A
Rotor Burst Protection Program Experimental
Test Data Compilation
DATA COHPILATION NOTES:
e
(I) GE T58 Engine Power Turbine Rotor - Refer to Figure A-I for
dimensional and physical details.
(2) SRCT Ring Diameter = 15.0 inches.
(3) NF - Centrifugally cast 4130 steel billet produced by National
Forge Company, refer =o Figure A-2 for stress-strain char.
(4) ACIPCO - C_ntrlfugally cast 4130 steel billet produced by
ACIPCO, refer to Figure A-3 for stress-straln char.
(5) Fiber Glass - Composite ring manufactured by Eshbaugh Cor-
poratlon; construction - E-glass roving in an epoxy resin matrix.
(6) B/C-Glass - Composite ring manufactured by Reflective Laminates/
Fansteel; construction - Boron Carbide segments backed wlth
E-glass tape in an epoxy resin matrix (see Figure A-4).
(7) STL-Glass - Composite ring; construction-41]0 plate steel se_ents
backed with E-glass roving in an epoxy matrix (see Figure A-5).
(8) Curtiss-Wrisht J65 Engine Stage 2 Turbine Rotor; Refer to
Figure A-6 for dimensional and physical details.
(9) LltCT Ring Diameter = 31.64 inches,
(10) Centrifugally cast 4130 steel billet produced by ACIPCO. Refer
to Figure A-7 for stress-strain char.
(11) C - Contained
NC - Not Contained
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THE INCIDENCEOF UNCONTAINED ROTOR BURSTSIN U. S.
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
1962 - 1976
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COMPONENT AND FRAGMENT TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
CONTAINED AND UNCONTAINED ROTOR BURSTS"L-1975
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ROTOR FAILURE/BURST CAUSE CATEGORIES D 1975
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SUMMARYANALYSISOFROTORBURST
INCIDENCEANDRATEFOR1975
FACTS:
• TOTALNO.ENGINESHUTDOWNS - 2305
e NO.ROTORFAILURES - 193
• NO.ROTORBURSTS(1) - 104
• NO.UNCONTAINEDROTORBURSTS - 14
• A/CFLIGHTHOURS - 6x106
• ENGINEFLIGHTHOURS - 19.2x106
ANALYSIS:
• PERCENTROTORFAILUREINDUCEDENGINESHUTDOWNS- 8.4%
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DISCUSSION
J. Meaney, Rohr
First, was the Kevlar ring made with epoxy binding? Second, did you
ever test these rings with radial s,,_l)orts;don't you feel that not having
radial supports could be unconservative inasmuch as you allow the ring to
deform to a much greater manner than if it were part of a "long" container?
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
In answer to the first question, the Kevlar that we used was a fabric
wound on a diagonal with no binder. A thin inner aluminum cylinder was used
to provide shape.
Concerning the second question, some preliminary tests in which we
purposely added radial constraints were conducted. We found that it wasn't
a weight-effective configuration. That is, it weighed more than a freely-
supported ring that provided the same degree of containment for identical
burst conditions.
J. Meaney, Rohr
Well, the point I was trying to get at was that some of the rings that
you showed that actually contained the fragments were greatly deformed. But
if the ring had a "large axial length" and was supported on casing or bracket
; structure, would not this support influence the containment ability? '
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
That was why we went through the exercise of trying to determine the
optimum ring axial length with respect to weight. An optimum was found when
the axial length ratio between the rotor axial length and the ring axial length
was one. Ratios of one-half, one, and two were investigated for a one-inch wide
rotor. We evaluated the effect of axial length on the containment process and
found an optimum with respect to weight at a rotor to ring axial length ratio
ratio of one.
R. Bristow, Boeing
I would like to make a comment on that last question. A Kevlar shield
/ must deform quite a bit more than a steel shield, and we were worried about how
# some of the aircraft structure might r_strain the Kevlar shield such that the ,
fragment punches a hole or chews its way through. We put some honeycomb material
._ behind the Kevlar on some of our tests to simulate the sound suppression material. !
On some of these, we had two layers of sixteenth inch aluminum with honeycomb i
in between, so that the whole honeycomb panel was about an inch thick. The
Kevlar did not fail under that condition; it blew the honeycomb apart and
% continued to expand. These were ballistic type impact tests, not engine rotor
burst" impacts.
B.L. Koff, GE-Cincinnati
These disk impact tests were conducted by bursting a rotor between two
' 143
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steel plates and having the segments impact on a steel ring. In an actual engine,
that ring cross-section is not held rigidly and would roll and let the disk segments
slip by. As a result, it would take three or four tLmes the ring weight if the
axial length effect is included to achieve containment, because in the engine the
disk is not guided between two solid steel plates. The disk moves radially out-
ward but the fragment could twist the ring and deflect right past it. That's
one point.
The second point is that if you're talking about containing turbine disks,
it seems that you should only experiment with materials (if you're going to
pack it down tight around the rotor) that can take the temperature environment
in the turbine section of the engine.
G.J. Mangano, NAPTC
Yes, I agree. These tests are somewhat abstract; they are not intended
to provide final design information, but rather to explore containment ring
behavior under conditions of actual engine rotor fragment attack. Because
this was a first attempt at providing general design guidelines, it didn't
take into account more specific variables such as engine mounting effects,
temperature effects, etc. i
S. Sattar, P&W
To follow up the previous question -- in an engine, you may not get an
axisymmetric failure where fragments are trying to load the ring in a hydrostatic
pressure manner. Quite often the fragments want to apply not only hydrostatic
pressure on the ring, but want to twist it. If you had supported the contain-
ment ring in the manner that the engine sees it, quite often I think a Kevlar
ring which might be very effective to contain pressure, may buckle under the _
very large torque loads that these pieces will impart. An engine rotor may
not burst perfectly; all the pieces may not be released. You might lose maybe
one-third of it in pieces, and the other two-thirds might stay on the rotor.
. I wonder if you'd like to comment on that. _
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
High-speed photo results taken of the containment process and examination
of the rings after testing indicate that ring loading by a symmetrical rotor
• burst is not hydrostatic. In fact, highly local and considerable bending of
the ring occurs outwardly at the disk impact sites and inwardly at points
approximately midway between the impact sites. A symmetrical three-fragment/iA
/ burst, for example, will cause six local bending sites: three inward and
' _ three outward. For two-, three-, and six-fragment sywmetrical bursts, the '_
loading is symmetrical to be sure but is far from being what can be considered
hydrostatic. This is evident from Figs. 9, I0, II, and 16 of our paper. As
the numbers of fragments involved in the burst increases much beyond six, the
ring loading would tend to be hydrostatic, but within the scope of our experience,
highly fragmented disk bursts in service tend to be the exception rather than the
_- rule.
I have no direct experience with the mechanics of asymmetric burst contain-
ment, but it would seem that this type of failure would more likely load larger
areas of the ring in a hydrostatic manner than would a symmetric burst.
i
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In order to minimize the weight of ring used for containment, whether
it is made of steel or Kevlar, the ring should be allowed to deform and
displace freely during the fragment interactions so as to take maximum
advantage of the energy that can be absorbed in the distortion process.
Where weight is to be minimized, this concept dictates that the ring installa-
tions on an engine should approach that which was used for test; namely, freely
supported. Under these conditions the Kevlar ring did admirably well in con-
taining the fragments at minimum weight.
P. Gardner, Norton Co.
Why did you limit your studies of Kevlar to Kevlar 29 and not 497
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
We did only exploratory testing of Kevlar: Boeing has provided us with
the rings. We have conducted only four or five tests to date. Kevlar 29 was
supplied and used.
• J.H. Gerstle, Boein_ #
I might just add a comment to that. Boeing has tested both Kevlar 29
and 49. We did not see substantial differences.
J
i A. Weaver, P&W ! /
" Concerning the weight effectiveness, with the increased axial widths of
your rings, above the ratio of I:I that you cited, although the long rings are _!i
heavier, did the actual thickness for threshold containment decrease when i
compared with the I:i ratio case?
!
G.J. Man@ano, NAPTC
Thickness required for containment at an axial length ratio of 2 was
greater than for a ratio of I. This is a surprising result, i
• Sol Weiss, NASA-Lewis
AS you presented the containment data on the small wheel, I got the
impression (I think you said this) that apparently #/le threshold containment
weight did not depend upon the number of equal-size fragments. I think
yesterday we heard some people intuitively say (and I think we all believe
this) that if you decrease the size of the fragments and increase the number
of fragments, you may have a better opportunity for containment at lower
containment ring weight. Now, when you went to a large wheel, it seems that e,
? _ the number of fragments did have an effect upon containment .capability. Now,
with what we've done so far, can we conclusively say, that the number of
fragments did not affect containment in _e small wheel tests, but did in the
large wheel tests?
G.J. Sag_ano_ NAPTC
For the small-rotor containment tests, the results definitely indicate
an independence between the weight of ring required for containment (or SCFE)
and the number of fragments generated at burst. The large rotor test results
tend to indicate the opposite. ,
l
p
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A.K. Forney, FAA
Guy, if I may, I'd like to go back to the motivation portion of your
presentation because I'd hate to have these experts leave here with an
incorrect impression about the FAA sitting on all of this beautiful data.
First, I'd like if you could, to put your slide back up that shows the causes
of the uncontained rotor bursts. Could you, I'm going to ask you to show two
things: one that SDR, and second: your causes.
Now, since he's found the SDR I'll go ahead with it first. I wanted you
p
to see that you get very little info_.ation on an SDR; here you see just about
all that you really ever get. Now, a few things about it that maybe you wanted
to know. This one is "open"; it does me_ that there will be a subsequent report.
It says "under investigation" so that theze will be another one that will close
it. All three of these happen to be open and so we do get a subsequent report;
it's interesting what some of these subsequent ones say. This one could very
well say "engine torn down and inspected, insufficient stall margin". We have
a little difficulty determining how the airline's overhaul shop determines b)"
inspection that the hardware had an insufficient stall margin (that it obviously i
did have insufficient stall margin under the conditions that caused it'to stall).
We in FAA engineering have found that we cannot use the SDR's to provide us with _ ;
any engineering information. All the SDR's can do is tell us that something
happened, and if we want to get details, we really do not depend on the SDR. J
Now there are several reasons. One is they don't have very much more detail ,,
than you see here. Secondly, all of this is fed into a computer and the computer
is not programmed, for example, to :et us pull out "uncontained failures". So
- if it does not specifically happen to mention it (and frequently you can't tell •
from the SDR whether the rotor failure was contained or not) the SDR really is
of no value there. Then (and maybe I should have started out here) these things
are submitted by an air carrier (that's the FAA term for airlines). They are
required by the regulations to report certain things that occur, and one of the
things they are req-:red to report is all of the in-flight shutdowns of engines.
NOW, it's interesting, what is in-flight; there's a fuzzy area. If something
requires them to shut an engine down before rotation, then some of the airlines
don't record it; it wasn't in-flight so it wasn't an in-flight shutdown. But
you know, we're interested in what happens to the engines just the same but
we don't often get the reports. So having made my comment, I would like to
ask you how you determined the causes. Did you attempt to determine the causes
from SDR's, or did you do it like we do, use the SDR to alert yourself to an
incident and then go back not even to the airline but to the engine company?
; / Experience has shown us that we get the best information on what really happened
•_:J and what the causes were by going back to the engine manufacturer whose engine
was involved. I do not know enough of your work to know how you' re doing that.
6
G.J. Man_ano_ NAPTC
Let me explain our procedures to you. I agree with you, there isn't
very much information in the SDR, but there is enough to give us some measure _
J
/ of what's happening. When there's any controversy as to whether or not a
fragment was contained or if fragments were generated, we just don't include
it in our analysis. We operate to the limits of what the SDR has to offer,
nothing more. If the SDR doesn't have the cause (and this is FAR data), if it
doesn't stipulate what the cause is, then we do not use it. This is evidenced
, 4
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by the preponderance of "unknowns" that we nave here; the "unknown" category
is far and away the largest category. We compile data to the level of what
the SDR provides. However, this compilation gives a reasonably good indication
of what's going on. I do not think that our compilation is nearly as extensive
as that of the SAE committee; theirs is a very fine effort, and a very welcome
one. Our tabulation is intended to keep our finger on the pulse of the situa-
tion; the data are no better than the information provided by the FAA. Now,
Bob DeLucia is in charge of reducing this information, I would like to ask if
he has any comments to make.
R. DeLucia, NAPTC
I'd just like to address one point. As of June of last year we got
together with the FAA in Washington and explained the problem that we're
having identifying uncontained rotor bursts. They are sympathetic and as of
last year, they have included a code letter T, which means "engine case punc-
tured". So any subsequent SDR, say from about last June to the present will
have a code letter "T" in the computer runoff sheet if a fragment penetrated
the engine ca_ing and came out.
f
A.K. Fornez, F._A_
I would like to express publicly my appreciation to the Navy for that.
First of all, I didn't know that; I'd be interested in knowing who in FAA ,/L
headquarters you talked to. But our maintenance people, not engineering,
looked after this program. When the SAE Committee's activities started, we
asked them to pull out of the computer all of the uncontained failures, and . .
,: they couldn't.. We tried officially from engineering and maintenace to get
the program changed to identify uncontained failures, and we were unsuccessful. , '
So the fact that you now have done it, I want to express my appreciaticr "
. publicly, but I'd like to know who you did it with so I can find out the
details of it.
G. Gunstone, CAA-FAA
; l
I would just like to say that the last question reinforces yesterday's
plea that the constructors should get together to supply a consistent set of
data which could be used by all. We are all fumbling around with insufficient,
incomplete,, inaccurate data. It is quite silly that we should be "_n that
position, and I hope that a strong recomm_endation for a consistent data input
will come from this meeting.
4
y / H. Garten, GE-Lynn k
•_. I would just like to reinforce some of the other technical comments about
_ the tests. It seems to me that the first series of tests with the small turbine
"' wheel were really hydrostatic tests. If you had bothered to measure the length
of the shield after testing, you might have found that it was quite long, (oircum-
ferentially long) as compared to the original circumference, because most of the
strain energy went into tension. Now, when you got to the larger rotor, you had
_" to build your ring shield very deep, and the shield failed before it ever could
: support the hydrostatic load in tension, and it failed in bending. So I Just
wonder if you had considered comparing a metal shield with a Keval shield, build-
ing a metal shield in layers so that you would get more strain energy, into tension
: and less strain energy into bending?
, 147
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G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
Herb, in fact, we did run layered rings. The results were not presented
here because those tests were exploratory and not part of a systematic testing
effort. As an abstract idea they worked well but appear not to be a practical
configuration.
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
j
I'd like to make a comment about the separate-rings tests -- I happen to
have se._ those three concentric rings which the Navy tested, and which worked.
I believe that the three rings responded similarly to a Hopkinson bar apparatus
with the outer ring doing the momentum trapping. That is, the stress waves will
first propagate in the thickness direction of the three rings and will be
trapped in the outer ring after it separates, causing it to break while leaving
the second rang intact. However, this is not a practical method.
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
There was a qu£stion about the relative ductility of the ring material
for the small rotor vs. the large rotor containment tests.
/
As a matter of fact, I think the materials used for the large rotor tests
were less ductile. We have some curves and t_zey're contained in the paper.
The material was centrifugal cast 4130 steel Mandom samples of the material
- were taken and subjected to standard ASTM X-ray tests for defects -- none were
found. We were concerned about porosity problems. We ran some containment tests
on wrought steel rings, and found large rotor threshold containment at a weight
of about 135 pounds vs. about 168 pounds for the cast 4130 steel. We did not
use titanium for containment tests. As someone mentioned, containment testing
under high temperature conditions would be useful.
What we'd like to do to close the loop is, perhaps, run a few more base-
line tests using a better steel, perhaps such as a wrought alloy that isn't
subject to defects and has better ductility. Then we plan to go on to composites,
which Art Holms is going to cover, in a paper later on. We shall explore Kevlar.
We are not looking at a particular design but want to provide generally applicable
guideline information that will be useful. We would welco,e your comments on how
we can make the tests more realistic without incurring excessive costs, and with-
out focussing on a particular application or problem. We are looking for rules
._ / that will be generally applicable and useful to the aircraft community.
H. Garten, GE-Lynn
I don't know why you're not looking at titanium because titanium is incorpo-
rated in some of the fan engines.
; G.J. Man_ano_ NAPTC
%
We agree with you and Denis McCarthy that titanium does appear to merit
: attention for containment applications. Some selected testing would be useful.
A. Holms_ NASA-Lewis
I have a comment. One question dealt with unsymmetrical bursts. It seems
!to me that the symmetrical burst is the more severe test of the ring. Mainly
with an unsymmetrical burst, you probably have one piece flying out with a
lot of translational energy and velocity, but the big piece has a lot of
stored rotational energy which it can give up over a longer period of time,
dissipating its energy with rubbing friction. So it seems to me that an
unsymmetrical burst would be a less severe test than a symmetrical burst.
On the question of the X-rays of the castings, the pieces that were
X-rayed were about one and a quarter inch thick with the X-ray beam going
through the one and a quarter inch direction. I think that was a reasonable
nondestructive test of the material. It is true that the larger castings
were more difficult castings than the small castings. The elongation in the
tensile specimens from the small casting was quite a bit larger than theL
elongation from the large casting specimens. That may explain our size
effect. But, on the other hand, workers in fracture mechanics often do find
size effects in the work they do.
The body armor data that's been gathered by the Dept. of Defense shows
that titanium is much superior to most steels for high velocity impact in the
range of 2,000 or 3,000 feet per second. Put if you get down around 500 feet
per second, titanium is no longer superior.
._ 'i}
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ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE 2-D AND 3-D METAL STRUCTURES SUBJECTED TO FRAGMENT IMPACT*
E.A. Witmer, T.R. Stagliano, R.L. Spilker, and J.J.A. Rodal
Aeroelastic and Structures Research Laboratory
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
SUMMARY
Reviewed in this paper are studies carried out and/or in progress at the
MITAeroelastic and Structures Research Laboratury to develop theoretical pro-
cedures for predicting the large-deflection elastic-plastic transient structural
responses of metal containmont or deflector structures to cope with rotor-burst
fragment impact attack. Most of the past effort was devoted to containment/
deflector (C/D) structures whose axial dimension is comparable to that of the
attacking fragments and hence the associated structural responses are essen-
tially two-dimensional. Recent effort has been applied to analyzing C/D struc-
tures whose "axial dimension" is much larger than that of the attacking fragments;
thus, the associated structural response to be analyzed is essentially three-
: dimensional.
_ For two-dimensional C/D structures both finite-element and finite-difference
analysis methods have been employed to analyze structural response produced by
either (a) prescribed transient loads or (b) fragment impact. For the latter
category, two time-wise step-by-step analysis procedures have been devised to
predict the structural responses resulting from (a succession of} fragment impacts:
(I) the collision force method (CFM) whereby one utilizes an approximate predic-
tion of the force applied to the attacked structure during fragment impact (also
equal and oppositely to the fragment itself) and (2) the collision imparted veloc- Iity method (CIVM} in which one computes the impact-induced velocity increment
ac_,iredby a region of the impacted structure near the impact point (and the
,;ttendant velocity decrement suffered by the attacking fragment}. The merits and
limitations of these approaches are discussed. For the analysis of 3-d respo =es
of C/D structures, only the CIVM approach is being investigated.
Experimental data for assessing the accuracy, limitations, and versatility
/" of these analyses have been obtained from two sources. The Naval Air Propulsion
" Test Center has provided data on the responses of containL.ant rings to (a) a
? single T58 turbine rotor blade and (b) to tri-hub burst fragment attack from a
, T58 turbine rotor. Simpler impact experiments involving a "non-deformable
fragment" (a solid steel sphere) against simple aluminum beams and panels have
been conducted at the HIT Aeroelastic and Structures Research Laboratory. Com-
parisons of predictions with observed structural response data are discussed.
This research has been supported in large part by the NASA Lewis Research Cente_
under NGR 22-009-339; the authors wish to acknowledge also the help of their
various colleagues {see co-authors cited in refexences of Appendices A and B).
!
_, _ I_GE Im,.ANll_ FILI11_ 151
!.
1978002125-153
i. Introduction
Engine rotor burst fragments may impact against the engine casing and/or
against special protective structures. These structures maj be intended either
to contain or to divert the fragment and to allow it to escape along a "harmless"
path; th£ respective behavior is termed as being either fragment containment or
fragment deflection. Of principal interest in this paper is the theoretical
prediction of container or deflector structures (C/D structures) which are
subjected to fragment impact. Further, attention is restricted to single-
layer metallic protective structures; the use of non-metallic materials for
protective structures undergoing fragment impact is addressed by several other
papers in this Workshop.
If the dimension of the protective structure in the direction parallel to
the axis of rotation of the turbojet engine is comparable to the corresponding
dimension of the attacking fragment, the defl__ction of the attacked structure
will be essentialS.7 the same at all locations along that axial direct__on; in
this case, the deformation is termed two-dimensional (2-D}. However, if that
protective-structure dimension is large in the above comparative sense, the
; structure will undergo general three-dimensional (3-D) structural deflections. a
For prelim/nary design and parametric studies of C/D structures, it may
be useful to idealize the transient structural response as 2-D, as depicted
schematically in Fig. I. Here the effect of the structure which supports the
C and/or D structure is represented by a normal and tangential spring founda-
tion; also, various support conditions can be provided in this type of idealized
2-D model. This tYPe of model tends to include the main structural response
features while minimizing the computational burden. Accordingly, a series of
2-D structural response codes for partial and/or complete rings of arbitrary
initial shape, with uniform or nonuniform thickness, and subjected to initial-
/ velocity distributions, prescribed externally-applJ d loads, or fragment impact
have been developed. The capabilities and features of these computer codes
[1-5]* are summarized in Appendix A. Some illustrative examples of the use of
some of these codes are shown later in this paper.
For structural response conditions wherein the use of a 2-D idealization
- is an excessive over-slmpliflcation and where one seeks to predict the response
:" in greater detail, the structure needs to be modeled as an assemblage of shell
elements (and stiffeners] [6-8] to enable an accounting of the 3-D shell
References are indicated by numbers in square [ ] brackets.
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structural deflections which are present. On the other hand an excessively
fine modeling such as the use of 3-D solid elements to represent a single-
layer shell, stiffeners, etc. leads to an excessive computational burden for
many purposes. Hence, "shell behavior" modeling serves as a logical "next
improvement" over 2-D modeling of C/D structures. Accordingly, theoretical
prediction methods to compute the responses of plates and shells to initial
velocity distributions and prescribed externally-applied transient loads [6]
are being adapted to predict structural response to fragment impact [9].
In order to evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of these structural
response prediction methods, various experiments have been carried out. The
Naval Air Propulsion Test Center (NAPTC) has provdied data on the responses
of aluminum and steel containment rings to (I) impact by a single T58 turbine
rotor blade and (2) to tri-hub burst fragment attack from a T58 turbine rotor ,
([10-13], for example); in these cases the attacking fragment is complex and
undergoes a considerable amount of deformation during its impact interaction
with the containment ring. A cleaner, less-complex set of impact experiments
has been conducted at the MIT Aeroelastic and Structures Research Laboratory,
involving steel-sphere impact against (I) beams, (2) uniform-thickness initially-
flat square aluminum panels, and (3) panels of type (2) but with integral stiff-
i eners of rectangular cross section; transient strain, permanent strain, and
permanent deflection data of good reliability and accuracy for comparison with
predictions were obtained [14,15]. Some of these studies are described briefly I
in the following.
At the present time, theoretical-experime.ntal correlation studies utilizing
the NAPTC and the MIT-ASRL experimental data are in progress for the 2-D cases;
for these cases the C,'VM-JET 4B computer code is being employed. For fragment-
impact panels (which undergo 3-D responses), some preliminary calculations are
#/ under way using the breadboard CIVM-PLATE code; systemati_ testing and checking -_,
of this code will be required before it can be used with confidence.
Figure 2 serves as a concise outline of most of the MIT-ASRL studies which
• have been carried out to date concerning the theoretical prediction of the
: responses of metallic C/D structures to fragment impact. Listed in Appendix B
•, are the associated MIT-ASRL reports and papers, as well as the status and
availability of the pertinent structural response computer codes.
153
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Section 2 is devoted to describing two of the analysis methods (the
collision imparted velocity method CIVM, and the collision force method CFi4)
studied for predicting the large-deflection, elastic-plastic, transient
responses of 2-D structures which are subjected either to impulse loading or
to fragment impact attack; illustrative examples of the application of these
methods are shown, with emphasis on the CIVM approach. Section 3 deals with
theoretical and experimental studies of fragment-impact-induced responses of
panels which undergo 3-D structural responses. Comments are given in Section 4
concerning the status of structural response prediction procedures for 2-D and
3-D single-layer metallic C/D structures, as well as observations concerning
analysis needs for multilayer multimaterial C/D concepts and configurations
being considered as lighter weight candidates to cope with en.-rgetic engine
rotor burst fragments.
!
2. 2-D Structural Response Studies
Some representative analyses and results will be illustrated here concisely;
more extensive results and discussion may be found in the cited references.
Analysis of 2-D structural response to fragment impact will be discussed for two
approaches: the collision imparted velocity method (CIVM) and the collision
force method (CFM); for illustration, both approaches are applied to analyze •
the transient response of a containment ring to impact by a single blade of a
turbine rotor. Next, a more complex fragment attack is analyzed by using the
!
CIVM approach; this involves T58 tri-hub turbine rotor burst attack against a
&
steel containment ring. Because of the complexities arising mainly from severe ?
changes -in the geometries of the attacking fragments during the impact and
interaction process, it became advisable to obtain experimental data for a
more clearly defined impact situation in order that the measured transient
_ / response information could be used to make a clear assessment of the adequacy ;:
L
of the basic building blocks contained in _e theoretical prediction procedure.
Accordingly, described next are experimental and theoretical studies of the
transient responses of simple beams to impulse loading or to steel sphere
: impact attack.
2.I Single Rotor Blade Impact Against a Containment Ring
In these studies of 2-D structural response to impact, use is made of
finite element and finite difference methods which have been showr, to produce
!
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reliable predictions for large-deflection, elastic-plastic, transient response
of simple beams and rings subjected to known impulsive loading [16,17]. For
impact-induced structural response analysis, the principal added ingredient
to be taken into account is the impact/interaction itself; two methods (CIVM
and CFM) explored for treating this matter are discussed next.
To illustrate these approaches, impact of a single blade from a T58 turbine
rotor against a containment ring will be studied. High speed photographic data
for such a case have been obtained at the spin-chamber facility of the Naval
Air Propulsion Test Center [i0]. Ring configuration data and blade orientation
as a function of time at intervals about 30 microseconds apart were obtained
and are used for illustrative comparisons.
2.I.1 Analysis with the Collision Imparted Velocity Method
Figure 3 illustrates a containment ring which is modeled by a number of
a
finite elements and subjected to impact attack by an idealized single rotor
blade. The equations of motion for the ring and for the fragment are solved
in small increments At in time by an appropriate finite-difference time operator
l
sch_ _. For this analysis, the fragment is regarded as being rigid. Impact is
regarc _ as being an instantaneous local effect between the fragment and a small
regioll of the structure in the vicinity of the impact point; for present purposes,
the size of this small ring region on either side of the impact point is estimated !
as being the product of At and the longitudinal elastic wave speed in the ring.
Impulse/momentum and kinetic energy conservation equations are used to calculate
the "post-impact" (or collision-imparted} velocities of the fragment and of this
impact-affected structural region; by employing the concept of the coefficient
of restitution (e) this local impact can be treated as perfectly elastic (e=l),
perfectly inelastic (e=O), or intermediate (0<e<l).
Figure 4 is an information flow diagram illustrating the use of this)
/ / "collision-lmpartedvelocitymethod" (CIVM)in the calculationof transient
structural response produced by fragment impact. Typically, a succession of
impacts is predicted. Fuller details of this approachare given, for example, ,
in Refs. 4, 17, and 18. •
Table I summarizes the containment ring and fragment data for the illustra-
tive case: NAPTC Test 91. Shown in Fig. 5 are predicted and measured deformed
ring configurations and blade locations at 150, 570, and 810 mlczoseconds after
initial Impact. In the Impact quadrant the ring was modeled h_ 10 equal length
Y
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cubic-cubic elements; 6 equal-length elements were used in each of the 3 other
quadrants. For these calculations, coefficients of restitution of e=0 and e=l
were used. The 6061-T6 aluminum ring material was regarded as elastic, perfectly-
plastic, with a strain-rate (EL-PP-SR) dependent yield stress a given by the
_ _ y
following approximation:
: o [1+ p]
I
% o
where 0 is the static yield stress, is the strain rate, and D and p are
o -I
material constants. For these calculations, D=6500 sec and p=4 were assumed.
Also, frictionless impact and interaction (B=0) between the ring and the blade
was assumed for the cases illustrated here. Fairly good agreement between the
predicted and observed deformed ring configuration is noted, but the predicted
d
vs. observed fragment motion is not good. This latter disagreement stems mainly
from ignoring friction and the changing mass moment of inertia of the actual
I
deforming blade. Later calculations included these effects.
2.1.2 Analysis with the Collision Force Method
b
In this method the attacking fragment is treated as being deformable.
Shown, for example, in Fig. 6 are some postulated idealized configurations to
represent a deformable impacting blade. The straight rigid blade model was
: used in the previous case. Explored in Ref. 19 were the following two idealiza-
tions -- the blade was assumed {a) to remain straight but to shorten in an t
elastic, perfectly-plastic (EL-PP) fashion or (b) to curl in a simple plausible
assumed-mode fashion; these are termed, respectively, the elastic, perfectly-
plastic shortening blade model {EL-PP-SB) and the elastic, perfectly-plastic
curling blade model (EL-PP-CB)These modes of behavior combined with a step
J
by step collision inspection set of rules permitted following this process.
At any given instant, applicable values of governing geometric deformed-., ade-
configuration parameters were identified. These in turn were related via
energy methods to the _mponent of the force applied by the blade perpendicular
,. to the surface of the attacked contaimlent ring and equal-and-oppositely to the %
fragment itself• Similarly, equal and opposite tangential forces (from friction) _,
were postulated to be _ times the normal-to-the-surface component. A self-
explanatory information flow chart for the CFM process is given as Fig. 7.
• Shown in Fig. 8 are defomed ring predictions at two instants after initial "
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impact for the EL-PP-SB model and the EL-PP-CB model for the case in which the
friction coefficient _ is assumed to be .15 and the perfectly-plastic yield
stress of the steel-alloy blade is assumed to be O -- 160,000 psi. Fairly
v-
good agreement between experiment and these EL-PP-C_ model predictions is
observed. Reference 19 shows the ring response to be rather insensitive to
(plausible) values of friction coefficient used. The motion of the blade,
however, is much more sensitive to p -- as Fig. 9 indicates.
The curling blade model [19] devised by plausible engineering rules and
approximations appears to represent rather well the behavior and the observed
deformed configuration of the actual single blade in NAPTC Test 91. One must
keep track of the time-varying geometry of both the deforming blade and the
deforming containment ring in order to determine when and where the successive
collisions (i.e., attempted simultaneous occupancy of some regions of space)
occur. Hence, it is evident that if one were to use this method to analy-:e
structural response to impact by, for example, a disk-rim fragment with perhaps
3 to 10 attached blades (each of which will undergo sequential different deforma-
tions), one would be faced with a substantial book-keeping job to define the
space occupancy of this complex deforming fragment; the advisability of seeking
a less compl_x scheme is clear. Accordingly, subsequent attention has been
given to the use of greatly-idealized rigid fragments in conjunction with the
CIVM analysis scheme.
2.2 CIVM Analysis of Tri-Hub Rotor Burst Attack Against a Containment Ring
One type of postulated engine rotor fragment attack which has received much
discussion is that in which the rotor bursts into 3 equal segments (termed a
tri-hub b.urst}. One fragment of this type is shown schematically in Fig. 10.
The NAPTC has conducted many tests involving tri-hub burst attack against various
/ single-layer and multilayer containment rings. Recently NAPTC Test 201 involving
tri-hub burst attack of a T58 turbine rotor at 19,859 rpm against a cast 4130
steel cone_Inment ring of 7.50-in inner radius, 0.625-In thickness, and 1.50-in
axial length was conducted [13]. Figure II shows the post-test deformed-rlng
configuration. High speed photographs showed the severe deformation incurred
by many of the blades during the impact/interaction process; this is depicted
: schematically in Fig. I0.
For convenience and geometric simplicity, each such fragment has been
idealized for use in the CIVM-JET 4B computer code [4] as a rigid circular body
157
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of the same mass and mass moment of inertia as the pre-impact fragment, with
the same CG location, translational velocity, and rotational velocity as the
actual fragment at postulated release. As indicated in _ig. i0, one might
elect to represent the actual fragment by an idealized fragment of "properly
selected radius rf". An examination of this rotor indicates that reasonable
minimum and maximum values for rf would be about 2.56 and 4.20 inches, respec-
tively; the use of these as well as an "intermediate" value of 3.36 inches was
explored.
Figure 12 indicates the geometric• test, and modeling data for this case.
The ring has been modeled by 48 equal-length ring elements. The point of
initial impact of each of the three fragments is indicated in Fig. 12; element
numbers and node identification are also given. The uniaxial static stress-
strain properties of 4130 cast steel were approximated by piecewise linear
segments with the stress-strain pairs: (O,_) = 80,950 psi, .00279; 105,300
psi, .0225; and 121,000 psi, .200 via the mechanical sublayer model; strain
-1
rate effects were approximated by using D = 40.4 sec and p=5. Shown in
Fig. 13 is the predicted ring configuration at i000 miczoseconds after initial
impact. The predicted inner surface and outer surface strains at the midelement
location of elements I, 4, and 6 are given in Fig. 14; for this calculation,
frictinnless impact _=0 and rf=2.555-in were employed. Figure 15 shows the
circumferential distributions of inner-surface and outer-surface strain at
2400 microseconds after initial impact.
The effects of friction for otherwise identical modeling are indicated
roughly by the Fig. 16 comparison of deformed ring configurations at 1200
microseconds after initial impact for _=0 and _=0.3. Similarly, the effects
of idealized fragment radius rf are seen in Fig. 16 where deformed ring profiles
. / at 1200microseconds after initial impact are shown for rf=2.555-in and rf=3.360-
_ in. It is evident that if one chooses an unduly large idealized fragment radius
rf, this "rigid fragment" will constrain the ring to restrict its bending strain
contribution so that unrealistically small total strains will be produced at
the "convex lobes" -- compared with that which the actual "effectively-smaller-
\ radius" fragment will produce.
The use of an idealized fragment of constant radius will clearly make it
impossibleto obtain complete time history agreement between predicted and
measured Inner-surface and/or outer-surface strains. However, the hope is that
a properly-chosen effective rf will lead to reasonable predictions vs. experiment
158
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of maximum strains produced as a function of circumferential location. Further
calculations and measurements are need6_ L_sess the reliability with which
this can be done. However, at the cost of greater complexity and computational
expense, one can devise and use a fragment model which more closely simulates
the behavior of the actual fragment.
Note, finally, that a comparison between the predicted and observed
permanently-deformed ring configuration is not shown. This is the case
because the calculation at At=l microsecond has been carried out only to 2400
microseconds after initial impact. Whereas peak response occurred near 1200
microseconds, the ring is still springing back considerably at the 2400 micro-
second time. A longer calculation would be necessary in order to permit making
a reasonable estimate of the permanent-deformation configuration.
2.3 Beam Response to Steel Sphere Impact
In order to obtain appropriate and detailed 2-D transient structural
response data under well-defined impact conditions so that a definitive '_
evaluation could be made of the adequacy of the approximate collision-
interaction analysis employed in the CIVM scheme, some simple experiments
have been conducted at the MIT-ASRL. Beams of 6061-T651 aluminum with nominal .
8-in span, 1.5-in width, and 0.10-in thickness and with both ends ideally
clamped (see Fig. 18) have each been subjected to midspan impact by a solid
steel sphere of one-inch diameter [14]. Impact velocities ranged from those I
sufficient to produce small permanent deflection to those needed for threshold
T
rupture of the beam. Spanwise-oriented strain gages were applied to both the
upper and the lower (impacted) surface of the beam at various spanwise locations.
In each test, transient strain measurements were attempted for 8 of the gages;
after each test, permanent strain readings were obtained for all surviving
'_ / gages. Also, permanent deflection measurements were made.
/ An inspection of each specimen indicates that except near the point of
impact itself (i.e., where Ix[_0.8-in), the beam underwent essentially 2-D
deflection behavior; pronounced 3-D behavior occurs near the point of initial
impact. Hence, the 2-D structural response code (CIVM-JET 4B) may be expected
to provide valid comparisons for Ixl>0.8-in. Accordingly, such calculations
, and comparisons are in progress, and some preliminary results are shown next.
For the test and specimen identified as CB-18 in Ref. 14, the entire beam
has been modeled with 43 equal-length cublc-cubic finite elements. The beam
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material has been modeled as having either elastic, strain-hardening (EL-SH)
or EL-SH-SR behavior where the uniaxial static stress-strain curve has been
approximated by the a,e pairs: a,e= 41,000 psi, .0041; 45,000 psi, .0012;
and 53,000 psi, .i000. For EL-SH-SR conditions, D=6500 sec -I and p=4 have
been assumed. For CB-18 initial steel-sphere impact occurred at a velocity
of 2974 in/sec; a state of large permanent deflection was produced.
Shown in Fig. 19 are predicted and measured strains at spanwise stations
x=l. 50 and i.20-in from the midspan impact point. At these 2-D structural
response locations, there is fairly reasonable agreement between predicted
and measured strains. Figure 20 shows the predicted transient vertical dis-
placement response at x=l.0-in for both the EL-SH and the EL-SH-SR case. From
these and longer-duration plots, the estimated respective permanent deflection
is 0.63 and 0.58-in; the measured value is 0.60-in. While the comparisons shown
here indicate encouraging agreement, mL_.e extensive calculations and comparisons
are needed before a firm assessment can b' made of the adequacy of the procedure
embodied in the CIVM-JET 4B computer code '4].
t
3. 3-D Structural Response Studies !
Of concern here are situations in which the fragment-impacted structure ii
undergoes pronounced 3-D rather than 2-D deformation. Appropriate methods of
structural response analysis and corresponding well-defined experimental
transient structural response data which will serve to permit making a clear
evaluation of the adequacy and/or accuracy of proposed prediction schemes are
needed. Some contributions to this process are described here.
Although structural response analyses for fraqment impact against initially-
curved as well as initially-flat target structures are of interest, it is useful
to minimize the complexities while checking the adequacy of the basic building
/ blocks in the analysis process. Hence, attention has centered on impulse and
• _ impact experiments and theoretical analysis of initially-flat structures.9
o Experiments involving steel-sphere impact against (1) narrow-plate (or beam)
specimens [14] as well as (2) square uniform-thlckness panels with four clamped
edges and (3) panels of type (2} but with integrally-machined stiffeners of
rectangular cross-section [15] have been conducted.
% Two of the type (2] inltlally-flat specimens have been subjected to well-
defined impulse loading by the sheet explosive loading technique to produce
: large-deflection, elastic-plastic transient structural response data for checking
,: 1 160
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the basic finite-element and transient response prediction aspects -- independent
of impact itself. Also, steel sphere impact tests of this type of panel have
been conducted. Thus, transient strain, permanent strain, and permanent deforma-
tion data of high quality are available for checking the prediction procedures
of Refs. 6 and 9; the latter pertains to the breadboard computer codes PLATE
_ and CIVM-PLATE which hopefully will enable one to predict 3-D transient large-
deflection elastic-plastic, structural responses of panels caused by impulse
and impact, respectively. If future correlation calculations reveal these codes
to provide reliable transient response predictions, these codes will be upgraded
to a condition convenient for routine use.
To illustrate the general character of the panel deformations produced for
this purpose, Fig. 21 shows the permanent deflection along tb5 centerline of
specimen CP-2, a 0.062-in thick square initially-flat 8-in by 8-in panel of
6061-T651 aluminum with all four edges ideally clamped. The sheet explosive
loading technique was used to impart essentially a uniform initial normal
velocity of 16,235 in/sec over a 2-in by 2-in region centered at the panel L;
center. Strain gages were also applied at various locations on the non-loaded
side of the'panel; both transient and permanent strain data were recorded. In
addition, a pattern of lightly scribed grids was applied to a 3-in by 3-in
region centered at the panel center on the non-loaded surface. Measurements
of pre-test and post-test spacings of these grid lines enable one to make a
rough determination of the permanent relative elongation on that surface as
a function of location from the center of the panel. Some results from these
determinations are shown in Fig. 22.
Steel sphere impact against a square 8-in initially-flat 6061-T651 aluminum
panel of 0.063-in th%ckness with all four sides ideally clamped :esults in
permanent deformation conditions wherein severe permanent deformation is con-
centrated near the Point of initial impact itself as Fig. 23 shows for panel
_ specimens CP-8 which suffered 1-inch diameter steel-sphere impact at 2435 in/sec. '
> Photo-etched grids spaced O.020-in apart on the non-impacted surface permitted
making the permanent relative elongation measurements indicated in Fig. 24; the
"large strains" are seen to be ooncentrated near the impact location and decrease
rapidly with distance from the center of impact.
Finally, some illustrative preliminary results from applying the bread-
board CIVM-PLATE code to steel-sphere-lmpacted narrow-plate (or beam) specimen
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CB-18 are presented here; the steel-sphere impact velocity was 2794 in/sec
initially. For computational thrift, one quarter of the specimen (see Fig. 18)
was modeled by a 2 by ii mesh of flat plate elements .aving 6 degrees of free-
dom per node, with symmetry conditions imposed along x=0 and y=0; this finite
element mesh is shown in Fig. 25. Initial impact was assumed to occur at
(x,y)=(0,0) whereas it actually occurred at about .06-in from this location.
Relative elongation time histories predicted in this calculation along y=0
at stations x=0.6-in and x=l.2-in are compared with experimental measurements
in Fig. 26. Figure 27 demonstrates that this 3-D structural response model
exhibits 3-D deflection predictions -- vertical displacements predicted along
y=0 (the centerline), y=.375-in, and y=.75-in as a function of spanwise location
x are shown at 800 microseconds after initial impact. The anticipated larger
/ displacement is seen to occur along y=0, with decreasing displacements (at ,
given x-locations) more remote from the center of impact. Finally, Fig. 28
shows the predicted lateral transient deflection of the center of the plate
(x,y)=(0,0) and the observed permanent deflection at this location; reasonable "
agreement is evident.
4. Summar_ Comments
; Presented here is an overview of some of the work carried out to develop :
simple methods for predicting the 2-D transient large-deflection elastic-plastic
. structural responses of metal containment or deflection structures subjected to
impulse loads or fragment impact; many more details may be found in the cited _
references. This 2-D type of idealization may serve as a good representation
of certain fragment/structure impact/interaction situations or as a reasonable
first approximation to other more complex cases. This 2-D idealization is
relatively inexpensive to apply and may be useful for preliminary design,
parametric studies, materials screening, etc. Structural configurations of
2-D type included in this discussion consist of complete rings, partial rings,
J
constant or variable thickness, and uniform or arbitrarily-varying initial
curvature, with various elastic foundation or various local support conditions
provided. The associated computer codes (see Appendi_es A and B) are:
?
Structure Subjected to Prescribed Transient Loads or Initial
Velocit_ Distributions
JET 3: Single-Layer Structures
' JET 5A: Multilayer Bernoulli-ruler Structures
i ls2
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Structure Subjected Only to Fragment Impact
CIVM-JET 4B: Single-Layer Structures
CIVM-JET 5B: Multilayer Bernoulli-ruler Structures
Comparisons between experiment and predictions indicate good theoretical-
experimental agzeement for JET 3 predictions and a very encouraging but
incomplete assessment for CIVM-JET 4B; further assessment studies are in
progress.
For cas_s in which the impulsively-loaded structure [6] or fragment-
impacted structure [9] undergoes significant 3-D structural responses, this
more complex behavior must be modeled accordingly. Excellent theoretical-
experimental agreement has been demonstrated [6] for finite-element analysis
of plates and curved shells which undergo large-deflection elastic-plastic
deformations in response to known severe impulse loading. Shown in this paper
are encouraging preliminary comparisons between theory and experiment for
fragment-impacted structures exhibiting 3-D structural response. Appropriate
high quality experimental data on steel-sphere-impacted narrow beams, square
uniform thickness panels, and longeron-stiffened initially-flat panels are
' available for near-future theoretical-e}_perimental correlation studies to
assess the accuracy and/or adequacy of the proposed prediction procedures.
These studies are expected to suggest useful prediction modifications and
improvements. Extensions to include fragment-impacted inltially-curved 3-D dL
structures would comprise a useful logical addition to the prediction capability.
Although this discussion has pertained to initially-isotropic metallic ,
protective structures, many but not all of these analysis features can be
carried over to the analysis of multilayer multimaterial protective structures
-- such configurations are of potential future interest, as other papers in this
/ Workshop indicate. Although such configurations will be much more complex and
_i difficult to analyze, a validated structural response analysis _apability would
be of considerable value for preliminary design, materials screening, parametric
studies, and to reduce the amount of ad hoc testing which otherwise would be
required. The development and checking of accurate prediction methods to
. accommodate structural configurations and materials such as those cited at
this Workshop in the presentations, for example, of Gerstle, Gardner, and Holms
will be a difficult and lengthy process but will represent a highly useful
state-of-the-art advance. This development and validation will require making
I
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careful and detailed transient response observations and measurements for
well-defined targets (geometry, boundary conditions, material mechanical
and failure properties) and impact conditions. Realistic types cf rotor-
burst fragments should be used in exploratory experiments and in evaluation
p
experiments; such experiments are essential to reveal the principal phenomena
and to insure that important response features at6 not overlooked -- as might
be the case if only highly simplifieu impact experiments were to be conducted.
However, simpler better-defined fragments should be used to minimize uncertain-
ties when obtaining detailed transient respo,.se data which are intended to
" serve as a definitive test of the accuracy and/or adequacy of the key building
blocks of the procedures proposed for predicting the "threshold containment
i
levels" of _tructural responses of multilayer multimaterial C/D struc£ures.
7
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TABLE 1
DATA CHARACTERIZING NAPTC RING TEST 91
Ring Data Test 91
Outside Diameter (in) 17.619
Radial Thickness (in) 0.152
Axial Length (in) I.506
Material 2024-T4
Elastic Modulus E (psi) 107
PP Yield Stress _ (psi) 50,000
o
Fragment Data
Type T-58 Single Blade
Material SEL-15
Outer Radius (in) 7.0
Fragment Centroid from Center of _'
Rotation (in) 4.812
Fragment Tip Clearance from Ring (in) 1.658
Fragment Length (in) 3.5
Fragment Length from CG to Tip (in) 2.188
Fragment Weight (Ibs) 0.084
Fragment Moment of Inertia about its
CG (in Ib sec 2) 2.163xi0 -4
Failure Speed (RPM) 15,644.4
Fragment Tip Velocity (ips) !1,467.
Fragment Centroidal Velocity (ips) 7,8S4.
J Fragment Initial Angular Velocity (rad/sec) I,638.3
Fragment Translation KE (in Ib) 6,756.
)
Fragment Rotational KE (in Ib} 290.3
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I DEVELOPMENT OF PREDICTION METHODS FOR STRUCTURAL RESPONSE
• TO PRESCRIBED TRANSIENT LOADS OR INITIAL
VELOCITIES---e'JET CODES (FINITE ELEMENT)
• TO FRAGMENT IMPACT--_ CIVM-JET CODES
• ANALYSIS OF 2-D STRUCTURES
A SINGLE-LAYER RINGS_NEAR COMPLETION
Ak MULTILAYER RINGS---_IN PROGRESS
• ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PANEL RESPONSE
• SINGLE LAYER---m-IN PROGRESS
• MULTILAYER _ NEXT
EXPERIMENTS
• SMALL SCALE SIMPLIFIED IMPACT TESTS AT MIT TO
SUPPLEMENT COMPLEX FULL-SCALE TEST AT THE NAPTC
A OBTAIN DATA TO MAKE IN-DETAIL EVALUATION OF •
ADEQUACY OF PREDICTION METHOD
• IMPACT OF STEEL SPHERE AGAINST
"- } i• FLAT SINGLE-LAYER PANELS _ED EDGES0 WAFFLE-STIFFENED PANELS
1 THEORETICAL-EXPERIMENTAL CORRELATION STUDIES
/ • use or MIT-ASRLEXPOS
/ • USE OF NAPTC DATA
m COMPUTER CODES
• PARAMETRIC AND SCREENING STUDIES
" • TO ASSIST PRELIMINARY DESIGN OF CONTAINERS
AND DEFLECTORS
FIG. 2 S[flMRRRYOF MIT-ASRL STUDIES ON ENGINE ROTOR FRAGMENT IMP&CT
ON C/D STRUCTURES
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LOCALLY-AFFECTED
RING REGION
/
/ KING DZSCRE?I2FJ) ItffO
/ SEG_.NI'S FOR AHAL¥SIS
FIG. 3 SCHFJ_TIC OF &COlffAZliMU_ff RIH(; SUi_ECTFJ) I_)
SINGI,E-FI_qGNE_ tI4PACT
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No YesCOLLISICN
/ CO_TI_JE FOR NEXT 1
TIME STEP OF I "
-- CALCULATION (OR
_' STOP, IF DESIRED)
i.
FIG. 4 INFORHATZON FLOW $CHEMATZC FOR PREDICTING RING AND FRAGMENT
MOTIONS IN THE COLLISION-IMPARTED VELOCITY METHOD
'" j. _ ;_
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o _-- EXPERII_.NT
X ..... CASE CR-II.B (EL-PP-$R, e - O)
CASE CR-IOB (F_-PP-SR, • o l)
RZKG BEFORE INITIAL IMPACT
tO LN
O
#
f
i . ,
;D
.-Z !
-I0
•'_ ,f "P
_: (a) ?AZI - IS0 Uuc "
-- FIG. 5 COMPARISON OF CIVIl PREDICTIONS WITH EXPERIMENT FOR THE FREE
COMPLETE RING SUBJECTED TO SINGLE-BLADE IMPACT IN NAPTC TEST 91
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o----- E3_PER/NENT
x .... CASE CR-llg (FJ.,-PP-SR, e ,, O)
A ____ CASE CRoIOB (FJ+-PP-SR, • I 1)
RING BEI_RE INITIAL INI>ACT
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o _- _ EXPERZNENT
x .... CASE CR-IIB (EL-PP-SR, • - O)
"*- _ CASE CR-10B (EL-PP-SR, • -, 1.)
-_ RING BEJrOREZNZTZKL Z/LlPJ_e'T
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i,
- RIGID STRAIGHT STRAIGHT DEFORMING ,;
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RE-TEST
m
D
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CURLING
I¢OH-DEPORMABLE
L,
FIG. 6 SC_TICS OF ACTUAL AND IDEALIZED FRA_NTS
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:- FIG. 7 INFORMATION FLOW SCHEMATIC F.ORPREDICTING RING AND
FRAGMENT MOTIONS IN THE COLLISION FORCE METHOD
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.............PRE-IMPACT PROFILE
EXPERIMENT
_) EL-PP-SB MODEL
Z_ EL-PP-CB MODEL
(rf = 0.3 IN)
U
: FIG. 8 COMPARISON OF CFM PREDICTIONS FOR EL-PP-SB AND EL-PP-CB BLADE
MODELS FOR M-.15 BLADE/RING IMPACT VERSUS EXPERIMENTAL DEFORMED
RING DATA
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.............PRE-IMPACT PROFILE
EXPEPIMENT
Q EL-PP-SB MODEL
EL-PP-CB MODEL
(rf = 0.3 IN)
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7
,, (b) First Quadrant of the Deformed
Ring at TAII= 626 _sec.
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• .
/ \
/
,g
BEFORE IMPACT
ACTUAL
-- IDEALIZED
i
/
POST-TEST
FIG. I0 SCHEMATICS OF PRE-TEST AND DEFORMED TRI-HUB DISK/BLADE
FRAGMENTS, AND IDEALIZED MODELS
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FIG.  11 POST-TEST CONFIGURATION OF THE STEEL CONTAINMENT RING 
SUBJECTED TO T 5 8  TURBINE ROTOR TRI-HUB BURST I N  NAPTC 
TEST 201 
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48 ELEMENTS T58 TURBINE ROTOR
4 DOF/NODE TRI-HUB BURST
EL-SH-SR
rf=2.555 IN
X _=0
0 IJ=0.3 ,--12 (IN)
-- 10
OX -4 XOXQ
OX -2 XO0
_ o X0
r " ; i _ .... 1 I i -1.m,a---
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FIG. 16 COMPARISON OF PREDICTED DEFORMED RING CONFIGURATIONS AT 1100
MICROSECONDS AFTER INITIAL IMPACT FOR U=O AND If=0.3 WITH
rf=2.555 IN FOR THE NAPTC TEST 201 CONTAINMENT RING
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48 ELEMENTS T58 TURBINE ROTOR
4 DOF/NODE TRI-HUB BURST
EL-SH-SR
p=0
X rf=2. 555 IN
% _ rf=3.360 IN - 12
-- I0
_xZ_,_ z _A
xA
_x x A
-6X& _
_X
xA
_x -4 K A
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',: I X.
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FIG. 17 COMPARISON OF PREDICTED DEFORMED RING CONFIGURATIONS AT 1200
MICROSECONDS AFTER INITIAL IMPACT FOR TWO DIFFERENT FRAGMENT-
SIZE MODELINGS AND FRICTIONLESS IMPACT COND£TIOMS FOR THE
NAPTC TEST 201 CONTAINMENT RING
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES OF MIT-ASRLCOM_UTER CODES FOR PREDICTING
TWO-DIMENSIONAL LARGE-DEFLECTION ELASTIC-PLaSTIC TRANSIENT
RESPONSES OF RING STRUCTURES
This description is intended to provide for the reader a convenient
tabular sununary of the principal features and capabilities of the two-
dimensional transient large-deflection elastic-plastic structural response
ring codes JET 1 (Ref. i), JET 2 (Ref. 2), JET 3A-3D (Ref. 3), CIVM-JET 4B
(Ref. 4), and JET 5A and CIVM-JET 5B (Ref. 5) developed under kASA NGR 22-009-
339.
The JET 1 code of Ref. 1 pertains to single-layer complete, uniform-
thickness, initially-circular rings of either temperature-independent or
temperature dependent material properties. These rings may be subjected to
prescribed: (a) initial velocities, (b) transient mechanical loading, and/or
(c) steady nonuniform temperatures. The finite-difference method employed
in this code had been shown previously (Ref. 6) to provide reliable predic-
tions for the case of temperature-independent material properties.
The JET 2 code was written in order to extend this finite-difference
analysis capability to treat multilayer rings -- cases anticipated to be of
_' future concern. In the interests of efficiency and the minimization of
< computer storage requirements, temperature-dependent material properties
, and thermal loading features were omitted from JET 2; if these omitted '
features should turn out to be needed urgently, they could be added later.
Since the JET 1 and JET 2 codes pertained to initially-circular,
complete rings of uniform thickness whereas there was interest also in
variable-thickness, arbitrarily curved, partial as well as complete rings,
the JET 3 series codes was developed. To accommodate these latter features
as well as a variety of types of (i) boundary conditions, (2) elastic-
foundation supports, and (3) point elastic supports, the more versatile
finite-element analysis procedure was developed and employed. For efficiency
and user convenience, four versions of the JET 3 program were developeds each
version accommodates both complete rings and partial rings. JET 3A and JET 3B
• pertain to.uniform-thickness, initially-circular rings, and employ, respectively,
the central-dlfference and the Houbolt finite-difference time operator; for
certain cases, the latter flnlte-difference time operator may permit more
" /" economic converged transient response predictions than the former. The codes
/ JET 3C and JET 3D are corresponding codes which accommodate varlable-thickness,
"'2
arbltrarily-curved rings.
In most of these codes (JET I through JET 3D and JET 5A), the stimuli.
(I) initial velocity or impulse conditions and/or (2) transient mechanical
loading must be prescribed by the user or analyst. The externally-applied
_ forces experienced by a complete or a partial ring from fragment impact are
: no___tprovided within these codes. The user must supply his own estimate of the
distribution and time histories of these forces. However, in the CIVM-JET 4B
and CIVM-JET 5B codes, fragment/rlng interaction and response effects are
handled internally automatically, for the idealized single-fra_ent and
: n-fra_nt cases provided and discussed in the Appendices of Refs. 4, 5,
and ?.
J
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The CIVM-JET 4B code (Ref. 4) was developed from a modified version
of the JET 3C code, using the central difference timewise operator. The
CIVM (c_ollision i_mparted v_elocity_method) handles a fragment-structure
impact as a series of quasi-static momentum transfers between the attack-
ing fragment and the local-impact-affected portion of the impacted structure.
The solution proceeds as though a series of impulses has been applied to the
impacted region of the structure. This code provides strain output at each
Gaussian station, nodal location, and designated additional points for user
convenience, and calculates the reaction forces at each constrained degree
of freedom. Another feature of this code is the ability to accommodate
branches which are used as additional structural supports. These branches
can have material properties either the same or d_fferent from those present
in the main structure.
The JET 5A and CIVM-JET 5B codes (Ref. 5) were written in order to
extend the capabilities of the JET 3D and CIVM-JET 4B codes to multilayer
structures which are assumed to be hard-bonded and to deform in the Bernoulli-
#
ruler fashion. Both codes contain the Houbolt timewise operator and all the
additional strain and reaction force output and structural support capabilities
utilized in the CIVM-JET 4B code.
In convenient tabular form, the principal features and capabilities of
the codes JET i, JET 2, JET 3A-D, CIVM-JET 4B, JET 5A, and CIVM-JET 5B are
, given in the following:
I
_J
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STRUCTURAL RESPONSE COMPUTER CODE STATUS
Code Capability Status Availability
JET 3 2-D Single-Layer Beams and Complete a
Rings Subjected to Prescribed (Ref. 8)
Transient Loads or Initial
Velocity Distributions (No
: Fragment Impact)
CIVM-JET 4B 2-D Single-Layer Beams and Complete b
Rings Subjected Only to (Ref. 14)
Fragment Impact
JET 5A 2-D Multilayer Bernoulli-Euler Complete b
Beams and Rings Subjected to (Ref. 15}
Prescribed Transient Loads or
Initial Velocity Distributions
, CIVM-JET 5B 2-D Multilayer B-E Beams and Complete b
Rings Subjected only to (Ref. 15)
Fragment Impact
PLATE and 3-D Single Layer Initially- In Progress --
CIVM-PLATE Flat Panels Subjected, Respec-
tively, to (I) Prescribed
Transient Loads and/or Initial
, Velocity Distributions or (2)
, Fraqment Impact Only
-
%
a: Available from COSMIC, Barrow Hall, University of Georgia,
Athens, GA. 30601; contact MIT for errata.
b: Available under a copyright licensing _greement from MIT.
% Contact Prof. E.A. Witmer, Room 41-219, MIT, Cambridge,
/
Mass. 02139.
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DISCUSSION
B.L. Koff, GE-Cincinnati
We have conducted tests a_d managed to collect pieces of blades that
were deliberately failed to under;rand containment ring behavior. It is
quite obvious that you don't get a three-lobe shape in the ring, because
- as soon as the ring starts deforming locally, all of the other blades in the
rotor act as a bearing for the ring. This tends to keep the ring round, not
three-corner or some other shape, by adding quite a bit of support to the ring.
It suggests that there is more to be learned from the tests you are now running
on panels, than in oversimplified tests run with a ring that is not supported
in a manner similar to the engine. When you start adding other support, you
might find that these simplified panel tests, in fact, more nearly duplicate
what actually happens, than an oversimplified test with rotor burst fragments.
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
I thiak it would be very useful in this whole program, if we could have
people like you, who could suggest to us proper models to use for supported
structures, so that we simulate things in the right way. It's an excellent
idea•
As I understand your described tests, you released I or 2 blade portions
from a rotating fully-bladed rotor to impact a containment ring. Similar tests
done at the NAPTC show behavior very similar to what you describe; the initial
impact causes the ring to deform and then it comes in contact with the blades D
still attached to the spinning rotor• These blades also deform but do "support"
the ring and tend to restrain it from deforming as severely as it would if a
"free ring" were impacted only by the initial attacking fragments.
A. Weaver, P&W
As I understand this model, it does a fairly representative job of
modelling deflections in simple structures, whether they are panels or rings.
However, it doesn't get at the meat of the containment problem as I see it,
which is failure. I don't always care about deflections, but I do care when
and where the ring is going to fail, and how to model that. The 2-D analysis
completely ignored the localized effects going on at the center of impact,
which I believe are very important.
/
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
You're perfectly correct, there are 3-D effects present where failure
initiates in the cited beam experiments, and 2-D is clearly an idealization.
It's a convenient scheme to us to obtain some crude estimates but it certainly
doesn't address the real problem. The 3-D problem is the important one. For
: the beams and rings discussed here, the structural response behavior is of the
% 2-D type essentially everywhere on the (narrow) rings and also everywhere on
the steel-sphere-impacted beam specimens except near the "impact point" itself
where 3-D effects are very prominent. Here at threshold rupture, a multlaxial
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strain state involving very large strains exists. For such regions, the
analysis must accommodate large strain plasticity effects and an appropriate
"failure strain" or similar criterion. This is a matter that is receiving much
attention now by various groups.
D. Oplin_er, Army-AMMRC
Is it realistic to assume that you're going to get a structural problem
rather than a penetration problem? Some of the velocities I saw were fairly
low; they were a couple hundred feet per second, but when you get up to a
thousand feet per second, you've got to treat the penetration problem first
and then you can treat it as a structural response problem.
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
As I understood the fragment velocities cited, they represent the frag-
ment tip and/or the CG velocities; not the velocity component perpendicular to
the impacted surface at impact. For rotors with typical small clearance, the
typical impact angle is very shallow -- somewhere in the vicinity of 20-25
degrees. Hence, for many cases, the typical normal-to-the-surface velocity
component at impact might range up to perhaps about 420 fps. Depending upon
the material properties of the structure being impacted, the subsequent
behavior could involve "penetration" followed by structural response or could
involve principally only structural response. For most of the contair_:_nt
structure materials being considered, I believe that the latter is the more
prevalent case.
D. Oplinger,. Arm_-AMMRC
I am not familiar with blade materials but what little I know would lead
me to believe that At would be unusual to get such large curling as you were
showing. Is that typical of common blade materials, that they can bend over
like that without snapping into small pieces?
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
For the small T58 turbine rotor used in many of the NAPTC tests, this was
the observed behavior. However, for the rotors of the newer larger engines, I
will ask Mr. Koff of GE to respond -- he can give a better answer.
B.L. Koff, GE-Cincinnati
Some of the blades are high aspect ratio turbine blades, and are more
/' typical of aft end turbine stages. The first stage of the HP has blades of
low aspect ratio and the first stage of an air-cooled turbine consists of a
hollow structure which usually fragments into many pieces upon impact. Titanium
fan blades don't curl very much but break up into pieces.
S. Sattar, P&W
I want to remark on the basic philosophy or approach to fragment contain-
% ment design. Would it make more sense for us to step back and ask ourselves
that if you go through this analysis and you have to determine when these
computer programs will predict penetration, you would have to calibrate them
against tests? Might it not be easier to take a slmpler approach to predict
213
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whether the fragment will be contained or not? It is a case of strength of
materials or solid mechanics approach, calibrated against spin-pit or specimen
tests versus these codes to predict the deflections and strains, and then
finding out at what strain value will the penetration finally take place --
which you will calibrate anyway, against some tests. I would like a comment
on that.
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
Your point is, a valid one, however, I think that if one can afford to
run experiments on every kind of configuration, material, and so forth, to
obtain the data you seek, that's one way of proceeding. There is some hope
that one need not go that far, but instead one can rely upon more basic material
property information and methods of structural dynamic analysis (at least for
simple cases) and have a reasonable prospect of predicting analytically when
these containment-structure failures should occur. I believe that the 3-D
structural response studies in progress represent a useful step in that direc-
tion.
Now, one can immediately dream up a new case which is too complicated for
any available a_alysis to handle properly. In such cases one would have to
appeal to selected experiments; it seems to me any good organization would
-: always do that.
J.W. Leech, ERDA
Would you comment on why an aluminum alloy was used for the beam model,
the panel models, and the containment ring which was subjected to single-blade
'I
impact. ,
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL !
We used 6061-T6 and 6061-T651 aluminum for these specimens for fabrication
convenience and because their stress-strain properties are well known; very little
strain hardening is present. We approximated these properties by piecewise linear
segments and used them (via the mechanical sublayer model) in the transient
response calculations.
Incidentally, the NAPTC had static stress-strain tests conducted on the
4130 cast steel used in their containment ring tests. As perhaps you noticed,
we did not show any comparisons between our calculations and the experiment
for NAPTC Test 201 (T58 tri-hub burst against the steel col,tainment ring)
because we have not concluded that work. You can see immediately that the
•_ J idealization that we used for t__ fragment, will give us no hope whatever of
'_ predicting in detail the transient response. The hope is that .a realistic
selection of the idealized (rigid circular) fragment may enable us to predict
: the pe_ response reasonably well, but the actual physical situation is Just
so much different from the idealized model that the fine transient response
details actually present can not be reproduced by this model. But that's
really expecting too much of that simple model. Of course, the model can be
refined. One can devise a more complicated fragment model -- one can put in
the various curling blades (_ttached to the disk segment} and let them go ahead
and curl and follow them; a tremendous amount of bookkeeping would be involved.
Hence, we elected to try to see the potential of this simple rigid-circular-
fragment idealization. Also, one could modify this simple circular fragment
to permit deformations approximating roughly the behavior of the blade/disk
fragment itself to achieve a still simple, but better simulation of the actual
attacking fragment.
J
J
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DEVELOPMENTOF FIBER SHIELDS FORENGINE CONTAINMENT
by
R. J. Bristow and C. D. Davidson
Senior Engineers
TIIE BOEINGCOMPANY
Seattle, Washington 98124
SUMMARY
A partial review is given of the progress at Boeing toward achieving a lightweight
means for containing engine burst debris. This paper describes only the empirical
work. Another paper at this meeting, by Dr. J. H. Gerstle, deals with the Boeing
theoreticalapproach. The testing described was conducted in both translational
launchers and spin pits. Empirical model development relating fragment character-
L
- istics to shielding requirements is given. The change in relative importance of
shield mounting provisions as fragment energy is increased is given.
INTRODUCTION
lhe current shield design concepts have resulted from an evolutionary development
that began in the early 1960's. Since that time, a group at Boeing has developed
shielding for a wide range of threats: meteoroids, bullets, blast, hail, rain,
• and free-falling rocks, to mention a few. In all of these efforts, it was clear
that shielding weight could be reduced if the projectile deceleration distance was
increased. For lower velocity regimes, this could be accomplished by combini0_g
the properties of high shear resistance and elasticity in tiledirection of projectile
motion. Certain fibrous materials can provide these properties.
_ Various fibrous materials have been used since the days of spears and arrows to
-?
"_ shield against projectiles. More recently, fibrous shields liavebeen used as
"flak vests". At Boeing, glass fiber blankets have been used experimentally as
blast shielding. It was natural, then, to try fiber blankets for engine containment.
t
_ The first fibers tried, glass, performed better than metallic shields but the data
L
was inconsistent. DuPont's Kevlar fabric was then tried and has developed into
today's design concept.
217 _ PAGEBLANKHOTFIl.li1_
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The developmentof the Kevlar shieldhas been undertakenwith a two-pronged
approach. An analyticalcomputermodel (EBCAP)was developedbased on a
theoreticalapproach,the M.I.T.Model JET 4B and other publisheddata. The
secondapproachused the empiricaldata to generatetwo empiricalmodels that
have in turn been used to solve design problems. The first empiricalmodel
(Figurel) definedthe weight of shield for various projectilesizes and the
velocitiesat which the projectileswould be contained;this at a constant
dynamicstiffness. The secondmodel relatedthe shieldmount load to mount
dynamicstiffness. Both approaches,analyticalan_ empirical,were coordinated
with the test programand are complementary.
BACKGROUND
In order to maintaincontinuity,earlierprogram resultspublishedin a previous
paper*will be summarized.
Translationaltestingconsistedof firing s_eel cubes from a smoothborecannon
into a test shield as shown schematicallyin Figure2. Figure 3 is a photograph
of the test range. The targetassembly,shown in Figure4, consistednot only
@
, of the test shield,but a seriesof thin aluminumplates. The plates,called
"witnesssheets,"'were used to determinethe residualenergy of the cube if the
test shieldwas penetrated. The cubes were launchedfrom the cannon by means of
a polycarbonatesabot as shown in Figure 5. The ballisticlimitwas found by i
plottingpenetrationversusvelocityas shown in Figure6. (Ballisticlimit is
the limitingvelocitybelow which shield penetrationwill not occur.) The figure
shows the abscissato be made up of shield layers plus numbersof witness sheets.
The slanted line shows the number of witness sheets penetratedwhen the shield
J was removed. The "S"-shapedcurve shows penetrationwith the shield in place.
The number of Kevlar layers penetratedincreasedgraduallywith velocityuntil
_, the ballisticlimit was approached. At the ballisticlimit,the penetrabilityof
the cube increasedgreatly. At a velocitya littleabove the ballisticlimit, the
numberof witness sheets penetratedwas nearlyequal to that with no shield at all.
This signifiedthat above the ballisticlimit, the shield absorbedvery little
energy. From these data, the first empiricalmodel was developed(Figure1):
* Bristow,R. J., et al, "Advancesin EngineBurst Containment,"AGARD-R-648,
presentedat the 42nd Structuresand HaterialsPanel Meeting,R_TO-AGARD,
•_ Ottawa,Canada,April 1976.
?
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N = A(V)2(D)314(sino)516 - B (l)
where:
N = number of shield layers (Kevlar)
V = cube velocityat ballisticlimit - fps
D = cube size - inches
" 0 = angle betweenshield surfaceand flight path
A & B = constants.
Otherareas coveredby the previouspaper includetemperatureeffectsand the
effect of spinningon fragmentpenetration. Since neitherof these areas are
pertinentto the subjectof the currentpaper, they will not be reviewed.
One of the major efforts during the lastyear was the developmp-tof ah attach-
ment load model. The load involvedwas that in the mount of a particlJ!arshield
arrangementwith a particl_lardynamicstiffness. However,the form of the model
i.
, should be generalin nature and providesa great deal of informationon shield
, design requirements. The data for the model _ere obtainedusing the _est
i arrangementshown in Figure 7. One post was calibratedto read equivalentload
at the centerlineof the shield. In order to changeeffectilemountingstiff-
ness, a seriesof nylon ropes were run throughthe shield_nds and loopedaround
the posts as shown in Figure 8. The stiffnesswas variedby changingthe length
• or diameterof the ropes. The resultingmodel was of the form
P = CV(D)3(K)I/2(N+ E)"1/2 (2)
where:
: P = peak impact load (Ib)
K = stiffnessof mount + attachments(lb/in)
• / C & E = constants.
It shouldbe pointedout that the form of the term involvingthe numberof shield
layersmay be differentfor other shieldarrangements.
_ Once an empiricaln_del like the one above has been obtained,it is often con-
, structiveto examine it in detail in order to get an insight!nto the phenomen-
ology involved. Noticethat the peak load is directlyproportionalto the
fragmentvelocityand mass. It is not too surprisingthat the load would be
220
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Figure 3. - Tesi Range No. 2. 
Figure 4. - "Flat" Shield and Witness Sheets. 
Figure 5. - Steel Cubes and Sabots. 
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Figure 8. - T e s t  Arrangements - Elastic Mount. 
proportion-_ to the fragmentmomentum. However,the loadbeingproportional
to thesquarerootof the stiffnessis a bit surprising.Thisis becausewe
are accustomedto seeingthe loadin a springbeingproportionalto the spring
constanttimesthe deflection.
Once the relationshipbetweenpeak loadand stiffnesswas determined,it was
temptingto try to use this relationshipto get an equivalentrelationship
betweenstiffnessand ballisticlimit. The twomodels(EquationsI and 2)
showthatin one case,loadis directlyproportionalto velocity,while in the
other,the numberof shieldlayersrequiredat the ballisticlimitis propor-
tionalto the square of the velocity. Holding fragment size constant, and
equating velocity between the two models, we get a relationship showing that
" the shieldlayersrequiredshouldbe directlyproportionalto the stiffness:
N K (3)
y
The aboveequationhas not beensubstantiated.In fact,itsvalidityis
questionablebecauseEquation1 had to be simplifiedsomewhatin orderto
_" derivethe aboveequation. It is criticalto any designprocedureto knowthe
• relationshipbetweenballisticlimitand stiffness.The determinationof this "i
relationshipis currentlybeingderivedat Boeing.
The lasttermin Equation2 showsthat themagnitudeof the peakloadis a
" functionof the numberof shieldlayers:
P _ (N + const) "1/2 (4)
This equation indicates that the peak load drops with an increase in shield
layers. Thisis becausethe greatermassof shieldmaterialactsto transfer
/ the loadovera longertimeinterval.However,Equation(4)doesnot mean)
thatan increasein shieldlayerswillalwaysdecreasethe load. The stiffness
_' of the shieldisalsoa functionof the numbersof shieldlayers. The greater
the numberof shieldlayers,the greaterthe stiffnessand hence,the greater
the load. The resultis thatfor a shieldwithfew layers,the stiffnesseffect
') predominatesand an increase in shield layers will result in an increase in load.
For heavier shields, the masseffect predominates and the peak load then tapers
off with an increase in shield layers, Figure 9 showsthe change in peak load
: with changesin shield layers.
228 '_"" _'::"
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The above paragraphshave shown that stiffnes is an importantconsiderationin
any Kevlar fabric shield design. The stiffness,as viewed by the projectile,
can be written:
[K] = [ks] + [kA] (5)
where:
K = total equivalentdynamic stiffness (Ib/in)
ks = shield stiffhess (Ib/in)
kA = attachmentstiffness (Ib/in).
Algebraically,Equation (5) becomes:
ks + kA
K - (6)
ks kA
As discussed previously,the shield _tiffness (ks) depends on the number of
shield layers. Because of this, for a shield with few layers, the shield stiff- "
mess soon predominatesover the attachment stiffness. This is shown in Figure 10.
_ The four-layershield in Figure 10 results in a rapidly increasingload at low
attachment stiffnesslevels. However, the attachmentstiffness soon becomes so
high that only the shield stiffness needs to be retained in Equation (6). As
can be seen in the figure, this is also true for heavier shields except that the
• point where the attachmentstiffness can be neglectedoccurs at a higher total
attachment stiffness.
Another area receivingemphasis during the last year concerned large fragments.
Steel cubes up to 3.75 in. in size were launched in translationalaccelerators.
_ These large cubes were contained at energy levels of up to 5_I,000 in. lb.
These tests were interestingin that a new failure mode was discovered. It was
found that at high energy levels with large cubes, a tensile failure occurred at
some distance from the impact point. (Before, the normal failure had been shear-
ing or local tension around the periphery of the projectile.) However, it was
t further found that reduction of the effective shield stiffnesswould again switch
the failure mode to one of local failure at the impact point. This local failure
was deslrab]e since it occurred at a higher energy level than the tensile failure.
t
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The abovetests,plusthe loadmodel,made it abundantlyclearthatstiffness
isa majorconsiderationin any fibrousshie]ddesign.
Inorderto checkout the resultsol)tainedin the BoeingImpactMechanics
Laboratorytranslationalaccelerators,the Navyhas beenmostcooperative
with the use of the NAPTCspinpits. Severaltestshavebeenconductedwith
14-inch-diameterrotorsat aboutone millioninchpoundsof totalenergy. The
shieldsconsistedof a lightaluminumring (onepound)witha numberof wraps
of Kevlar(varyingfrom25 to 40). Recently,a successfultestwas madewhere
a rotorwith8.7 x lO6 in lb of totalenergywas containedby a 120 layershield.
It is expectedthaton latertests,thisnumberof layerscan be significantly
:. reduced. In all cases,the spinpit testresultswerenearthoseobtained ;
• withtranslationalacceleratorswhen adjustedfor stiffnessof the system.
, FUTUREWORK
The largesttaskyet to completeis a modelrelatingballisticlimitto stiffness. ,'
Thismode]willthenbe combinedwith theearlierballisticlimitmodelto give
requiredshieldweightas a functionof fragmentsizeand velocity,angleof ,
obliquity,and overallshield/mountstiffness.Anotherareaof studyinvolves '
techniquesthatwill reducethe inherentKevlarstiffnesswithoutlosingits i ,
inherentstrength.One methodcurrentlybeingexaminedinvolveswrappingthe I
shieldin sucha mannerthatthematerialis stressedin the biasdirection. I
• Furthertestsin the spin-pitwiththe J 65 turbineare programmed;thesewill i
be usefulin confirmingthe empiricalmodelsat higherenergylevelsand will ;_
L identifytheeffectsof multi-layerconfigurations.A numberof othersmaller
studyeffortswillbe made to fill in gapsor answerquestionsremainingfrom
., // previousstudies. _
_? CONCLUSIONS "_
Boeinghas beenstudying eng;,,e burst containment as part of a comprehensive
damagemechanismsprogram. The lastthreeyearshave beendevotedto a study "
'r
of Kevlarmaterialas the basiccontainmentmedium. Modelsfor ballisticlimit
? and attachment load are available. The modelshave closely predicted the results
obtained in spin pits. The importance of overall shield stiffness has been
determined and shield designs are being worked out that will have the proper
! stiffness. Translational test energies have been pushedup to over 540,000 in lb,
i 232 ,, "
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while successful spin pit tests up to 8.7 x lO6 in Ib have been made. An areal
weight of 1,7 ]b/ft2 was required for the spin pit rotor having one million
inch pounds of energy while 8 )b/ft2 was used for the 8.7 million inch pound
energy rotor. This latter shield was not optimized and a lower areal weight
is expected,
t
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DISCUSSION
Unknown Speaker
What are the effects of moisture and temperature/time on Kevlar?
R.B. Bristow, Boeing
There is a report put out by du Pont on that sub iect, which indicates
that Kevlar strength does indeed fall off with temperature and time. However,
we were rather surprised during our tests to find that when we heated the Kevlar
targets and fired the fragments into them, we actually had a higher ballistic
limit. The reason being that the strain rate effects increased faster with
higher temperature than does the degradation of the strength. This was covered
in a previous paper that I mentioned, and is cited in my paper here as a reference.
As far as moisture goes, I can't answer that.
D. Oplinger, Army-AMMRC
I was interested in your attachment or support load dropoff. With a_.mor,
. that's usually considered to occur because the projectile shatters at a certain
speed so that it becomes blunt. It's hard to visualize what would be causing
this in the case of Kevlar.
/
R.B. Bristow, Boein 9
I haven't been able to figure it out. One reason I brought it up was that
we have many experts here and I'd like to find out what's causing it, if possible.t
I also might mention that I feel we've come a long ways with Kevlar but we're a
long way from having something that's suitable for putting on an airplane. There's
lots of design considerations that we haven't even begun to consider•
P. Gardner, Norton Co.
That projecti_ that you passed around, the large cube, had some blunted
edges on it. Was that from the impact with the Kevlar or did it fa%l on the
floor after going _rough the first test panel?
R.B. Bristow, Boeing
The steel projectile was not deformed by going through the Kevlar. We
_ fired it in tests both below and above the ballistic limit, sc we could find
that dividing line. This one has gone through the shield and struck a steel
_' plate behind, and suffered this blunting of the edges.
2_
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LIGHTWEIGHT ENGINE CONTAINMENT
A. T. Weaver
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
United Technologies Corporation
SUMMARY
This presentation covers preliminary evaluation and development of Kevlar
fabric as a lightweight containment material for use to contain blades
released from gas turbine rotors. The evaluation and development included
review and selection of fabric styles and weaves as well as methods of
application for advanced gas turbine engines.
During this investigation effort, the Kevlar material was subjected to high
speed impacts by simple projectiles fired from a rifle, as well as more
complex sIIapes such as fan blades released from gas turbine rotors in a spin
pit. Just contained data is developed for a variety of weave and/or applica-
tion techniques and a comparative containment weight efficiency has been
established for Kevlar containment applications. The data generated during
these tests is being incorporated into an analytical design system that will
allow a designer of future engines to make blade containment trade-off studies
between Kevlar and metal case engine structures.
In addition to the evaluation of the containment efficiency of Kevlar, certain
laboratory tests and engine environment tests were performed to determine the
survivability of Kevlar in a gas tubine environment.
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A_rent recu!lations require that blade co,utair_,ent be provided on _ii gas turbine
e:_gines certified for commercial flight. Since the structures that provide this
",_regenerally parasitic, engine technoloL_y dictates that they be as light as pos-
sible, in order to meet this requirement, new materials _:d new contair_enf con-
cepts are being explored, initial data generated using fabrics as energy eJDsorbi.ni
devices under high speed impact indicate that a significant weight improvement
can be achieved. _.is presentation deals with the evaluation _md development of
fabric structures for blade containment applications for gas turbine engines.
7SCUSS!O_:
A cross section of a t_pical gas turbine engine is shown in figure i. The red out-
line represents a t_pical rotor stage for which a contairav.ent structure must be
provided. The rotor is enclosed in a metal case which provides support for the
engine weight, and imposed thrust loads. Additionally, the case must pravide the
necessary containment in the event of a blade failure. This contairLzent is pro-
vided by the energy absorbing capability of the impacted case structure which
normally bulges or deforms when struck by a released blade. Sufficient material
__ thic:_mess must be employed in the containment structure to prevent the blade from
eYiting the case.
Zn current gas turbine engines, the metal case structure is fabricated with adequate
thickness to provide the necessary containment, in future gas turbine engines,
fabric wrapped thin metal cases ma_ be used to provide the necessary level of con-
tainment capability with a minimum weight. (See yellow outline in Figure 2.)
The thickness of the engine cases, in the plane of the blades_ can then be reduced
to a value limited by normal engine loads -_ch as thrust and rotor support.
DEVELOPMZNT PROGRAM:
The following development program was performed at P&WA East Hartford to provide
a data base for future applications of fabric containment structures for gas
turbine engines:
/ • Ballistic impact Evaluations/
• Laboratory Tests#
• Spin Pit Tests
• Engine Tests
The ballistic impact tests consisted of subjecting various fabric structures to
impacts by projectiles fired from a gun. "Just-contained" data were developed for
a wide sp¢ .+rum of fabric weight densities and projectile velocities. (See Figure
3).
In this testing we were able to determine the degree of participation of Kevlar R DuPont
versus the associated metal structure. The res.ults of this testing showed:
236
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i. :levl:___ i_o.pacresisl'_'_.ceby itself"is ) more weid._%twf'i'ici_.:itt :ahA!SI h!0
hardened steel.
2. Levlar structures lose efficiency if the fabric is not allowed to deflect.
3. Kevlar fabric can absorb multiple hits closely spaced without apparent loss
of containment strength.
The laborator%_ investigation included wicking and flammability tests to assess fire
risk associated with Kevlar fabric around the outside of an aircraft gas turbine.
__.neresults of this testing showed:
Wicking
Kevlar 29, style 71 fabric, wicked engine oil and
hydraulic fluid in an applicable bench test.
Flammability
Kevlar 29 was non burning by itself.
The spin pit testing consisted of wrapping Kevlar cloth around a Ôxengine
case and subjecting this contair.mentstructure to an impact by a released blade
from a spinning rotor. (See Figures 4 and 5). A thin aluminum witness case was
mounted outboard of the Kevlar wrapped blade containment structure to determine if
blades/pieces exited the Kevlar. "Just-contained" data were obtained for typical
: gas turbine speeds and several configurations of Kevlar fabric.
The fabric configurations evaluated were:
L
Kevlar 29 I:i plain weave
Kevlar "" 3:i weave
• Kevlar '" 6:1 weave
Kevlar " 3D weave |
The results of this testing showed that the blades would penetrate the thin engine
metal cases; however, the blades were contained by fabric wrap. The containment
weight efficiencies for the above Kevlar weave configurations were determined to
be basically identical.
/
!
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FIGURE I 
GAS TURBINE ENGINE SHOWING TYPICAL FAN STAGE 
(RED BLADE TYPE).  
77-441-0042-E 
238 ORIGINAL PAGE 
R L K K  AND A'HITE PHOTOGRAPH 
FIGURE 2 
GAS TURBINE ENGINE SHOWING LOCATION O F  FABRIC 
CONTAINMENT WRAP (YELLOW BAND). 
77-441-0042-B 
ORIGINAL PAGE 239 
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH 
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FIGURE 4 
5PIV P I T  CONTAINMENT TEST RIG SHOWING KEVLAR WRAPPED 
CASE. 
C N - 5 i L I i  
F I G U R E  5 
SPIN PIT KEVLAR WRAPPED CONTAINMENT M E T A L  CASE 
A n E R  TEST. 
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DISCUSSION
J.C. Wallin, BAC
AI, as one who spends much time worrying about fires, I think you
tossed off the absorbability of Kevlar pretty lightly. If the casing were
wrapped around with asbestos, I'd be pretty unhappy. But as you described
> the wicking, I would not be any happier with Kevlar. I think that before
you can have a practical system on the engine you've got to have some way of
avoiding that soak-up (fire hazard) problem. Is there a suitable coating
that can be used to prevent its soaking up fluids?
A. Weaver, P&W
I share your concern about the fires; an engine can experience some
leakage of oil or fuel at some time. This leakage could be characterized as
so many gallons of this flammable fluid; all the Kevlar played a part in was
simply in wicking it. I'm not too certain if that's any more of a threat
than allowing the fluid to collect in the bottom of the nacelle, although
this can be drained off or trapped.
However, this is not going to take care of all of the leakage. Some of /
. the engine parts are going to be covered with this liquid because of its natural
adherence.
A I'm not yet convinced about the Kevlar increasing the fire hazard. We
do agree that it wicks, and probably is going to hold more of the fluid than
a metal part would hold just because it sticks to it. But it still may be a
small quantity and not an increased threat.
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
A1, wouldn't it be possible to put a very lightweight nonabsorbent sheet
around the Kevlar?
A. Weaver, P&W
• That is a possibility that is being considered. One could also put in
a certain amount of impregnation. This might result in some loss in contain-
' ability, but with a 65% weight saving as it is, I can afford to give up some
' ,_ of that and still have it very attractive.
/_'_ Some of these questions are long-range consideratior_ that we'd llke to ;
pursue and get answers on. That's why we're quite a ways away from putting
; this out in the field.
H. Garten_ GE-L_nn
How muchweight saving do you think that you get as compared with a
tltanlumshield?
D
A..Weaverf P&W
The data indicated a 65% weight saving compared with using 410 steel.
,, 243
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So, I think, the proper question would be: how does titanium compare with
410 steel? Then, obviously, how does it compare to Kevlar?
H. Garten, GE-Lynn
I thought you said that the actual engine test (the spinpit test) was
surprisingly good. I thought that it inferred that it was better than the
initial assessment of your ballistic test.
A. Weaver, P&W
Yes, there was some inference of that. We don't completely understand
it whether it's because the ballistic test does not completely model whac
happens in the spinpit or not.
We have not pinned down in the spinpit the exact weight savings with the
Kevlar. On the surface, it appears to me that the spinpit test results were
going to be better than ballistic-test results. This may be due to the way we
bookkeep the results. We have not completely understood the bookkeeping of the
Kevlar versus the inner _teel wrap that we have.
i
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
We tested some Kevlar and found that when it was wetted with oil, its
containment capability was seriously diminished; you suggested that the effect /
of oil wetting depended upon the shape of the missile. Have you done tests,
firing blades at the Kevlar shield while it is oil-impregnated?
A. Weaver, P&W
No, we haven't; we certainly intend to do that. We would have done it
some time ago had we not re¢ _ived the advice we did from Watertown saying,
"you really don't have to worry about it -- your initial ballistic tests
kidded you". We put that down to the lower part of our priority list, but it
- still remains to be done. We will not consider Kevlar to be fully developed 4
unless we run tests in a spinpit _ith the blades impacting into the oil-soaked _Kevlar.
?
R. Bristow, Boein_
I think you may very well find out that when you soak the Kevlar shield
in oil that you're getting a similar effect to having a matrix, that is, the
/ mass of the oil and the mass of the matrix is causing the problem.
j
E.A. Witmer, MIT-ASRL
Could you clarify the nature of the discussed test in the spin chamber:
the way the failure was initiated and the sequence of events?
A. Weaver, P&W
! We take a fully-bladed rotor, and purposely weaken a blade in the rotor
so that when you operate it at red-line speed, that blade is running very near
its ultimate tensile strength. The chamber is evacuated so the blade doesn't
have a significant vibration imposed on its P/A stress, and it continues to
remain intact. We then impose on the whole rotor a vibratory stress which
i
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forces the one weakened blade to failure, usually in a second. That's the
simple way we conduct most of those tests. We normally fail the blade in
a root attachment or in the root airfoil. This would be a significant mass
of blade.
I think in the particular photograph you looked at on the viewgraph,
there was probably a root airfoil. Though, on the same rotor we've also
run with the full root attachments released into the case.
J. Meaney, Rohr
I have two questions. First, had you spliced the Kevlar and in what
direction? Second, you say that the Kevlar must deflect to work, but in
the pictures of the engine you show a lot of pnetulatic lines that run very
close to the shield. Do the deflections exceed that distance?
A. Weaver, P&W
Concerning the first question, the Kevlar application that you were
looking at is a very simplified application that I would think of as analogous
to an ace bandage. When you put an ace bandage on your wrist, you take the
one piece and you hold it and you wrap the other piece around, and you depend
on the friction of the layers to keep it there; the last little end of the
ace bandage you take a couple little hooks and you hook. That's all we've
really done here. I propose to let the designer make it very simple; don't _'
require him to add weight.
As to your second question, the particular engine case you saw was
: simply a vehicle for subjecting the Kevlar to the environment of an engine.
This was not designed to be a mock-up of a final design. One must provide
for adequate clearance because Kevlar must deflect appreciably to do its work.
We had put some structure outboard of the Kevlar (not against _he Kevlar)
and the Kevlar has deflecteu into these structures. At the present time in the
number of tests we've run, we've seen no effect on the containability of the
Kevlar if it was deflected into a structure. If you back the Kevlar up in
intimate contact with the structure, yes, you would probably lose containability.
But, if you don't back it up and you give the Kevlar a gap and allow it to deflect
through that gap, then if you hit the structure it didn't really appear to affect
the Kevlar. The Kevlar still did its job.
J. Salvino, NAPTC
In your spin pit containment test on Kevlar, where did you find the blade
_ fragment? Was it between the Kevlar and the outer case?
A. Weaver, P&W
Typically, the Kevlar is ripped and torn, and many layers of it are
penetrated; the blade is trapped in the layers. The blade is generally in one
piece not including the root; it does not always break up.
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NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF PROJECTILE IMPZ 5T
IN WOVEN TEXTILE STRUCTURES
David Roylance*
INTRODUCTION
Textile structures have been used to provide protection
against ballistic threats since the Second World War, with
the development then of flak jackets for aircraft crewmen.
Now used widely by military and police personnel, these devices
have been constructed principally of ballistic nylon or
impregnated fiberglass. In recent years, however, improved !,
; ,i
devices have been developed using aramid fibers (DuPont's
Kevlar 29 or 49), and these are being considered for such
additional applications as aircraft engine rotor-blade burst
!
containment. Development and design of these devices has been
largely empirical, and considerable effort has been exDended
to develop rational analytical tools which may be used in • [
design, or at least in improving the designer's intuition.
Although closed form-mathematical analyses can be applied
to the initial ballistic response of a single fiber [1],
' / late-time effects arise due to s_ress wave interactions and
reflections which make such closed-form analyses intractable.
In the case of woven panels, each fiber crossover acts to
reflect a portion of the stress wave which is propagating out-
_', ward from the impact point, so here closed-form treatments
P
* Associate Professor, Department of Materials Science and
Englneerlng, Massachusetts Institute of Technoloqy, Cambridge,
MA 02139.
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are comp]etely inapplicable. The complexity of these phenomena
have resulted in the development in our laboratory of a series
of computer codes, and these numerical treatments have proven
to be of great value in understanding the ballistic event.
These codes do not involve the idealizinq approximations
needed in many other treatments, such as modeling the woven
panel as a membrane, so that the user is able to proceed
directly from fiber material properties, weave geometry,
projectile velocity, etc.
NUMERrCAL ANALYSIS OF TEXTILE IMPACT
J
The computer method used in the numerical analysis of ;.
textile impact is an outgrowth of a technique pioneered by
; Davids et al. [2] and applied successfully to a variety of .
: wave propagation problems. This approach, which is sir_ilar
in final form to finite-difference analysis but markedly
I
. different in derivation, was first used by Lynch [3] to analyze i
?
transverse impact of single fibers and later extended by
Roylance et al. to the study of viscoelastic fiber impact [4]
and impact of woven textile panels [5]. Referring to Fig. i,
the woven panel is first idealized as an assemblage of pin- 6
L_
jointed, f]exible fiber elements, each having a mass which
makes the areal density of the idealized mesh equal to that
of the panel being simulated. The initial projectile velocity
is imposed 6n the node at the impact point, which causes a
strain to develop in the adjacent elements. The tension resulting
I from this strain is computed from the constitutive law, and
248
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this tension is used to calculate an acceleration in the
neighboring elements° The computer proceeds outward from the
impact point in this manner, using a momentum-impulse balance,
a _train-displacement condition, and a constitutive equation
to compute for each element the current values of tension,
strain, velocity, position, and such ancillary but important
quantities as strain energy and kinetic energy.
At the end of these calculations, a new projectile
velocity is computed from the tensions acting on the projectile
from the fibers, and the process is repeated for a new increment
of time. In the development of such code_, due attention
must be given to matters of efficiency, stability, and accuracy. /
As now developed, the fabric code produces data in excellent
agreement with experiments, and does so at reasonable cost
(approximately $15 for a typical impact event simulation, using
MIT's IBM 370/16S system).
t.
: MATERIAL PROPERTIES
The numerical algorithm is finally terminated by simulated !
/ rupture of the fibers. Since the strain and tension his._ories _
J are computed for each element in the mesh, a variety of failure
o
criteria may be easily incorporated. The use of Eyring-type
rate pzocess fracture criteria [6] are particularly attractive, _
>
since they are computationally convenient and still provide good
simulation of time and temperature effects.A simple but very
useful such criterion is that due to Zhurkov, who states that "
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the lifetime T of a solid subjected to a constant stress o is:
where k is Boltzman's constant and T is the absolute temperature.
_o,U and _are material constants related to the dissociation
kinetics of the atomic bonds and the internal defect structure
of the material. For time-varying stresses and/or temperatures,
one may assume superw,_ibility and write Zhurkov's equation
in the form
-- i !
In our numerical treatment, the current value of the above
integral is computed at each node. The time and location of i.
!
• upture is determined when the integral value reaches unity
at any node.
In the course of the iterative calculations, a cons-
/
titutive material law must be evoked at each element in order
£
to compute the element tension from its strain (or strain hlstory).
One would expect that a model incorporating viscoelastic effects
would be necessary for proper simulation of polymeric structures
and in fact, there is considerable evidence that relaxation does
indeed occur in the ballistic time frame [8]. This is expected
in light of the dynamic mechanical speutrum of nylon, in which
250
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a beta relaxation is observed having an apparent activation
energy of _ 14 kcal/mole [9];this relaxation is calculated
to occur in approximately five microseconds at room temperature.
A general viscoelastic model well suited for computing
- tensions from prescribed strains is the Wiechert model, depicted
schematically in Fig. 2. This model takes the polymer response
to be that of the shown array of Newtonian dashpots and Hookean
springs. The differential tension-strain law for the jth arm
of the model is
=.--- +--- _--.
., where the dots indicate time differentiation, o is the tensile
stress and ¢ is the strain. Casting this equation in finite
difference form relative to a discrete time increment At
and solving:
!
where the superscripts t and t-1 indicate values at the current
and previous times respectively, T = n _/k i is a characteristic
relaxation time for the jth arm. The total tension at time t
is the sum of all the oj plus the tension in the equilibrium
:- p spring ke:
• *
i _
?
• KeG*
_- This tension-strain calculation is performed at each element
node. In addition to storing all the ks and Tj, the computer
must also store the previous strain and tension values at each
9 node.
., 2sl
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Finally, it should be noted that the above models for
dynamic fracture and viscoelastic consitutive response may
not be applicable to some materials. The modification or re-
placement of these models is very convenient in the computer
code, since they exist as separate subroutines. The easy
implementation of various material response models is one of
the strongest advantages to this numerical treatment of impact.
RESULTS
The Fabric code has been used to perform computer ex-
periments aimed at elucidating the influence of various material
properties on the impact resistance of woven panels. The ob-
jective of this work has been to provide a tool for the designer
of personnel armor devices, and to enhance his intuition as to
the physics of the impact event. Certain related phenomena have
also been exploredj including the influence of nonlinear visco-
elastic response and the role of backup layers in reducing
dynamic deformation and blunt trauma. Certain findings from these
studies will be described briefly here in order to illustrate
the utility of the method.
• / Assessment of accuracy of the x_umerical analysis is somewhat i#
problematical, as no closed-form mathematical analyses are available _ -
against which to check the code results. Certain experimental _
observations are available, however, one of which is shown In !
-" Fig. 3. This figure Is a plot of residual projectile velocity _
after penetration of a Kevlar panel, as a function of initial
velocity. The good agreement of the predicted and observed
-_ 252
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results is especially satisfying, since it provides some
assurance that both the transient response and the final
fracture processes are being modeled reasonably. It might
also be mentioned that this particular plot is one which plays
an important role in the design process, so that the ability
to generate it numerically without prior ballistic data or
any idealizing assumptions is of considerable practical im-
portance.
Figure 4 presents the results of a series of computer
experiments in which the response of various ballistic candidate
materials is compared. The principal parameters of interest here
are the dynamic modulus of the material and its dynamic
breaking strain. It is seen clearly that the energy absorption
i
rate of a given fabric rises monotonically with the modulus,
increasing in the order of nylon, Kevlar 29, Kevlar 49, and
graphite. However: Kevlar 29 demonstrates the best balance of
high modulus and reasonable breaking strain, with the result
that it is the superior ballistic material. It should be
mentioned that Kevlar 49 is not found experimentally to be as
deficient as this figure would predict, indicating that an
/
_ improved model of fracture for this material is needed.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the numerlcal method described above was developed
for use in design and analysis of balllstlc protection devices
for personnel armor, its potential for use in a similar role
in rotor blade burst containment at high velocity is obvious.
i
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The speed range for which the code is well suited is that
for which wave propagation effects become important:
approximately 200 m/sec and above. The code is applicable
at icwer impact speeds, but would not be cost effective in
comparison with structural dynamics approaches.
Certain alterations in coding would be required in treating
burst containment problems. First, one would relax the present
restriction to zero-obliquity impact. Such impacts are used as
worst-case evel:ts in personnel armor, but a more general treat-
ment would b_ needed for burst containment analysis. A loss of
symmetry would result, accompanied by proportionally greater
computation time, but the principles of analysis would be un-
ci nged. Another coding alteration would involve the projectile
size, and a provision for larger projectiles would be incor-
porated without major difficulty. Motion of the impacting frag-
ment would likely be followed by an incremental rigid-body motion
scheme.
It is this author's hope that the community concerned
with hardening against rotor bursts will agree that the method
described here would constitute a valuable addition to the tech-
/ niques presently available or under development. The implementation
and verification of the method for this type of problem would
not be an overly large task.
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DISCUSSION
D.. Oplinger, AMMRC
Is the code capable of handling multiple-layer fabrics?
D. Roylance_ MIT
As presently configured, the code simulates multiple layers
only in that it uses a numerical mesh of weight equal to the fabric
being simulated. Such an approach obviously misses any layer-layer
interactions which might be present, but comparisons with limited
experimental results using multiple-layer targets have been very
promising.
J
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ANALYSISMETHODS FOR KEVLAR SHIELD RESPONSETO ROTOR FRAGMENTS
J. H. Gerstle
Boeing CommercialAirplane Company
Seattle,Washington
ABSTRACT
Several empiricaland analyticalapproachesto rotor burst shield
sizing are comparedand principaldifferencesin metal and fabric dynamic
behaviorare discussed. The applicationof transientstructuralresponse
computerprograms to predict Kevlar containmentlimits is described.
,. For.preliminaryshield sizing,present analyticalmethods are-useful
if insufficienttest data for empiricalmodeling are available. To provide
., other informationuseful for engineeringdesign, analyticalmethods require
furtherdevelopmentsin material characterization,failurecriteria, loads ,
definition,and post-impactfragmenttrajectoryprediction.
L,
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JINTRODUCTION
Over the last coupleof decades,therehave been numerouseffortsto
developpredictivemethodsfor bladecontainmentdesign. Theseefforts
- have helpedto reducethe costlyfull-scaletestingrequiredfor design :
i_itegrityvalidation.
Many effortsat shieldsizingformulaswere basedon the assumption
thata rotorfragment'skineticenergycan be equatedto the available
strainenergyin the enginecasingand other structuresin the path of the
fragment. Test data and analysisI usuallyindicate,that a factoris re-
quired,namely:
Ff = C Z Un
n
where ! Un is the sum of ultimatestrainenergiesfor the n materialto be
deformed,Ef is the fragmentenergy,and the rangeof the factoris roughly "
0.05< C < lO
dependingon casematerials,bladetype,etc.,as well as assumptionsre-
gardingthe extentof deformedmaterial.
: Semi-empiricalcontainmentcriteriahavealso been developedthat
relatefragmentenergyto shieldthicknessas well as otherrelevantphysi-
cal parameters.These criteriacan be generalizedas havingthe form:
Ef = Z fn (hb'°u' e, A, B)
n
'! ) where h is the materialthickness,au is the ultimatetensileor shear
strength,e is the elongatlon,A is the contactarea, shearar_a,or con-
tact surfacelength,and B = the angleof impact. Typicallyfor metals:
2<b<3
implying that the thickness is a function of velocity (or momentum)when b
a 2.
These criteria appear to generally be adequate when based on suffi-
cient test data.
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To reduce the dependence on test data, many other methods have been
developed to predict impact response, especially in the field of ballis-
tics. Before the availability of !arge-meraory high-speed computers, such
methods relied principally on quasi-static theories wherein the deformation
shape was assumed a priori and various assumptions were made regarding
material behavior, e.g., rigid-plastic, etc. _See refe,_nce 2 for further
_ discussion and extensive references.)
One analytical containment criterion has recently been proposed3 that
considers both the short-term compressive and shear energy absorption in
the contact region followed by longer term energy absorption due to overall
structural deformation. This model, as well as :he others, still neglects
the contribution of bending stiffness which has been observed to be signi-
ficant, although correlation with very high energy spin pit tests was found
#
to be satisfactory
During the lasL decade, transient material and structural response
computercodes have advancedto the pointwhere in weapon effectsand other
aerospaceapplications,largedeformationtransientresponsecalculations
are made routinely. Whethersuch techniquescan be appliedto containment
" prediction and specifically to the problem of Kevlar containment shielding, _.,
and whetherthey offer any advantagesover empiricalmethods,will be the
subjectof the remainderof this paper.
BOEINGKEVLARSHIELDDEVELOPMENTPROGRAM I
I
In 1972,an experimentalprogramwas initiatedat Boeingto develop
lightweightcontainmenttechnology.4'5 The initialtestsused multilayered
flat shieldsmade of "S" glass fabric. Subsequenttestsused Kevlar49,
/" then Kevlar29. From these early tests,it war apparentthat the very high
J strength-to-weightratio and excellertballisticimpactpropertiesjustified
furtherinvestigation,but the impactand structuralbehaviorof Kevlar o
would be very differentfrom steelor titaniumalloysand would pose major
installationdifficulties.
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pThe Kevlar program has been undertaken with a dual approach to the
development of (math) models ,or shield sizing. One approach, an empirical
6
model, has already been discussed in a previous paper. The other approach
is analyticaland is basedlargelyon existingtransientstructuralanaly-
sis methods.7 As such,the two approachesservedthe test programby pro-
vidingcomplementarybut independentprojections.
Transientfinitedifferenceand _initeelementcomputationaltech-
niqueswere firstappliedto rotor fragmentimpactby Witmeret at. Under
NASA funding,successiverefinementshaveculminatedin the CIVM-JETseries
of codes.2'8'9 A similarapproachwas also adapted"at Boeingto an exist-
ing finitedifferencelargedeflectionplate/shellcode, PETROS3.10 The
convertedprogram,calledEBCAP,was specificallydevelopedto predictthe
containmentof woven fiber shields.II
BOEINGANALYTICALAPPROACH
', The principalassumptionsin EBCAPare that:
1 Fragmentdeformationis negligible.
-, -
2. The impactprocessis inelastic(i.e.,zero coefficientof resti- j
tution).
3. For rotatingfragments,the instantaneouscoefficientof friction
,o
is :.ser,tiallyinfinite(thiswould be incorrectfor smooth- i
surfacedmetal shields).
4. MultilayeredKevlarshieldscan be idealizedas singlelayer
membranes.
i . The flow diagramshown in Figure1 illustratesthe numericalprocedure
J
used to predictthe motionof the fragmentand shield.
i
) .
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For given initialconditionsof fragmentangular velocity,transla-
tional velocity,and incidenceangle, the post-impactvelocitiesof the
fragmentand shield are calculated. Next, the nodal displacementcompon-
ents for the first time increment,t = At, are found from the nodal veloc-
ities. The midsurfacegeometricquantitiesat each mesh point are then
calculatedfrom the displacements,followedby the strain incrementsand
then the stresses. A stress failurecriterion is evaluatedto determineif
tne s;Rieldfibers could have ruptured. If not, the stressesare used to
calculate stress resultantsfrom which the new velocitiesare found by
solving the equilibriumequation,thus specifyingthe new displacements.
Next, the fragment'sposition is updated to correspondto the new time
accordingto equationsof motion. A check is made to see if the effective
: fragmentradius overlaps any mesh points. If not, the program flow cycle
is repeated. Otherwise,a collision is assumed to have occurred and the
impactanalysis procedureis used to calculatevelocity incrementsthat are
superimposedon the vibratorymotion before enteringa new cycle. The
processends if a failure is predicted,a maximum time is reached,or a
numericaTstabilitycondition is violated.
A principaldifferencebetween EBCAP and the CIVM-JET codes is that
momentum transferoccurs over an area of the shield larger than the immed-
iate contact area due to stress wave propagationover the durationof the
numericaltime step, Figure 2.
FLAT PLATE IMPACTTEST PREDICTIONS
Kevlar shieldsdissipatethe fragmentenergy almost wholly by tensile
deformation. The mechanicalenergy is distributedrapidly throughoutthe
•_ // fabric shield, relative to metal response,due to the fiber's high wave
A
7 speed and membraneresponse. Transverse wave propagation, while not quan-L,
., titatively predictable for a nonbondedstructure, is attenuated extremely
quickly. The in-plane compressive stresses cause buckling, which in these
analyses are only crudely taken into account by setting the compressive
stiffness to zero.
t
ae5
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The measured peak displacementas a functionof time from an early
Kevlartest is shown in Figure 3. In this experiment,a l-inch nonrotating
steel cube was shot at the center of a rectangularflat shield with an in-
cidence angle of 60 degreeswith respect to the plane of the shield. The
projectilevelocitywas reducedfrom 876 fps at impact to 250 fps after
perforation. The shieldwas riveted to steel reinforcementsat the top and
i
bottom which in turn were bolted to a heavy steel frame. The shield was
unattachedat its two sides. The shield was composedof two materials.
The first layer was a thin steel plate that may be regardedas simulatinga
supportpanel. This steel panel was experimentally'foundto reduce the
residualprojectilevelocityby less than I0 percent for impact velocities
above 800 fps. Twelve layersof Kevlar made up the rest of the shield.
The deformationof the shieldwas obtainedby high-speedphotography. Ex-
perimentaluncertaintiesare shown by error bars on the experimentaldata
points.
To compare results, the predictedpeak displacementtime historiesare
also shown in Figure 3. In this analysis,the shieldwas idealizedas a
single layer of fabric clamped at the top and bottom edges. Since the
fabric layers are neither bonded nor sewn together,only the initialtran-
sient response predictionis meaningful.
Details of this test comparisonmay be found in referencel, but the
principalconclusionswere that the predictionof peak displacementdid not
vary significantlywith node spacing and was consistentlylower than meas-
ured. However, the actual shield deflectionswere also found to be partly
due to bucklingof the steel reinforcementsand failureof some of the
rivets,which unfortunatelyhinders the comparison. EBCAP will predict
/ fastenerfailures,but cannot change the boundary conditionsto physically
model this effect. Another shortcomingof the analysiswas probablythe
_ lack of material data, i.e., a linear stress-straincurve based on the
static mechanicalfiber propertiesof Kevlarwas used.
266
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The most direct computationalapproach for predictingcontainmentlim-
its is to start with very high fragment velocitiesand successivelyreduce
velocity until the ballisticlimit, the impact velocityat which the resid-
ual velocity is zero after perforation,can be estimatedby extrapolation
as shown in Figure 4. As the fragment velocity is lowered,the EBCAP
calculationstake more time steps to predict perforation,with the result
that numerical inaccuraciesbuild up and the physicalsimulationbecomes
increasinglymore questionable.
The results from a series of tests to determinethe ballisticlimit
are compared in Figure 4. It is seen that as impact velocitiesapproach
the ballistic limit of approximately830 fps, the number of damaged (i.e.,
penetrated)fabric layers increasesvery rapidly for small increasesin
velocity.
To evaluatethe effectivenessof the analyticalmethod, the predicted
residual velocitiesare again shown for two differentmesh spacings. When
the region of influencecontainsmany mesh points, the predictedballistic
limits will generallyconvergewith increasingnumbers of mesh points.
In Figure 5, the correlationwith higher energy flat Kevlar shield
tests is compared to EBCAP predictions. Two sets of predictionsare shown,
4
one made with static properties,the other with modulus and ultimate stress
measured at elevated strain rates. The use of this Boeing strain rate data "
did not shift the predictedballisticli_it significantly(althoughin
other studies,the ballisticlimit was raised up to IO percent higher).
The predictedballisticlimits are seen to be within 15 percent of the I
experimentalballisticlimit.
• In general,the analyticalpredictionsfor flat shield tests were com-
parable in accuracyto those from the empiricalmodel.
/x CURVED SHIELD IMPACTTEST PREDICTIONS
A major analyticaldifficultyfor either flat or curved shields is
modeling flexiblesupports. Varying the material propertiesat nodes adja-
cent to the supports will lower the overall shteld stiffness, but care must
be taken to make the transition sufficiently gradual that large spurious
stress wavesare not generatedby wavereflection.
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As mentionedearlier, in many of our tests in the past two years,
flexiblesupports have been successfullyused to improvecontainment
performanceand also to simulatethe responseof ring shieldsby curved
segment shields. In general,analyticalpredictionswere not very satis-
factory.
SPIN PIT TEST PREDICTIONS
In a.recent test (No. 218) at the Naval Air PropulsionTest Center,
three 120° pie segments from a T-58 rotor were containedat a burst speed
of 20,550 rpmbya 6.7-Ib ring shield made of 40 layers of Kevlar 29. The
shield width of 6 incheswas much larger than the blade chord length (ap-
proximatelyI inch) or disk thickness. The exact ballisticlimit is un-
known,-but is regarded to be close to 20,550 rpm for this configuration.
Figure 6 shows that perforationwas predictedabout 17,000-18,000rpm, or
equivalently,the predictedcontained rotor burst energy is approximately
25 percent too low.
As discussedearlier,MIT has developeda series of special purpose
finite element transientstructuralcomputer programsto simulate the
responseof rotor fragment/containmentring interactions. These programs
restrictcontainmentshield motion to be two dimensional,i.e., by a beam/
ring idealization,in contrastto EBCAP, which allows for three dimensional
" geometryand motion. However,the latest code, CIVM-JET4B,has the capa-
bility of followingthe impact of up to 6 rotor fragmentssimultaneously,
whereas EBCAP cannot model more than one fragment-shieldinteraction. In
view of this, the CIVM-JET4Bcode was obtainedwith the hope that the use
of both computerprogramswould lead to improvedanalyticalpredictions.
// The Boeing version of the CIVM-JET4Bprogram has incorporated severalJ
changes. Special logic was added to allow the idealization of Kevlar
fabric as a membraneand the equivalent of buckling by .ot allowing com-
pressive stresses. A shield failure criterion based on the maximumstrain
in an element is used to predict the shield failure similar to the logtc
_ used in EBCAP. The overall solution procedures are also similar.
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Analysesof test 218 were also made with the modified CIVM-JET4Bcoae.
The resultsare shown in Figure 7 where the three points at each energy
level indicatethe residualenergies calculatedfor each fragment. Con-
tain_entis seen to be predictedapproximatelyat 18,000 rp_.
riosignificantlydifferentconclusionswere drawn from predictions
based on only the fragment translationalenergies.
. As far as possible,the ECBAP and CIVM-JET4Bruns were made using
comparablemode spacing, time increments,and physicalaysumptions. The
CIVM-JET4Bresults appear to be slightly better. The bIVM-JET4Bresults
are expected to improve for lower ratiosof shieid_idth to fragment thick-
ness.
A subsequent test, NAPTCtest 221, was used to obtain an order of
magnitude higher energy, approximately 10,000,000 inch-lbs. In this test,
a 58-1b, 120-layer, 9-inch-width Kev|ar shield was successfully used to
contain at least two 120° fragments from a J65 rotor burst at 8100 rpm.
(The shield was intact, but lack of photographic evidence makes it diffi-
cult to ascertain if the nonimbedded fragment tumbled around the edges of
the shield.) This test, however, indicatedthat considerablymore further
developmentwork is probably required,for neither EBCAP or CIVM-JET4Bcame
close to providingas satisfactoryshield sizing predictionsas the empir-
ical model.
If future needs indicatethat Kevlar or other woven fiber materials
warrant more detailedconsideration,then such developmentwork should be
directedtoward present shortcomingssuch as the idealizationof multi-
layered Kevlar wraps as a membrane,and modeling of load transfer processes
when inner layers of the shield are torn, More extensivematerial data for
Kevlarwould also be useful ;ince so little is known about its fabric
' / properties,damagetolerance,etc.J
G
' CONCLUSIONS (
I
At present, speclal purpose structuraldynamics computer programs for
_) rotor fragmentcontainmentpredictionare only advantageousfor Kev1aror
other woven fiber shield sizing when there is insufficienttest data for
empiricalmodeling.
269
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To be useful for engineeringdesign, analyticalmethods such as JET4B
should continue to be developedunder NASA sponsorship,but with emphasis
on shield failure and attachmentloads with considerationfor structural
behaviordifferencesbetween metals and woven fiber and in the long-term,
post-impactfragment path prediction.
Developmentof a 3D finite element programwith similar emphasis
should also be continued,which could offer the capabilityfor analysisof
off-centerfragment impacts,one-sideddisplacementconstraints,and vary-
ing shield thicknessor material propertiesin both circumferentialand
axial directions.
"_ /#
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CERAMIC COMPOSITE PROTECTION FOR TURBINE DISC BURSTS
P. B. Gardner
Industrial Ceramics Division
Norton Company
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself boarding an airbus with 300 other
passengers heading off for a vacation trip when suddenly the
in-flight certified auxiliary power unit bursts a turbine
rotor during the take-off roll. Not a very happy start for
your vacation is it?
This is what the civil authorities in Europe were con-
cerned about prior to European certification of the A30OB
Airbus Commercial Transport. "
The Hamburger Flugzeugbau Division of Messerschmitt-
Bolkow-Blohm went to work on a solution to this potential
problem since they had the installation responsibility for
the Garrett supplied Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) for the
A300B. In a program with Norton Company, a viable lightweight
rotor containment system was developed and qualified for use
!
in the production A300B aircraft.
The ceramic composite rotor containment system for the
A300B application was totally developed and qualified for J
/ close to $60,000 with an addition to the aircraft weight of _J /
about 50 pounds. The cost per aircraft set is close to $2300. i
J Compared to the integral containment system used on the L-1011 i
APU which cost clos_ to 2 million dollars to develop at an I
increased unit cost per PT-6 engine much greater than the cost
.5
of the A300B panels, it can be readily determined that the
ceramic composite rotor containment system provides an
economical solution to the APU disc containment problem.
• 277
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BACKGROUND
The Garrett TSCP 700-4 APU for the Airbus is the identi-
cal unit used in the Douglas DC-10. Unlike the L-1011 APU
which Lockheed specified both integral blade and rotor disc
protection for, the DC-10 unit was not designed to withstand
rotor disc failures since the FAA TSO only required blade
containment. Both the DC-10 and L-1011 APU's have high
degrees of reliability, but Lockheed wanted the extra measure
of safety provided with an integrally contained APU. Over
two million dollars was spent to develop and qualify the
. L-1011 APU for this protection level.
The Garrett unit in the DC-10 installation apparently
does not constitute a hazard to flight critical equipment in
the immediate proximity of the tail installation location:
, but with the A300S location there could be some severe :
consequences from a turbine burst. Immediately beside the
APU the triply redundant hydraulic actuators for the hori-
zontal stabilizer surfaces are located. The rotating plane
;_i of the high energy rotors can be shown to pass through the
d
.i flight control actuator locations. It was in these areas that
k
MBB selected to locate rotor containment protection panels.
I MATERIALS SEARCH
I
Having made the decision to provide protection with
guards or panels located in the plane of the high energy
compressor section of the APU, the next obvious task was to
278 '
$ , I
• . ...--,"%,.. .... ,._ ,,, .'- , ,,,... ,..ll2_ ,.ll..,...,/,_...:..%.__.... ._.i..,
miF,.m,
........... , ................ , ..... , , ._ .............. , .....................................
1978002125-277
find a lightweight material capable of stopping pieces of
the high or low pressure compressor rotor discs.
This turned out to be a much greater task than originally
anticipated by MBB. Their tests were conducted on over 25
different materials without success. In utter frustration,
even reinforced concrete slabs were tested without success.
Some limited success was obtained using rubber/metal composite
laminates but not so much success as to allow their con-
sideration for production. Finally, MBB contacted the
ceramic composite armor manufacturers for information and
selected Norton to work with them on a developmental effort
to see if a modified ceramic composite armor system could do
the job.
. Norton's engineers determined analytically that a slight
modification to the Armor System could possibly provide the
. high energy ,evel protection required and various ceramic i
to backing ratios were proposed for testing to prove out the
system design.
Essentially, four configurations were finally selected
J
/ for testing against the high pressure and the low pressure
wheels. Samples were provided to MBB and successful contain-
me,l, tests were conducted on the first try! All of the
selected configurations passed the imp,act tests, and a final
design _as then optimized to combine bo_h high pressure and
low pressure protection in the same panel.
i 279
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Final qualification impact and environmental testing
was then jointl_ conducted and the Norton supplied rotor
containment system was certified for use on the A300B
aircraft against the FAA special conditions which required
compl_te APU containment against rotor bursts to protect the
complete aircraft.
PANEL DESIGN
As previously mentioned, Norton provided a modified
Armor System design for the rotor containment panels.
Basically, the modification of the design consisted of in-
creasing the thickness of the fiberglass reinforced plastic
backing material to achieve an ophimum ratio of ceramic
thickness to backin_ thickness for the different ballistic
defeat condition.
CERAMIC COMPOSITE ARMOR SYSTEMS
Conventional Armor Systems of ceramic composites for
Armor piercing projectile protection have been around for
about 15 years. Much of the preliminary design of these
"" _Istems was done on an empirical basis in ballistic test
laboratories by both government and industry researchers.
The first lightweight Armor Systems to provide protection
against ballistic projectiles were composed of a sintered
aluminum oxide ceramic tile approximately one-third of an
inch thick bonded to a ductile backing panel, usually
aluminum or fiberglass reinforced _astic. In the early
28O
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1960's, the Norton Company entered the field of ceramic
a_mor development with the hot pressed boron carbide armor
system. Both the alumina and the boron carbide systems are
similar in construction - the tile composition being the
only difference, but the lower specific gravity of the boron
carbide ceramic ". elds an armor system weighing approximately
30 percent less th_n the aluminum oxide system.
The most common lightweight armor systems, listed in
the order of decreasing areal density (the weight per square
#
foot necessary to provide a given ballistic protection level)
follow:
I
-Dual Hardness Steel (also identified as DPSA,
or dual property steel armor)
B
-Alumina (Aluminum Oxide, or AI203)/GRP Backing §
-Silicon/Boron Carbide/Silicon Carbide (Si/B4C/SiC-
Sintered/Impregnated)/GRP Backing
-Boron Carbide (B4C, also identified as SF B4C,
or silicon-free boron carbide - hot pressed)/GRP _
backing
All of the ceramic armor systems have one feature in
, common. Each is a two-component system consisting of a facing
/
/ of hard brittle material and a backing of soft, deformable <
_: material such as fiberglass reinforced plastic.. For dual
hardness steel armor, the facing is a hardened austenitic
steel, while the backing is a mild steel.
When either armor system is struck by an armor-piercing
projectile, the core or penetrator is broken upon impact with
the facing in the first few microscconds. The residual energy
i
, !
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is then absorbed by the backing material. The role of the
backing has been likened to that of a "catcher's mitt" in
this situation.
What was desired in the rotor containment application
was to optimize the design to obtain a bi9ger "catcher's
mitt" to contain the much greater kinetic energy of the
impacting disc fragment. Unlike the piercing projectile
situation, the impact "footprint" is very much larger for
the disc fragment. The boron carbide ceramic acts to break-up
the impacting disc fragment much like the armor piercing
projectile, but the backing material plays a much greater
role in absorbing the kinetic energy. Without the ceramic
facing, the disc fragment's sharp edges would easily cut
through the various plies of fiberglass causing easy defeat
of the backing plate.
MODIFICATION OF THE DESIGN
By increasing the backing thickness of the rotor con-
tainment system to achieve a nearly I/i ratio of ceramic
thickness to backing thickness, as opposed to the conventional
p projectile armor system which utilizes close to a 1.75/1
f
ceramic to backing ratio, a two-to-three fold increase in the
kinetic energy protection level can be obtained for the same
areal density system. For comparison purposes, an armor system
for 50 caliber AP projectiles with an areal density of 13
pounds per square foot protects against 12,500 ft-lbs of
energy whereas the rotor containment system of 13.5 pounds
per square foot protects against 26,000 ft-lbs of en¢,gy.
2_
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BALLISTIC TEST PROGRAM
In order to develop the rotor containment system,
Norton Company in conjunction with Hamburger Flugzeugbau in
Hamburg, Germany, conducted an extensive test program
utilizing an air cannon test rig. A plenum chamber was con-
nected to the air cannon barrel by a fast acting pressure
valve. The plenum chamber could be pressurized to varying
levels to produce different impact velocities at the test
panels.
The test fragments were unmachined 120 ° segments of the
actual compressor discs weighing 1.25 Kg each. Impact
velocities from 175 m/sec to 260 m/sec were used in the test
program with the test criteria for success being total
containment.
The test fragments were mounted in hard foam plugs
which exposed the sharp edge of the disc fragment. These
%
hard foam plugs are called sabots, and this is a common method
for mounting test fragments of varying sizes for impact
: tes£ing.
The test panels were rigidly mounted to an impact
I frame and subjected to a variety of impact tests which
?
simulated various energy levels associated with the high
and low pressure discs of the engine compressor.
\
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The initial tests were conducted with the panels
bolted directly to the impact frame, but the impact energy
transmitted to the frame was so great that the mounting bolts
were all sheared completely off. A revised mounting
technique was then designed utilizing four straps which
mounted the panel to the test frame. This mounting method
was very successful and has been incorporated in the actual
aircraft installation.
This transmitted energy to the mounting structure is
a particularly troublesome problem for projectile armor
systems as well. On the higher level kinetic energy threats
such as the 50 caliber AP round, it can be a tough problem
to solve. LTV Corporation spent considerable time and "q
effort designing deformable bracketry to mount the armor
panels on the USAF A-7D air_raft just to attenuate the energy
!
levels transmitted to the aircraft structure. The Army's
Natick Laboratories have also fretted over the problem in the
design of a ballistic infantry helmet. Their problem is a I
T
bit tougher, however, because if they stop the round, the
transmitted energy is great enough to break the helmet
J f
wearerOs neck, and a helmet suspension system capable of
' attenuating the energy is also much too heavy to wear! For
these reasons, the U. S. Army Infant_,y is still using the old
"steel pot" helmet which makes a good coffee pot but not
much else!
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THE A300B APU INSTALLATION
In the absence of firm requirements for rotor disc
containment and the fact that the APU compressor is not
secured against the egress of debris; Hamburger Flugzeugbau
' required additional shielding over a given area. This
shielding is installed between the adjacent fire walls and
the airframe structure of the APU compartment. The shielding
protects both the hydraulic systems and the airframe structure
from damage, so that the free operation of the horizontal
elevators remains unimpaired. !
THE FINALIZED DESIGN - DUAL PROTECTION
After the complete survey of ballistic impact tests
'. were conducted, it was determined that a single panel design
could be provided to protect both the low pressure and high
pressure disc fragments. Norton designed this sy,_tem using
a constant thickness backing with two different boron carbide
o
ceramic thicknesses. The total thicknesses of the two
segments are 25 mm and 30 mm respectively.
The backing material consists of various p_ies of
armor grade woven roving fiberglass in a special high temp-
';/"
erature resistant polyester resin. The high temperature resin
0"
, was used since the panels are subjected to the high
i
temperature levels of the APU compartment during operation.
:. This panel design was then subjected to full environ-
_ mental testing per MIL-STD-810 which included the following
tests •
d
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-Structural Performance Load Tests
-Fungus Resistance
-Humidity Test
-Salt Fog Test
-Fluid Resistance (Hydraulic oil, fuel, lubricating
oil and Halon 1301 fire extinguishant)
-High and Low Temperature (-600C to +150°C)
-Acceleration (-4.5G to +gG)
-Vibration Test (Method 514, Procedure I,
MIL-STD-810B)
Following the successful completion of the environ-
mental test program, the rotor containment system was
certified for use on the A300B Aircraft. The A300B aircraft
I
entered commercial service in 1974 and over 50 aircraft are
now in service with the European carriers.
!
.RECENT ADVANCES IN ARMOR TECHNOLOGY - WEIGHT SAVINGS POTENTIAL
There has been a significant improvement made in the
performance of ceramic composite armor systems since the _
?
rotor containment system was developed and qualified for
the A300B APU. This improvement could be directly applicable
!
/ to this system to achieve an areal density savings of about
: 12%. This could translate directly to a weight reduction of
7.0 pounds per aircraft set of panels today with a minimum 0
of requalification testing required. This improvement in-
volves the replacement of the woven roving fiberglass backing
with DuPont's Kevlar-49 organic fiber. Norton Company is
considered the pioneer in the development of advanced design
Z
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°ceramic composite armor systems utilizing Kevlar-49 backing
materials, and a summary of this development work applicable
to crashworthy armored seats is discussed below.
BACKING MATERIAL IMPROVEMENTS
With the advent of the U. S. Army's request for
proposals to industry for the Advanced Attack Helicopter, much
emphasis was placed on eliminating parasitic armor completely
, or reducing the current areal densities required to defeat
the specified ballistic projectile threats.
J
Theoretical penetration analysis techniques (THOR)
indicated that a significant weight savings could be realized
.!
by replacing the conventional woven roving fiberglass (E-Glass) i
reinforced plastic with a newly developed synthetic fiber
recently developed by DuPont.
Initial consultations began and soon various tests were
underway by Norton to evaluate the validity of the hypothesis
that a potential (7-8%) savings _ould be achieved by utilizing I
this material as a backing for _the then "best" B4C/E-Glass
armor system.
' Initially, the test results were not entirely encouraging,
/ but inspired by DuPont, Norton attempted to reduce the ,_
variables affecting the performance of the backing to a mini-
mum by utilizing essentially a one-for-one replacement of
the E-Glass fibers alone by the Kevlar-49.
i
7!
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In a self-funded program, a comparable backing material
was developed to the conventional E-Glass system with a
resultant weight savings of about 30% over the E-Glass system.
This program gained extreme interest and eventual further
funding for ballistic verification by the U. S. Army's '
Natick Laboratories.
A number of ballistic verification tests were conducted
to establish the validity of the initially encouraging re-
sults and the B4C/Kevlar-49 system was approved by the Army
for use as the armor system on the new advanced attack
helicopter, thereby enabling the potential contractors a
significant 10-12% weight savings in the Armor System. _,
i
The Kevlar-49 backing works well as an armor because
' p
of its outstanding physical properties as compared to E-Glass.
As suggested by Wilkins et al, the synthesis of a new backing _
material that would be stiffer to more adequately support the
ceramic and delay the onset of ceramic tensile failure is
accomplished with the Kevlar laminates. At 19 million psi,
it has the highest modulus of elasticity of any synthetic
fiber, and is twice as stiff as E-Glass the most commonly
,, used reinforcing fiber. Its high tensile strength and high 5°
modulus combined with its extremely low weight (1.45 g/cc -
40% less than the weight of glass), along with low elongation
(2.8% at break vs. 4.0% at break for glass), high stress
rupture, excellent impact strength and good vibration damping
characteristics make it a natural for use as an armor backing.
_8
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SUMMARY
The development of the ceramic composite turbine disc
protection panels for the A300B was a direct application of
_orton's armor technology to a commercial application. In
this case, the analytical predictions for modifying the
ballistic projectile armor system were more than verified by
the test program conducted to qualify the rotor containment
system. In fact, with only a slight change in the areal
density of the armor system a more than two-fold increase
An kinetic energy protection level was achieved. ,
f
The assumption that guards used to protect against disc
.!
fragment damage to either the engine or aircraft components
from failed turbine discs would impose intolerable weight
and cost penalties upon the aircraft is disputed by this
design. In fact, this concept is only slightly heavier than
an integrally contained turbine engine but significantly less
expensive on both a recurring and non-recurring cost basis.
Additional improvements in the state-of-the-art of armor
technology also can now be incorporated into the rotor
containment system to make this alternative even more attractive
/
_* on a weight comparison basis to integral containment. The
v
use of Kevlar-49 as a backing for the boron carbide ceramic
has already been proven and qualified for use in the projectile
_ armor systems, and its use for the rotor containment system
could achieve a 12% weight savings over the current system.
J
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Based on the successful application of Norton's Armor
technology to this commercial application, and the signifi-
cant increase in protection level that has been achieved,
Norton has filed for patent rights in the U. S. and several
foreign countries under Application Number 329,046. Patents
rights are now pending in the U.S., U.K., France, Germany
and Japan. This application is also covered in Italy
under Patent Number 1004855.
290
m ,i,
1978002125-289
. o
REFE2ENCES
i. Wilkins, Mark L., Third Progress Report of Light Armor
Program, UCRL-50460, Lawrence Radiate Laboratory,
Univ. of California/Livermore, July 9, 1968.
2. Wilkins, M. L., Cline, C. F., and Honodel, C.A.,
Fourth Progress Report of Light Armor Program,
UC----_50694, Lawrence-----_ad_atlo_-_--nLabor-----atory_Univ. of
California/Livermore, June 4, 1969.
3. Wilkins, M. L., Landingham, R.L., and Honodel, C.A.,
Fifth Progress Report of Light Armor Prglram , UCRL
50-_,'Lawrence Radiatl_-6n Laborator----_,U---niv__of
California/Livermore, January 1971.
4. Gardner, Paul B., Ceramic Armor - A Status Report,
National Defense, September-Octobe_I97-_.
5. Murphy, Jack, Making A Name For Itself, DuPont
Magazine_ July_August-_-g73[ _t
6. Editor, Strongest Synthetic Fiber Yet Fills A Host _
Of Design Needs, Product Englnee'------{i_g,September----J974.
7. Gardner, Paul B., Advances in Ceramic C___omposite Armor
Technology, Paper Presented-_t the Amerlcan Defense
Preparedness Association Symposium of Survivability and |
Vulneralility, October 1975.
8. Deutsche Airbus GmbH, Test Report
VB No. 185_, 1973. I
, . ,
/
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Paul B. Gardner is currently Business Manager for Armor
and Spectramic Products in Norton Company's Industrial
Ceramics Division. He joined the company in 1971 as a
,' Project Engineer in Ceramic Components and in 1972 he was
named Product Manager for the Armor Products Department. In
his current position since late 1974, he has the responsibility
for the business pi_,%ing, marketing, sales and engineering
of the Company'_ ARMOR, CRYSTAR and NORBIDE Product Lines.
Prior to 1971 he held Experimental and Senior Experimental
Engineering positions in Hamilton Standard Division of
United Technologies' Aircraft Systems Department.
'; He received a BSME from the University of Rhode Island
and an MSME from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He
is currently a candidate for a Master of Science Degree in
• Management Science from the Worcester Polytechnic Institute.
He holds a Registered Professional Engineers License in the
Commonwealth of MassachuEetts and is a member of the American
Helicopter Society.
/
7
I
J
-.,_ 292 '
I. t
1978002125-291
DISCUSSION
P. Gardner, Norton Co.
The compressor segment weight was 1.25 kilograms and the velocities
varied from 175 to 260 meters per second.
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
Paul, you r_de reference to high temperature. Could you tell me what
the temperature was, how high?
P. Gardner, Norton Co.
We qualified the system at 300°F.
,_ion
How was the shield supported?
P. Gardner, Norton Co.
Only the four straps chat I showed on the viewgraph supported the shield.
These straps were attached to the aircraft structure at the Z-frame inside the
firewall. The system weighed about 50 pounds, not including the weight of the
: straFs. I do not recall the, weight of the straps.
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
Did you test a titanium shield mounted on the straps in exactly the same
way?
P. Gardner, Norton Co.
No, we did not dc any of the testing, it was done by Air Bus Industry,
Hamburger, Flugzeugbau. Their test report indicates that they tested over
25 different materials, and had very little success, or had some very little
success they could afford the weight for.
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
I had the _pression that the straps made quite a difference to the
results.
/
? J P. Gardner, Norton Co.
The straps made some difference in the results. The initial test work
was done with the armor panels _unted directly to the Z-frame of the slmulated
aircraft structure. The panels stopped the rotor segment, but the transmitted
energy into the structure sheared the bolts off and the panel dropped away. So
the straps were there to distribute that load more uniformly into the structure.
•" That was not our design, that was designed by Hamburger Flugzeubau. If the
actuators had not been _n _e wrong posltton relative to the APU, we probably
wouldn't ha_'e had to contain anything.
/0
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CONCEPTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIGHT-WEIGHT COI_tPOSITE
STRUCTURES FOR ROTOR BURST CONTAINMENT*
by Arthur G. Holms
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
ABSTRACT
Based on published results on rotor burst con: _i.ament with single materials,
and on body _rmor using composite materials, a set of hypotheses is established
as to what variables might control the design of a weight - efficient protective de-
vice. Based on modern concepts _or the design and analysis of small optimum
seeking experiments, a particular experiment for evaluating the hypotheses and
materials was designed. The design and methods for the analysis of results are
described.
_UMMARY
The purpose of the research reported herein was to plan an experimental
program, the results of which could provide a basis for the design of weight ef-
ficient full circumferential containment devices to protect passengers and critical
aircraft systems from the devastating effects of tarblne engine disk bursts. The
conclusions about the needed experiment were synthesized from three areas of
information, namely, (1) prior disk burst protection experiments, (2) personnel
body armor research, and (3) modern concepts in the design and analysis of
/'" small optimum seeking experiments.
/ Based on both the prior disk burst experiments and the body armor re-
search, a listof hypotheses was established as to what factors might be control-
llng in the design of a weight efficient protective device. The consequence of such
hypotheses iz that the device should consist of as many as four concentric rings,
each to consist -,f a material uniquely chosen for its position in the penetration
: sequence. Four unique classes of materials are proposed for the four rings and
*Also published as NASA TM X-73633, 1977.
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particularly attractive examples of each are identified. Experimenting ispro-
posed to evaluate the hypotheses and material choices.
Because the materials are expensive, because their processing is difficult
to control, and because the results of disk burst containment experiments are
difficult to evaluate, some modern concepts for the design and analysis of small
optimum seeking experiments were examined and are discussed. Based on such
concepts, a particular experiment for evzluatlng the hypotheses and materials
was designed, and the design and the method for the analysis of results is de-
scribed.
INTRODUCTION
Recent statistics on turbine engine rotor failures in commercial aviation
show that failures of several types occur (Mangano and De Lucia (1975)). The
probability of successful containment of such failures depends on whether the J
failures to contain the fragments are due to: (1) full wheel bursts, (2) failed t_
rim segments, or (3) failed blades. Engine containment of full wheel bursts
(Table I) has never occurred. Containment of rim fragments occurs in only a
minority of failures. Containment of failed blades usually occurs, but this is
not surprising because the FAA requires (Federal Regulations, Title 14) the _ _
failed blades be contained. Another FAA requirement is that failed disks L_
contained ff the turbine is internal to the fuselage, as in the case of auxiliary
power units. 1The results of a long series of rotor burst prot_ion experiments have
Leen described by Mangano (1972). These results seem to imply that the
weight penalties associated with full circumferential disk burst containment
• are prohibitive. The problem must be regarded as a research problem for
which a major breakthrough is needed.
/ The possibility of using something less than fell circumferential contain.
;: meat is currently being explored. Devices are under investigation to protect
,_, Just a sector of a fall circumference. The technique is called shadow sh/eld/_
and the devices that have been proposed are called deflectors. Future research
will undoubtedly separate those design situations (mall angle of protect/on)
/. where deflectors have the best weight efficiency from those sltoat/oas (large
= angle of protection) where full circumferential eontalnment has the best effi-
ciency. Such a delineation cannot properly be made until optimization studies
have been completed for both types.
1978002125-294
The purpose of the present research was to plan some rotor burst contain-
ment experimenting that could result in procedures of general applicability for
the design of weight efficient full circumferential rotor burst containment de-
vices. To that end three areas of information were examined. The first was
that provided by the bursting of turbine rotors into containment rings in a spin
pit (Mangano (1972)). That investigation presented the results of a large amount
of testing of mostly similar (steel) containment materials. The second area of
information is that provided by the ballistic materials research of the Depart-
ment of Defense to develop weight efficient personnel body armor. Although the
response of targets to projectiles is basically different from the response of
containment rings to disk bursts, the research does compare the ballistic
properties of very dissimilar materials.
The joint examination of these two areas of research provides a list of
physical hypotheses on how materials of widely different ballistic properties
might be used in combination (composite rings) to product a more weight effi-
cient containment than could be achieved with monolithic rings.
The main hypothesis from the rotor burst tests (Mangano (1972)) is that
the containment device should absorb large amounts of energy in tensile strain-
ing. The main hypothese_ from the body armor research (Rolston(1968)) is that
the material properties should vary through the thickness of the device. In
military armor, such variations are exemplified by dual hardness steel and by
ceramics backed by fiber reinforced plastics.
The physical hypotheses should be subjected to critical experimentation so
that they can be evaluated. Because the materials are expensive, because their
processing is difficult to control, and because the results of disk burst contain-
ment expe-iments are difficult to evaluate, some modern concepts for the design
and analysi_ of small optimum seeking experiments were reviewed. A specific
design of an experiment is proposed. Because the materials and their proces-
sing are expensive, the experiment was designed so that preliminary conclu-
/, sions can be drawn on completing Just one half of the total design. On comple-
x, tion of the first half, the results can be examined to see whether the composite
rings are superior to, or inferior to, the simpler monolithic rings (which have
been extensively investigated). If the composite rings are not clearly superior
to monolithic rings, the investigation can be terminated and further costs
: avoided. If the composite rings are superior, then the second half should be
performed. Because the experiment is a telescoping design (Holms (1967)) or
_ Addelmas (1969) the data from both halves can be combined to produce valid es-
tlm'ates of the dlrect effedts _f ._e varlabl_d and their "synergistlc combin._tlons.
f
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In addition to providing containment design methods, a second purpose of
the proposed experiment is to determine the weight penalty associated with a
weight efficient containment system.
The results of the experiment might also identify concepts and materials
applicable to the lesser problems of fan, compressor, and turbine blade con-
tainment.
IMPLICATIONS OF BODY ARMOR RESEARCH FOR ROTOR
BURST CONTAINMENT
A basic concept that has proven widely useful in the design of weight ef-
ficient armor is the concept that the material properties should vary through
the thickness of the armor. An elementary example is provided by the use of
dual-h:_rdness steel. The projectile first encounters a hard material that con-
tributes to the deformation of the projectile, bu_ because the hard material
cannot be ideal in energy absorption, it is backed up by tougher material that
sacrifices hardness in favor of better energy absorption. Such a concept was
, further investigated by Wong and PrifU (1977) .'°_the Army Mechanics and
Materials Research Center, Watertown, MA, who showed the existence of
synergistic combinations of metals.
More complex systems were described by Rolston, Bodine, and Dunleavy
(1968). They described some body armor in which a very hard material (a
ceramic) is used in combination with a very strong material (a fiber reinforced
plastic).
"Materials that have proven weight efficient in protecting against slower
moving projectiles have included nylon cloths (MIL-C-12369F(GL) (1974)) nylon
felts (MIL-C-43635 (1'969)) and aramid cloths (LP/P DES 32-75 (1975)). The
_" use of aramid cloth for rotor burst protection was dit.,Lssed by Gerstle (1975),
_ in which he suggested that multi-material devices might be superior to mono-
lithic devices.
!. PHYSICAL HYPOTHESES
The process by which a projectile is defeated by"body armor is assumed
to have some characteristics in common with, and some characteristics which
298
1978002125-296
, f. #,. ;.
differ from, the process of a full circumferential disk burst containment. The
common characteristics are assumed to occur in the initial stages where re-
sistance to shear and resistance to spalling are importsut. The stage of disk
burst containment that is assumed to be different from the operation of body ar-
mor is the final stage where the protective ring undergoes very large circum-
ferential tensile and bending strains (Mangano (1972)).
The literature of body armor and the literature of rotor burst protection
thus suggest a large number of physical hypotheses that might describe the
rotor burst protection process. If all of these hypotheses were,operative, the
most efficient devices would be quite complex. The appropriate research
would seem to consist of investigating the indicated complex device with a
view to determining which features contribute to weight efficiency and which
features do not.
Thus the long list of hypotheses to be considered should not be viewed as
listing factors to be included in a design manual, but instead should be regarded
as listing factors to be included in a research program. Many of the factors
might prove to be insignificant and could be so identified in a design manual.
The hypotheses are as follows:
1. The protective device should consist of a nested set of four concen-
tric cylinders, each having unique ballistic properties.
2. The innermost cylinder should be very strong in shear because:
a. It should provide some bhmtiag of the sharp edges of the projectile.
b. It should dissipate some energy through projectile deformation.
c. It should resist penetration by achieving a wider distribution of the
load.
3. The first and second layers function in the immediate vicinity of the
impact points as beams in bending. The first layer acts as the compressively
stressed part of the beam and the second layer acts as that part of a beam that
sustains high tensile stresses. The bond between them must sustain the "neu-
/ tral axis shear stresses" and should also delay the spalling failure of the hard
/
;: layer. The first layer should be very strong in compression and the second
, layer should be very strong in tension, and the combination should be of very
low mass so as to minimize the distortions from circularity that result from
inertia effects. The preservation of circularity would improve the uniformity
_. of the load that is transferred to the outer layers. The particular desirability
: of low inertia for these layers suggests that hardness in the first layer is to
be sought from a ceramic or a glass instead of a metal, and that strength in
the second layer should be sought from a fiber reinforced plastic.
299
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/4. The thirdlayer shouldbe the resultof a "hedge" strategy,thatis,it
shouldbe a materialproven weight efficientin testsof monolithicrings,
namely, a high-toughnessmetal. As such, itwoilldhave some of the attri-
butesof theotherthreelayers.
5. The fourthlayershouldbe chosen solelyforitsabilityto absorb
largeamounts of energy intensilestraining.Itshouldbe a ballisticfabric
or felt.
The experiment shouldserve two typesofobjectives.
I. It shouldtestthetruthor falsityof each of theprecedinghypotheses.
2. R shouldshow whether an optimum device(ona weightbasis)would
consistof more thanone of thepreviouslydefinedlayers,and on a rough
quantitativebasis, it shouldgivetheoptimum proportionsof each.
.Sothattheexperimentwillbe representativeof theweight efficiencies
that are appropriate to aircraft usage, the four layers should each consist of #
materials that have maximum probability of performing the hypothesized-
function on a weight efficient basis. Classes of materials that are though to
• be appropriate are as follows: _'_"
Layer Class of material
/
First Ceramic or glass _
Second Fiber reinforced plastic
• Third Metal &
Fourth Ballistic fabric or felt
:. Some materials that are regarded as being illustrative of the preceding
four classes of materials are listed in Table 2. The listing does not differ-
entiate between materials as to their practicality for the cold section or the
• // hot section of a turbine engine. The assumption is that the experiment will
evaluate basic interactions among the disk burst and containment material '
_ variables. When this has been done, the containment designer must then
select materials that will retain the appropriate dynamic properties at the
engine temperature conditions. For example, if an aramid fiber reinforced
/'- epoxy were found to be weight efficient in the second layer, then a contain.
merit device in the turbine hot section might use a tungsten fiber reinforced
nickel in the second layer.
i
3OO
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A high strength adhesive is proposed to be used between the first and the
second layers. Detailed information on high strength adhesives was given by
Shields (1970). High strength adhesives are specified by MMM-A-132. Some
examples of high strength adhesives are provided by the cyanoacrylates
(1VIIL-A-46050) an# the epoxy-nylons.
y
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF SMALL OPTIMI_/I SEEKING EXPERIMENTS
Many strategies for the experimental attainment of optimum conditions
have been investigated and described in the literature. Of them, the particular
set of concepts known as "Box-Wilson methods" (Box and Wilson (1951)) or
"Response Surface Methodology" (Box and Hunter (1957)) is now well established
as the most _ational and efficient approach. These methods have a flow seque.nce
as depicted by Fig. 1 and as described as follows.
Step 1. - Using all prior knowledge, select a set of independent variables
that are to be investigated for their effect on the dependent variable that is to be
optimized. (In the present instance the dependent variable could be chosen as the
•: ratio of rotor burst energy divided by the containment weight for just marginal ,
containment, or it could be chosen as the ratio of rotor burst momentum)
divided by the containment weight for just marginal containment, or it could be
chosen as some other function of the rotor variables and the containment weight).
The Independent variables would be chosen to represent the environment of
the impact process together with the design and material variables of the con--
tainment device. The test levels chosen for the independent variables would be
: based on prior knowledge of the physical process. A statistically optimal de-
sign of experiment is then selected to be maximally efficient for the model fit-
_ ting. The data is to be fitted with a simple mathematical model (which is usu-
. // ally a polynlmial equation of first degree augmented by a few higher degree ,.
_ terms as may be permitted by the small experiment). I
The experiment is performed and a statistically optimal procedure is used
to select a mathematical model of maximum predictive accuracy in terms of the i
actual data. The next step depends upon the nature of the selected model, as !
displayed by the relative magnitudes of the first degree and higher order terms.
_-. If the first degree terms are clearly'predominant the response function is essen-
tially planar and the "method of steepest ascents 't is appropriate. The next
step is therefore_. If the second degree terms cannot be ignored, the re-
aponse surface is warped or curved and the "method of local exploration" is
, appropriate, and the next step is therefore Step__3.
t
• _ ,"_ _: -
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Step 2. - The situation is that a planar surface represents the response as
a first degree equation in the independent variables and the equation is used to
determine the direction of steepest ascent in terms of the independent (coordi-
nate) variables. The situation is analogous to a mountain climber at a river's
edge who decides to walk in a straight line over the meadow in its direction of
steepest ascent (for example, 30 degrees east of north, which is to say, some
fixed ratio of the independent variables "miles east" and "miles north").
Having established such a direction, a sequence of experimental points is
laid out in that direction. With the completion of the indicated experimenting,
the location in the experiment space is identified for the maximum of the de-
pendent variable. If the achieved maximum is adequate or if experimenting
must be stopped for other reasons, the next step is S_4. Otherwise the
_ next step is to go back to Step1 (but with newly acquired empirical and other
information).
Step 3. - The experiment plan of "Step 1" was minimally adequate for a
,_ first degree equation. It must be augmented by sufficient "hypercube blocks"
(Box and Hunter (1957)) or (Holms (1967)) to evaluate two-factorinteraction
terms. It must also be augmented by a "star block" (Box and Wilson (1951))
or ](Boxand Htmt_r (1957)). Performance of the experiment allows the firing
_mdselection of a model that is a statistically optimal representation of the
data. The practical interpretation of the equation can be performed as de..
scribed by Box _nd Wilson (1951), by.Davies (1960), or by Myers (1971).
The predictive model and its geometrical interpretation (often by the
"method of canonical reduction") can be used to decide that a true maximum
has been located, or that it has not. If a true ma_mum has been located,
or if experimenting is to be discontinued for other reasons, the next step is
__.._. If not, then the canonical reduction would be used to identify a line
of steepest ascents along a "rising ridge", and the procedure would other-
_, wise be that of Step 2.
_. - Stop the experimenting and w_ite the report, or build the pro-
_ totype, or both.
- -, 302 ,_ :
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ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE- A PARTICULAR EXPERIMENT FOR
PRELIMINARY OPTIMIZATION OF A ROTOR BURST
CONTAINMENT DEVICE USING
COMPOSITE MATERIALS
To test the stated hypotheses, and to evaluate the listed materials, the ex-
perimenting would consist of spin-pit burst containment testing using a repre-
sentative turbine wheel. The wheel to be burst is surrounded by the contain-
ment ring assembly to be tested. The number of equally sized wheel frag-
ments and the burst speed are controlled by saw cuts radially oriented in the
rim of the test wheel. The result of each burst test would be measured by the
weight of the containment assembly, the wheel speed at burst, and whether
the ring assembly contained or did not contain the wheel fragments.
In the design and analysis of a sequence of optimum seeking experiments,
one object function, such as the protective efficiency, would be selected as the
dependent variable. In any case, in the fitting of models to the data from a
:: single experiment, more than one dependent variable can be tried. One de..
pendent variable that might be tried is the ratio of kinetic energy stored in the
rotor just prior to burst divided by that weight of containment that provides
marginal or threshold containment-,-- Another dependent variable that might be
tried is the ratio of angular momentum stored in the rotor just prior to burst
divided by that weight of containment that provides marginal or threshold con-
tainment. If two or more such dependent variables are compared for their cor-
relation with a set of independent variables, the comparison might show that
one of them Is superior as a containment design variable.
Two classes of independent variables can be defined.
1. Variables that involve the attacking fragments such as (a) the number of
._ _ them, (b) their mass, (c) their speed, and (d) the initial clearance between the
," rotor and the protective device.
' 2. Variables that involve the containment design such as the mechanical I
properties of the containment materials and the weight of each material used.
The experiment should provide some information on what might epproxi-
- mate an optimum condition among the second class of variables. It should
" ' also provide some information on how the conditions within the first class of
variables might affect the optimum among the second class. The experiment
303
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should be designed so that it can be fitted by a model equation containing first
degree terms in all the variables and containing cross product terms involving
independent variables both within and between thes_ two classes of variables.
Fragment Variables
,.
The fragment variables selected for the experiment are ('9 the number of
equally sized sectors and (b) the initial radial clearance between the rotor and
the inside surface of the containment device. The test wheels will be modified
so that on a controlled basis, the nature of the bursts will include two, three,
and six piece bursts. Thus the sector sizes will be, respectively, 180 °, 120 °,
and 60° . These pieces will differ widely in their masses, so that their speeds
for threshold containment will probably be different.
I
Differing speeds are likely to require differing relative weights of the dif-
ferent layers for maximum overall weight efficiency. Such a result is equiva-
lent to saying that there are interactions between the sector size variable and _
the variables expressing the relative weights of the layers.
• The radial clearance is defined as the radial distance between the outer
surface of the disk and the inner surface of the container. This definition
ignores the presence of the blades. Blades were concluded to be relatively
unimportant by Mangano (1972) who wrote as follows:
"Therefore, the blades on a rotor fragment do not significantly influence
the distribution of the impact loads that are induced in a ring (provided the
ring thickness approaches that required to effect containment and the fragment _
hub to blades mass ratio is large), nor do the blades absorb significant amounts
of energy through their deformation during the containment process. The blades
serve: only to influence the fragment trajectory during the initial stages of int=
.. /, pact. This also means that in cases where the rotor tip-to-ring clearance is
_ small (test or operational clearances) the blade radial length becomes in effect
the radial clearance that influences the orientation of the hub or disk portion of
the fragment." : o
As defined, the radial clearance would be relatively small for the last
_. stage of a compressor and for the first stage of a turbine, and would be rels,.
: tively large for the first stage of a compressor or for the last stage of a
turbine.
!
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The radialclearancedeterminesthe amount thata disk sectorrotatesbefore
contactingthe container.Thus making the radialclearancean independentvar-
iablewillvary theorientationof theattackingfragment tothe innersurface.
This variationmight affect he optimum fractionoftotalweightthatisassigned
tothe innerlayer. Thus theremight be an interactionbetween clearanceand
firstlayerweight.
ContainerVariables
The container consists of four layers. The fractions of the total weight
assigned to three of the layers are independent variables. The fraction of t, tal
weight assigned to the fourth layer is correlated with the other three and is
therefore not an independent variable. Such a variable is sometimes called a #
slack variable.
Two variations of a basic experiment plan will be described. In one var-
,I
iation of the plan, the fraction of total weight assigned to the third (metallic)
layer will be the balance of weight variable, while in the other variation, the
fraction of total weight assigned to the fourth (cloth) layer will be the balance ,
' of weight variable. In any case, the materials fdr each layer would be seldcted '
from Table 2.
Plan of Experiment [
The plan of the experiment is Indicated in Table 3. The treatment symbols
represent the combinations of independent variable conditions in Yates notation
and they are listed in the first column. They are the same as those in Table 7
of Holms (1967) which also describes the notation and further characterize's
"_ // the plan.
The independent variables xA, XB, Xc, XD, and x E are to. be assigned
,, relative levels that are consistent with the levels implied by the treatment sym- ,
bols in the first column. In Table 3 the plan variables have the meanings listed
in Appendix A.
As listed in Table 7 of Holms (1967) all the treatments are intended to be
performed in a single time span, or stage, or block. As such, the experiment
is highly efficient in producing orthogonal estimates of all direct effect coeff-
icients and all two-factor interaction coefficients. As such the experiment would
q
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not ordinarily be subdivided. For the purposes of multi-layer rotor burst con-
tainment experimenting, each specimen will be terribly expensive. Further-
more, as described in Appendix B, each treatment (each combination of inde-
pendent variables) will require about four specimens to produce a single value
of the associated dependent variable.
Because the evaluation of the treatments will be so terribly expensive, the
experiment plan as listed in Table 3 has been divided into two blocks, so that
depending on the results from the first block, a decision can be made to either
continue or not continue with the second block. This division means that on
completion of the experiment, one two-facto interaction effect will not be
capable of being estimated. To improve the precision of each block and to im-
prove the precision of the combined experiment, some center point treatments
not in Table 7 of Holms (1967) have been added to each block of Table 3.
One basis for deciding whether or not to continue from the first to the
second block of Table 3 could consist of a comparison of the performance of the
multi-material containers with the performance of monolithic containers. The _,
standard of comparison might be the performance of a metal container, or it ,,
_, might be the performance of a cloth container. In either case he standard
of comparison need not be established by data external to the experiment. It
could be established from results obtained from the first, bi._ck. If a metal
were desired as the standard of comparison, then the variable xC would be
assigned to the weight fraction of ballistic cloth, and the variable z would be
assigned to the weight fraction of metal, namely z would be the weight fraction
of metal in the third layer which would be specflied by the z=column of Table 3
(and the metal would be chosen from Table 2 (c)).
If the standard of comparison were to be a ballistic cloth, then the weight
fraction of metal in the third layer would be specified by .xC of Table 3 and
/ the weight fraction of cloth would be as specified by the z columr, of Table 3.
(The cloth would be chosen from Table $ (d).)
The criteria used in assigning the treatments of Table 3 to the two blocks
are given In Appendix C. Also given in Appendix C is an illustration of how the
results from the first block, and from the combined blocks, would be inter-
• preted ff the standard of comparison were a metal.j;
• 1 306.... .
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Model Selection and Interpretation
If the experiment were that given by bath blocks of Table 3 then the model
Initially fitted to the data would be that given by equation (5) of Appendix C.
Such an equation might contain a few coefficients consisting mostly of experi-
mental error, and the equation could be improved by deleting such terms as
described by Holms (1974). Terms could also be deleted using a more con-
ventional deletion procedure such as that given by Sidik (1972).
Suppose equation (5) has been fitted to the data and the insignificant terms
deleted. The coefficients of XA, XB, and xC would be exmnined tar negative
signs. Any such term having a negative sign would thereby suggest that the
associated material was less weight efficient than the "others'. (The "otherd'
would always include the "balance of weight" material that is not explicitly
represented in the model.) The larger positive coefficients of XA, xB, and
xC (if any are found) identify associated materials as being particularly weight
efficient.
Numerically large coefficients of the two factor Interactions would shcw _-
important interaction (synergistic) effects. Their interpretation would follow
from the definitions given to the independent variables. •
CONCLUDING REMARKS
- Preliminar_ to some proposed empirical development of design mez" -de _.
for weight efficient full circumferential rotor burst containment devices, three !
areas of information were reviewed, namely: (I) rotor burst protection exper-
iments, {2) personnel body armor materials, and ¢3) modern methods for the
design and analysis of small optimum seeking experiments.
Review of the information on rotor burst protect/on and body armor sug-
/ gnJ_d that the following hypotheses should be evaluated: .-2
;- 1. The device should consist of four concentric cylinders, each having
, unique ballistic properties.
2. The innermost cylinder should be strong in shear to: (a) provide
blunti_ of the sharp edges of the rotor fragments _o) dissipate some energy
:_ through fra&qnent deformation, and (c) resist penetration by achievinS a wider
_. distr/but/oa of the load.
307
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3. In the vicinity of each Impact point the first and second layers should
act as a beam in bending with: (a) the first layer having high compressive
strength, (b) the second layer having high tensile strength, (c) the bond be-
tween them (the neutral axis shear area) having high shear strength, and
(d) the combination should be of low mass to minimize distortions from the
_ original shape due to inertia effects. The bond and the second layer should .
also be strong to inhibit spalling in the first layer.
4. The third layer should be the result of a "hedge" strategy, that is, it
should be a material proven weight efficient in tests of monolithic rings.
Thus it would have some of the uttributes of the other three layers.
5. The concentrated loads of [he attacking fragments should be assumed
to be well distributed by the first three layers, and the fourth layer should
be chosen solely for its weight efficiency in absorbing large amounts of
energy in tensile straining.
Based on the preceding hypotheses and based on _e balllst/e properties
, of differer.: types of armor materials, the four concentric cylinders should
consist of materials from inner to outer as follows: :,
1. A light hard layer, such as a ceramic or a F/ass.
9. A light high tensile Strength layer, such as a fiber reinforced plastic.
3. A tough layer, such as a metal. "_
4. A stretchable layer, such as a ballistic nylon cloth.
To test the stated hypotheses, and to evaluate the listed materials, the
experimenting would consist of spin-pit burst containment testing using a
representaUve turbIne wheel. The wheel to be burst is surrounded by the
containment ring assembly to be tested. The number of equally sized wheel |
fragments and the burst speed are controUed by saw cuts rad/ally oriented
in the rim of the test wheel. The result of each burst test would be measured
by the weight of containment assembly, the wheel speed at burst, and whether
the ringauembly contained or did not centsin the wheel fragments. In add[- ;.
// t/on to the conta_ent system variables, other variables (represent/_ engine ;
S design) were included In the ezperiment. Thus lntemct/ons can be observed _
between en_ne variables and containment material variables. The engine
o variables cons!st of the radial distance between the disk and the inner con-
tainmeat ring, and the combined effects of the mass and speed of the attack-
ink fragments.
"- The attributes of the proposed experiment plan are as follows:
1. The e_periment can be performed in two stN_es. Complet/en of the
first stage results in a direct comparison of the weight efficiency of the com-
posite ring concept with that of a monollth/c ring.
, i 308
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2. If the comparison is unfavorable to the composite ring, the investiga-
tion can be terminated.
3. If the investigation is continued to the completion of the second stage,
then the major hypotheses will be quantitatively evaluated. That is, the fitted
model equation will contain 14 empirical coefficients and their values will pro-
vide 14 conclusions about the direct influences of the variables together with
_ the ways that they combine (interact) to produce synergistic effects.
4. The orthogonal design of the experiment results in the observed effects
of the variables being free of error correlations with each other and free from
variations entering the experiment between the performances of the two stages.
/
°.
t
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APPENDIX A
SYMBOLS
xA weight fraction of first (innermost) layer
xB weight fraction of second layer
x C weight fraction of third (or fourth) layer
xD number of equally sized sector fragments of test rotor
xE radial clearance (-1 means small clearance, +1 means large, and
0 means mean of other two)
z balance of weight (weight fraction not included in XA, XB, and x C)
Y dependent variable. SFEs0 is a possible dependent variable
SFEs0 ratio of kinetic energy stored in the rotor at burst divided by the
weight of containment providing marginal, or threshold, or
50 percent probability of containment ,,
b
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APPENDIX B
TEST STRATEGY
Threshold containment is to be evaluated for each of the treatment condi-
tio.,_L:of Table 3. The dependent variable could be the stored kinetic energy
pl_t,:,r to burst divided by the container weight, or it might be the angular mo-
tor :ltum p_or to burst divided by the container weight, or it might be other-
wi6e defined. In any case, the threshold condition is defined here as that
condition which results in a 50-percent probability of containment. The object
of the testing is therefore to determine a rotor speed representing a 50-percent
prot,ability of containment. Each test usually has an identifiable result that
can '_e called contained and labeled "C" or not contained labeled "NC'. The
NC results'will usually occur at higher speeds than the C results (although.ma-
teri_l property variat ions can sometimes result in a C at a higher speed (RPM)
' than one or more speeds that resulted in NC). From the data, a quantity called
rpms0 must be determined which will be an estimated speed for a 50-percent
probability of containment. For the purposes of the experiment defined by
Table 3, a good enough estimate of rpms0 is believed to be attainable if the ex-
[, _rimenting includes four burst tests for every treatment. The test wheels _
would be modified with radial cuts to induce the 2, 3, and 6 sector bursts as
ll;_tod in Table 3. The depths of the cuts would be such as to result in spproxi-
m ttions to the desired burst speed. The first test at any given treatment con- _
di;ion ahould be at _ speed which (based on all prior information) is equally !
likely to result m a C or an NC. Subsequent speeds are to be computed using
a steppit,g factor, fs" If the experimenter bad good prior knowledge of the per-.
formance of the containment system, he mii_ht choose fs such that 1 < fs < 2.
With little prior information on the containment system, he might choose
_ / fs_2 2. If the first result is a C then each new speed rpmi+ 1 at point i + 1 ._
, / in the setluence following a C at rpm i should be
'_ rpmi+l ffi • o_ f/_* q)m i •
If th_ first test in a sequence results in an NC, then each new test that
follows an NC shall be at speed rpml+ 1 determined from the previous speed
rpr. i as follows:
" ! 311
-- ] _l 1
1978002125-309
rpmi+ 1 = rpml/_s
After a test result has been followed by a test result of opposite type
(C followed by NC or NC followed by C) the next test shall be at rpmi+ 1
determined from the smallest speed for NC; rpmmin, NC and from the largest
speed f'_r C, rpmmax, C as follows:
I(rp 2 +2 C)/] 1/2rpmi+l = retain, NC rpmmax,
nlustrations of how such a test strategy might proceed are given by Fig. 2.
The final estimate of rpms0 would be obtained from the preceding equa-
tion with i = 4, except that if all four results were only C or only NC, then /
rpms0 would not be estimable.
312
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APPENDIX C
DESIGN OF TWO-STAGE EXPERIMENT
This section presents some background information on the design of the ex-
periment for multi-material containment rings. The terminology and use of
symbols is that of Davies (1960) or of Holms (1967).
The first block (eight treatments) might be planned as a resolution 3 design
to provide estimates of first-order coefficients for a model equation that would
include the five variables. The defining contrasts must then include two three-
letter words and one four-letter word. The four-letter word would be the de-
fining contrast for the experiment with two blocks and 16 treatments. The ex-
periment with two blocks would be a resolution 4 design, and therefore, it
would be almost worthless with respect to the estimateion of the coefficients
of the two-factor interactions. Such a design would be of little value because
the physical basis for the research is the hypothesis that certain materials,
when used in combination, might interact beneficially, and that furthermore,
the beneficial effects of certain materials might be critically dependent on such
ballistic variables as fragment orientation and speed. Correspondingly, the es-
timation of most of the two-factor interaction coefficients is essential to the
answering of the main questions of the research. ,
In line with the preceding criteria, the objective of obtaining a resolu-
tion 3 design at the end of the first block will be sacrificed, and as a benefit
of that sacrifice a nearly resolution 5 design can be achieved at the conclu-
sion of the two blocks. For the two blocks, the defining contrast will be a
five=letter word (which would ordinarily provide a resolution 5 design) but for
the priviledge of having the option to stop or to continue the investigation be=
yond the first block we must pay the price of confounding one two-factor inter-
action with the block effect.
J/t The defining contrasts for the first block can be
I ffi-ABD ffiCE ffi-ABCDE (I)
and the defining contrasts for the first two blocks can be
[ =-ABCD .
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Let the variables be chosen and labeled as in Appendix A and in particu-
lar let xC be the weight fraction of the fourth layer (cloth) and let z M be the
weight fraction of the third layer (metal). In such a labeling of variables, the
variable zM is obviously a first-degree function of XA, XB, and xC and is
therefore not an independent variable. It is called a slack variable or a
"balance of weight" variable and would be omitted from any model fitting that
included the variables XA, XB, and xC. The association of particular plan
variables (letters) with the physical variables might have been arbitrary, but
it should not be, because the interaction XcXE is confounded with the block
effect. Because the coefficient of XcXE is in error by the amount of the block
effect, the letters C and E should be assigned to the variables thought least
likely to interact.
The asjsignment of physical variables to the letters C and E is based
' on the following considerations. The impact process begins with the wheel
fragments traveling through the clearance distance and the process ends with
, the transfer of some minor or major strain to the outer layer. This _vquence
suggests that the physical variables consisting of the initial clearance and the
weight fraction of outer layer are the two physical variables least likely to
interact. Correspondingly, these variables should be given the symbols C
_ and E, and the order is arbitrary. (As suggested by the body armor data,
the speed of impact is a variable that can change the mode of fracture. Thus
; the speed of impact has a high probability of interacting with the other varia-
bles. It was for this reason that the number of fragments is introduced as a
controlled variable into the experiment, thus forcing the experiment into dif-
fering ranges of speed. Correspondingly, the variables xC and xE should
not be used to represent the number of fragments.) Some additional concepts
for the matching of physical variables to plan variables were given by Sidlk
I
(1971).
With the defining contrasts given by equation (1), the treatments and the !
// aliased first- and second-degree model parameters are as shown in Table 4.
i Performance of the experiment with such treatments and acquisition of the 1
t
associated observations would permit the numerical evaluation of eight model
coefficients. Let these coefficients be labeled b0, bl, b2, b3, b4, bs, b6,
and b7. Referring to the alias combinations of Table 4, the predictive equation
could be written
J
Y = b0 * blX A + b2x B - b3x D + b4x C + bsXAXC .+b6XBXC - bTxcXV (3)
314
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tReference to the aliased pairs in Table 4 shows that any one or more of
the terms in the preceding equation can be arbitrarily replaced by its alias as
listed in Table 4. (The choices of algebraic signs are based on the assumption
that the b's are computed by Yates t method.)
Note that the first degree terms in xC and xE are indistinguishable.
Furthermore, a basic assumption of the multi-material concept is that the right
combination of several materials will provide containment that is more weight
efficient than the best material used singly. Consistent with this assumption
is the assumption that the two-factor interactions will be large and that the am-
biguities among the terms of Table 4 will not permit any conclusions to be
drawn with respect to the effects of the variables. What will be achieved is the
performance of eight or nine milti-material combinations to be compared with
the performance of single material containment rings.
The performance of single material containment rings could be obtained
' from direct tests with single material rings, however, a crude indirect com.
parison of the performance of single material rings with multiple material rings
is obtainable from just the first block data of Table 3. The crude comparison /.
is obtained by fitting the model
: Y = c_ +_MZM (4)Q
, to the data, where _ and _M are the only constants fitted to the nine obser-
vations of Y. If the coefficient of correlation were low, or ff the coefficient
_M were concluded to be insignificant, then no useful comparison could be '
drawn between the weight efficiency of metal rings and the weight efficiency of _multi-material rings. The experimenter might proceed with block 2 or he
might look to other sources of information. On the other hand, if the coeffi-
cient of correlation were high, of if the coefficient _M Were tested as signifi-
cant, the immediate conclusions would be that the variation of the weight frac-
tion of the metallic content was important and that the variations of the weight
• // fractions of the nonmetallic materials were unimportant. (As listed in Table 3,
I the weight fraction of the metal would have bean 0/12, 2/12, 3/12, 4/12, and
; 6/12.) If in the model fitting, _M were concluded to be significant, then a '
negative value would show that the nonmetallic materials were weight efficient
and that the investigation should be continued through the second block (at which
point the effects of the nonmetallic materials would probably become clear -
oignfficaat interactions would be displayed). A significant and positive value
' for _M from the first block would show that the performance of the metal was
315
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superior to that of the other materials. The implication of such a result would
be that all the concepts leading to the design of the experiment should be re-
examined, and that the next step should not include ape rformance of the sec-
ond block.
If a second block is performed, the basic treatments and the first,- and
second-degree parameter estimates for the two blocks would be as shown in ,
Table 5. Such an experiment would be described as a two-level, half-
replicate, fractional-factorial experiment on five variables in two blocks.
Based on the structure exhibited by Table 5, a prediction equation ob-
tained from the parameter estimates from the data observed from the two
blocks would be written:
Y = b0 + blXA + b2xB + b3XAXB + b4x C + b5XAXC + b6xBxC - bTXDXE + bsx D
#
+ b9XAXD+ bl0XBXD - b11XcXE + b12XCXD" b13XBXE- b14XAXE,'-b15XE (5)
The estimate bll is not necessarily the correct value for the coefficient of
xCxE. The estimate will be in error by the average performance shift in Y
caused by any changes that may have occurred between the two blocks. The '
term in XcXE would be deleted If equation (5) (or any simplification of it) _
were used as a containment design equation.
The experiment with the two blocks, as just described, can be doubled to
a full factorial experiment with parameters estimated for all interactions up _
to the five variable interaction. If this were done, the coefficients of xCxE,
XAXBXD, and XAXBXcXDXE would still contain any errors caused by block
effecta. * Confounded with block effect.
316 i
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TABLE 1. - DISK BURSTS
1971 1972 1973 1974
Fan 1 1 0 0
Compressor 7 2 2 1
- Turbine 5 2 I 4
Total 13 5 3 5
|
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TABLE 2. - MATERIAL AND PROCESS OPTIONS
(a) Layer 1
Option Requirements Description
,.L
a MII.,-A-46103 Boron carbide ceramic, mono-
(class 4) lithic ring.
b MIL-A-46103 Boron carbide ceramic, ad-
(class 4) hesively bonded tiles.
c MII,-A-46103 Boron carbide/silicon carbide/
_ (class 3) silicon ceramic, monolithic
ring.
d MIL-A-46103 Boron carbide/silicon carbide/
(class 3) silico_ ceramic, adhesively
: bonded flies. :,
|
: e MIL-A-46103 Silicon carbide ceran_,c,
(class 2) monolithic ring.
f MP_,.A-46103 Silicon carbide ceramic,
(class 2) adhesively bonded tries. |
g MIL-A-46103 Aluminum oxide ceramic,
(class 1) monolithic ring.
*i and/or 1MII,-T-46098
h MIL-A-46103 Aluminum oxide ceramic ad-
(class 1) hesively bonded tiles.
n and/or f
MIL-T-46098
,, i Borosrileate glass (Pyrex '_
7740 cr equal) monolithic
rlng
"_ MIL-A-46050 Adhesive, cyanoaerylate.
I
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TABLE 2. - Continued.
(b) Layer 2
;Option Requirements Description
||1
a SAF_,-AMS 3832 Glass roving, filament wound,
S-glass, epoxy resin.
b MIL-A-46103B Glass cloth reinforced, poly-
or ester resin.
MII,-I-17368"
c Aramid fiber filament wound,
phenolic-polyvinyl butyral
resin.
d Aramid cloth reinforced,
phenolio.polyvtnyl butyral
resin. .,
e Aramid fiber filament wound,
epoxy resin.
f Aramid cloth reinforced epoxy
resin.
Doron: Glass : UI,.C-9084, resin MIL-I%-7575.
y
/
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/TABLE 2. - Continued.
(c) Layer 3
Option Requirements Description
a MII-S-17758 Hadfleld steel rings.
Billets pierced and roll formed.
Fully austenUzed.
b MIL-8-13259 Hadfleld steel, rolled strip.
Fully austentized.
Spirally wrapped and tack welded.
c MIL-8-17249 Hadfleld steel rings, centrita- _'
(ASTM 128, gaily cast and f,nlsh machined.
13-3)
d SAE-AMS 5639 Stainless steel rings, billets
Fed 4_-S-763 pierced and roll formed,
(AISI 304) solution treated, b
, e SAE-AMS 5515 Stainless steel, rolled strip.
(AISI 301 or Hot rolled and solution treated.
302) Spirally wra_ed and tack welded.
f SAE-AMS 5370 Stainless steel rings, centrifugally
(ACI-CF-8) cast and finish machine&
g TRIPP steel.
Billets pierced and roll formed.
// h TRIPP steel, rolled strip.
- ,_ Spirally wrapped and tack welded.
t
.0
.,._
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TABLE 2. - Concluded.
(d) Layer 4
Option Requirements Description
a MIL-C-43625 Felt, ballistic, nylon.
b Felt, aramid (Kevlar 29).
c MIL-C-12369 Fabric, ballistic, nylon.
•, d LP/P DES 32-75* Fabric, ballistic, aramid.
e Polypropelene plastic film,
PhilllpsXP or equal.
• NaUck limited use specification.
323 _,:
1978002125-321
TABLE 3. - PLAN OF EXPERIMENT AND LEVELS OF VARTABLES
Treatment Block Fractions of total weight Number of Disk to ring
symbol sectors, clearance,
x A xB xc z
xD x E
Center 1 1/4 1/4 1/4 :L/4 3 0
(1) 1 1/6 1/6 1/6 3/6 2 -1
ae 9. 2[6 1[6 1/6 _-/6 2 1
be 2 1/6 2/6 1/6 2/6 2 1
ab 1 9./6 9./6 1/6 1/6 9. -1
ce 1 1/6 1/6 2/6 2/6 2 1
ac z 9-16 1/6 9.16 1/6 9. -1
_ bc 9. 1/6 2/6 9-16 1/6 2 -1
abce 1 Z/6 2/6 2/6 0 9. 1 ;'
de 2 1/6 1/6 1/6 3/6 6 1 ',
t
, _ _L _-/6 1/6 i/6 _/6 s -z I .
bd 1 1/6 216 1/6 9-/6 6 -1 i •
abde Z Z/6 Z/S 1/6 1/s 6 z i !
cd 9. 1/_ 1/6 9./6 9/6 e -z ,i t
acde 1 9-/6 1/6 2/'6 1/6 6 1 :
bede 1 1/6 216 9-/6 1/6 6 1 i "|
abed _ Z/6 Z/6 Z/6 0 6 -Z
ceater 9. 1/4 #4 _/4 1/4 s o
',
¢
,.J
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TABLE 4. - FIRST BLOCK ALIASES
[Treatments Parameter aliases Term aliases
(1) _I _CE b0 b0xcXE
ad _ A -_BD blXA "blXBXD
bd _B -_ AD b2XB "b2XAXD
ab _3AB "_D -b3XD b3XiXB
ce _ C "_ E b4xc b4XE
acde _ AC _ AE bsx AXc bsXAXE:
bcde _BC "_BE b6xI_xc b6XBXE
abce -_ CD "_DE -bTXcXv "bTXDXE
J
o i
i
,!
,/
i
• i _S
i
! t.J_, ot
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!TABLE 5. - TREATMENTS AND ESTIMATES
FOR TWO BLOCKS
Block Treatment Parameter estimated
1 (1) PI
2 ae _A
2 be _B
1 _ PAB
" 1 ce #C
2 ac PAC
Z be PBC
I abce "_DE
L
2 de _D
1 ad _AD
1 bd _BD
2 el)de #*
- CE
2 cd #CD
• 1 acde "#BE/
_, _ 1 bede "#AE i
++, 9. ebod "#E +!
J
+
* Confounded with block effect, i
i
t
.+_,+ m+ +_ +,
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DISCUSSION
R. Bristow, Boein 9
It looks like you had to have picked that equation, or the form of the
equation, beforehand. Do you feel very comfortable there or could it be some
other form in real life, perhaps a higher order, for example?
A.G. Holms, NASA-Lewis
I've shown what I call the lowest conceivable order equation thai would
utilize all of the data. It shows the unknown coefficients in a linear combina-
tion, and that is the type of thing that we can do a good job of fitting,
particularly with the method of least squares, which is a time-honored techni-
que and has never been questioned for 150 years.
The x's don't have to be in the first degree for this procedure to work
well. The b's must be in the first degree, but the x's need not be. This
means that if we had a physical reason for wanting to change the degrees of the
x's we could; we could put in an x squared instead of an x : we have all of
• 4
these options of varying the polynomial function of the x's a The plan has
sixteen orthogonal experimental conditions. That means that we cannot evaluate
more than sixteen b's. But we can always use any prior physical knowledge to
make transfomrations on the x's. "
G.L. Gunstone, CAA-UK
The factor that you call SFE, you said that you would calculate the fifty
percent level. That is really not a very useful figure. It tells you that the
fragment is just as likely to go through as not. To be useful to us, we need
something giving a fairly high confidence level of containment. We would like
perhaps 99 per cent.
A.G. Holms, NASA-Lewis
Yes, the containment should be designed for high reliability such as
99 per cent. But, our four test points for each condition only tell us
"success" or "failure" for each trial energy. Thus, we cannot even estimate
a standard deviation, let alone a probability distribution. Neither do we
know what kind of a probability distribution would come out of the final
manufacturing process. The evaluation of the probability distribution forthe manufacturing process would really be up to the production englneers.
But our fifty per cent point gives the containment designez a fix on his
fifty per cent point. This would also be the mean value if he assumed
O
normality. Then the desired level of reliability could be achieved by sub-
tracting the appropriate number of standard deviations, where the standard
deviation would be estimated for the final manufacturing process.
A. Weaver, P&W
: The program you propose is a very complex one. It may not take into
account all of the variables that are actually present, l don't think that
we (collectively} really understand the s_le machanisu of contalnme.nt with
two materials, even similar materials, placed side by side, let alone putting
four dissimilar ones there.
q
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I'm very concerned that the proposed configuration and materials confirma-
tion is so complex that it is far beyond the state of the art. I think you're
talking about an answer that's many years away, and not really aimed at present-
day problems. From a research standpoint, I think that there are other more
reachable goals to attack first.
A.G. Holms, NASA-Lewis
I agree that a program like this would not develop understanding, if you
use the word understanding to mean that you have a complete physical explanation
of all the processes. I think what a program like this does when it incorporates
a lot of variables is to give you this big equation and then you can look at
those coefficients and say: "now here is a bunch of concepts that are interest-
ing and surprising and here is another bunch of concepts that we can throw away;
now that we have seen some of these concepts that are quite a surprise to us,
let's design some smaller critical experiments that will give us a better
physical understanding of what's going on". But if you go at it in the other
order, of just investigating one variable at a time, then the existence of these
interactions will forever remain unknot,.
i
- J-H_ Gerstle, Boein_
Yes, first, I'd like to follow up on what A1 said. I guess I don't under-
stand why one would not pursue this on perhaps a two-material ring to start, to
see if this kind of approach, in fact, will work, and how much value will come :.|
out of this. I guess I can't disassociate the physical understanding from the
statistics of the experiment. To me they must go hand in hand.
J
A.G. Holms, NASA-Lewis
I had pointed out with my first slide that, if we are going to investigate
a single test condition, we should ask ourselves how many specimens should we
use to evaluate such a condition. Then I think the next thing to be thought
of is that if you're going to do your experimentation on a small scale and only L
investigate a limited number of conditions, then I would want to increase the
number of specimens that I tested for each condition. So what I have described _here is an experiment where I have (depending on how you look at the center
point) either sixteen conditions or eighteen conditions. I am saying let's
use four specimens for each condition and that will give me a total experiment
size of 72 specimens. Then, if you wanted to experiment with much smaller
numbers of variables (and hence smaller numbers of conditions), I would want
to increase the number of specimens for each condition so that we still might
wind up with sixty to eighty specimens, with a lot less information acquired. :
; Does that bear on the question or would you restate it?
7 J.H. Gerstle, Boein_
I guess I'm having difficulty unde._tandlng the answer. To pose the
question another way, it seems to me a number of serious concerns have been
voiced here about this method of testing and what will evolve from it in terms
of useful information. This seems to me a tremendous investment in going down
:;- one road with four materlals, only two of which acting together we don't yet
:: understand very well, if at all. To summarize, it seems to me much too big a
bite at one time. My intuition Is that this is not the best way to go at this
time. I think we ought to be thinking more about the test conditions,what
would be more useful, and you might want to revise the test. I'd be concerned
3Z9
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about how the rings would be made, whether that's practical and meaningful.
We have to think in terms of the engineering aspects of this, although I must
say I share ",our concern for having a statistically meaningful experiment.
A.G. Holms, NASA-Lewis
Perhaps the question is not whether we are look_ng at this in an engineer-
ing manner or a statistical manner. Maybe the question is are we looking at it
in an engineering manner or a physicists manner? It seems to me that if we're
doing something like this, we could discover that certain concepts are good,
that we can say Io and behold, this is good in an engineering sense. After
that, you might be dissatisfied with the results in terms of physical under-
standing, and then having seen some ideas of what's good and what's not good
on a quick basis, you can then go into more intelligently designed tests; that
is to say, tests that are more intelligently designed to illuminate the physical
processes. As far as doing a large massive experiment like this, I said that
we were evaluating sixteen coefficients, when we evaluate each of those coeffi-
cients, we evaluate them in terms of the sixteen values of y. The consequence
of that is that if for one of those conditions the y value is slightly in error,
then only one-sixteenth of that error goes into our coefficients. So that's one
i
reason for having a large orthogonal design of experiment like this, that even
though you have only fo_/ specimens for each condition, every one of those
informative coefficients that we're going after is averaged over the whole
sixteen y values. And, therefore, it has a much lower error content. But the
payoff is that we can get comparative information on many potentially beneficial ,_
materials interactions; namely, AB, AC, and BC instead of just AB, and they are
compared precisely because they are all compared for the same experimental
conditions.
D. McCarthy, Rolls-Royce
I was surprised that one of your parameters was the clearance between the
disk and the containment ring. I would have thought the clearance between the
blades and the containment ring was more significant because in the event of a
piece of disk and a group of blades being released, the blades do the initial |
distortion of the containment ring; therefore, they do play a big part in the _process.
A. Holms, NASA-Lewis
There is a report written by Mangano and his associates in 1972, which
seemed to say that blades on the wheel that he was working with, were a very
/ negligible factor in energy absorption. I think it's also true that the
9 _ thermodynamicists try to keep that tip clearance just about .as small as they
can get it so that tip clearance is not really much of a variable. If we take
the attitude that the blades are really negligible as far as absorbing energy
is concerned, then the important clearance is the clearance between the disk
outer diameter and the inner diameter of the turbine casing, and that clearanee
will determine how much the disk fragment rotates before it hits the container.
It will determ/ne whether a smooth Qurved surface of the fragment hits the
_ container braodside or whether the fragment goes up against the container with _
a sharp penetrating edge.
330
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:DESIGN OF ROTORS FOR IMPROVED STRUCTURAL LIFE
J. T. Hill
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group
Commercial Products Division
United Technologies
ABSTRACT
Failure of any large portion of a jet engine rotor structure poses a threat of
uncontained case penetration; therefore, considerable care and study is direct-
ed to the design, analysis, manufacture and inspection of these components to
ensure that rotor failure is avoided over the full life of the engine• In this
presentation, major rotor design criteria will be discussed with particular
emphasis on those aspects of rotor design that ensure long life component integ-
rity. Included will be a review of dynamic considerations, that necessitate
tuning of bladed disk and seal assemblies to avoid excessive vibratory stress
at both design and off-design conditions; and low cycle fatigue considerations,
which have resulted in detailed analysis procedures to establish part temperature '
and stress variation throughout an operating cycle and extensive specimen and
component fatigue testing to establish safe cyclic operating limits• Undetected,
subsurface flaws can cyclically grow to failure if smooth section stresses are
not restricted; therefore, investigations to characterize the frequency, size
and behavior of intrinsic material defects have been implemented and results
will be reviewed.
i
Manufacturing process improvements, including the application of increasingly
sophisticated inspection techniques and quality control procedures will be
• reviewed in light of their impact on component durability.
/
I
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UNCONTAINEDDISKANDSEALFAILURES
Majorcauses
• Highcycle fatigue
• Materialor manufacturingdefects
!
1
J J
• Lowcyclefatigue '_
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FLUTTERBOUNDARIESFORFOURFLUTTERTYPES
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HIGH FREQUENCY FATIGUE 
Summary 
Rotor resonance frequencies predictable 
Analytical systems ex is t  to predict f lu t te r  
in rotor components 
Engine development programs minimize 
vibratory problems 
Advanced analytical systems in development 
0 Stalled and unstalled f lu t te r  predictions 
Airfoil resonant stress predictions 
FRACTURE ORIGINATING FROM MATERIAL DEFECT 
Mag: 11X 
ANALYTICALPROGRAM
Defectarea Fracturemechanics
Cracklrowthtestinl frequencydata approach
• Influenceof material
andtemperature
• Scatter l _llm Life=
_K it f (ai, str ss,C,n)
da da _ f
. ]_
AK Flawarea
_I Statistical [- i simulation _-
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: Inspection Iseasitivity
dz /. a ¢rit
. . / da\ ",,, :1 -fi'_,n!
_ "_ J aiaitial
,, Stress
?
. Residuallife INwo)
t
1978002125-333
FRACTUREMECHANICSLIFECURVES
Correlation with experience
JT4steeldiskfailurepredictions
Disks supplied by suspect vendor Disks supplied by other vendors
P/N Predictedto fa!l Failures Predictedto fail Failures
360112 2 (1.89) 3 0 0
360113 0 0 0 0
360114 1 (0.284) 0 0 0
405715 0 0 0 0
242915 0 0 0 0
HOTISOSTATICALLYPRESSED
SUPERALLOYS
• Prealloyedpowdereliminatesegregation
!
• Powderscreeningcontrolsdefectsize
)
_. • HIPproduceshomogeneousstructures
• NDEsensitivitygreatlyenhanced
)M
• _:_
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MATERI_LDEf._ICTS
Summary
- • Smoothsectionstresslimitsfor currentalloys
to preventfailuresfromsubsurfacedefects
• Cleanlinessimprovementsincurrentalloys
throughmodifiedprocessingandcontrols
• ImprovedurabilitythrudirectHIPof powder
metalsuperalloys
LOWCYCLEFATIGUE
Definitionof life
• Numberof cyclesto 1/32 inchlongcrack
/ • Statisticalprobabilityof 1 outof 1000
Detailsof concern
_.. • Smoothdiskboresandwebs
• Diskboltholes,flangeholes,andrimslots
(
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DISKLCFLIFEDETERMINATION
r
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* • Plastic/elasticdiskstressapalysis • Gmeralizedshellanalysis
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DISKCOMPUTERP OGRAMS
MixedelementF/E code
J
4
J
LOCALSTRESSDETERMINATION
• Closedformsolutionforstressconcentration t
• • 2Dand3Dfiniteelementanalysis '
• 2Dand3Dboundary-int_q'alequationtechniques
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EFFECT OF RELAXATION 
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LOWCYCLEFfiTIGUE-
ACONTINUINGINVESTIGATION
Newalloycharacterization
• Highcreep strength titaniums
• Powdermetal superalloys
Qualityconsiderations
• Materialvariability
• Surfacefinishpreparation
• Coatings
• Surfaceintegrity :,
Basicfatigue studies
• , • Cumulativedamage
• Multi-axial fatigue
•. • Creep-fatigueinteraction j
• Fatiguemechanisms
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&K CALCULATIONMETHODS
• Numericalprocedures
O
Finiteelement Integralequation
(SectionAA) A_3 (SectionAA)
i +
• Influencefunctionmethod
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99.9 FRACTUREMECHANICS
ee Calibration
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LOWCYCLEFATIGUE/FRACTUREMECHANICS
Summary
o / • Wellcalibratedesignproceduresminimize
" _ lowcyclefatiguecracking
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!DISCUSSION
H. Rubel, Lockheed-Ga.
You have confirmed the SAE findings that progress has been made on low
cycle fatigue, and I hope that this effort will be continued. I am concerned
about HCF and flutter.
The airplane manufacturer, as we discussed earlier, must show that when
certain things go wrong, the system still is operable. I am thinking along
these same lines for engines. In a turbine, clogging of the nozzles may occur,
which could excite a resonance in the running range, and could lead to failure.
As another example, stator vanes in the rear end o_ the compressor could have
its incidence angle changed due to attachment loosening and hence drive a
particular disk to flutter. Would it _e desirable to put some effort along
those lines to ascertain margins for various deteriorated engine parts? In
this way the airframe manufacturer and the user could know what degrees of
safety exist in particular cases. A small incidence change may be more
critical in some stages than in others. Should we not look at old cracked
parts as well as virgin parts as is done for LCF? Could we advise the airlines
which stages are most critical so that disk rim failures could be minimized?
J.T. Hill, PWA
In the course of an engine development program, extensive compressor and
turbine rig testing is conducted at bo_. design and off-design operating condi-
tions. This testing establishes the success of the design effort by mapping
the location of both positive and negative flutter boundaries and monitoring
the level of resonance stage stress at all intermediate operating conditions.
Modifications to the stator geometry, to improve component efficiency, are
normally a part of the development effort. The sensitivity of dynamic stage
response to such variations are routinely monitored.
As we are well aware, despite our best attempts to identify and solve
vibration problems during the development program, HCF remains the major cause
of uncontalned disk failures. A review of PWA service experience, however,
indicates that gas path blockages are not _he major cause of such incidents.
The presentation indicated that there is a resonant stress prediction system
under development at PWA. When developed it will be possible to simulate
blockages upstream or downstream of a particular stage, establish the resultant
distortion pattern, and the effect on stage resonant stress. Such an analysis
_: / program, when developed, will permit the designer to assess the sens!tlvltyof
a particular design to the limits of gas path deterioration.
G.L. Gunstonef. CAA-UK
I think we all started out worrying mostly about LCF and I think because
we have done a very good Job on that we nearly have it solved. High cycle
fatigue is now the next major problem.
We are proposingto introducea recommendationin our requirementswhich
is being prepared right now, and it will read something llke this. The blades
should be designed in this order of strength fzomweakest to strongests the
airfoil, the blade root, the disk root, and the disk rim. Hence, any high cycle
/
/
]978002]25-343
!effect is more likely to brlng out a blade than break t,_e disc. I'd be
interested to know if anybody has any comments on that.
G.J. Mangano, NAPTC
That particular matter is scheduled to be discussed tomorrow. Thank
you.
.
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MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
FOR INCREASED LIFE/RELIABILITY
R. E. Duttweiler
Aircraft Engine Group
- General Electric Co.
Cincinnati, Ohio 45215
During the early 60's, improvements in both quality and durability of disk raw
material were considered necessary for both military and commercial engines.
Vacuum melting technology proved to be the breakthrough that spawned a new series
: of "superallo_-s", but it offered many process challenges. These new, tougher to
forge alloys were developed to run at stress levels 50% above then existing com-
rner,:ial disk experience and simultaneously meet greatly increased l_w cycle fatigue :
life capabilities. After addressing to the low probability of being able to rely on +
- Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) to sort for "good" part_ - including the then emer- i
ging improved ultrasonic techniques - General l_lectr!c set an objective to provide
material free of harmful indications for engine parts. +
The challenge was met by introducing an entirely new concept in raw material process
control which was defined as Premium Quality (I_) material. It imposes careful
selection, screening and sampling of the basic alloy ingredients, followed by careful
monitoring of the melting parameters in all phase8 of the Vacuum Melting (VIM/VAR)
sequenc'e. Special care is taken to preclude solidification conditions that produce
adverse levels of segregation. Melt furnaces are routinely cleaned and inspected for
contamination. Ingots are also cleaned and inspected before entering the final melt
step.
The ingot to billet conversion steps are closely controlled and monitored to maintain
melt traceability and ingot position. Special Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE)
/ routines are applied to the final billet. Questionable indications are cut out for
"' / metallurgical evaluation. Disposition of such a billet depends on the nature,
frequency and distribution of the indication. Occasionally an entire ingot, or even
the entire heat, is rejected.
Billets that meet standards are then sent to the forging house where those to be used
fur rotating disks undergo further NDE. Those passing thLs Stage are cut into
forging multiples - each multiple producing one part - and the end faces of each
/ multiple are etched as a final check for segregation before forging begins. When
unacceptable Indlcatinns are observed, correlation is made to the location of the
affected billet In the Ingot, and If not found to meet certain criteria, the entire
, Ingot product is again subject to rejection.
+i
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Forging and heat treat operations are performed to very detailed practices with
tight controls on forging pre-heat and reduction sc':_dules, as well as the quench
rates from solution heat-treatment. Metallurgical control is maintained over
morphology, grain size and mecbanical properties. Once accepted as Premium
Ouality material, the disks are shipped to the shop and skim-cut to a configuration
suitable for immersion ultrasonic inspection. A three-mode scan is performed
with Numerically Controlled (NC) eqt,.ipment capable of finding randomly oriented
indications in the part. Rejections are less than one part in one thousand for sig-
nificant ultrasonic indications, and few of these have proven to be actual flaws.
These processing and inspection actions on the part of the supplier and manufacturer
provide reasonable assurance thathigh qualityparts are delivered. As a result,
General Electric CF6 engines have not experienced a materials related failureof a
/an, compressor or turbine disk where the prescribed controls have been followed.
!
°°
PREV.EB.T..L_ OF ROTOR FAILURES IS A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF
THE ENGINE HANUFACTURER,
I_LT_FJ_IAL.P_BOCESSCONTROL IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY ELEMENT
IN THE PREVENTION OF HATERIAL DEFECT RELATED FAILURES,
THE HIGH BYPASS TURBOFAN ENGINE PRESENTED lOONY
NEW CHALLENGES TO ROTOR MATERIALS INTEGRITY NEEDSI .
- ._ INCREASE IN MECHANICAL PROPERTY LEVELS
- MORE MASSIVE COMPONENTS
- HAINTAIN DESIGN HARGINS (BURST/LCF)
J
- MAINTAIN VERY HIGH RELIABILITY
- EXTENDED LIFE REQUIRENENTS
- COMPLETE KNI_LEDGE OF OPERATING STRESS
AND ENVIRONMENT
349
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GE ROTOR MATERIAL INTEGRITY PERSPECTIVE
IN MOREDETAIL
HATERIAL DEFECT EXPERIENCE
I. LOH NUMBEROF "MATERIAL DEFECT#
RELATEDCKACKSIN COMMERCIAL
ENGINE ROTOREXPERIENCE
COMMERCIALENGINE ROTOREXPERIENCE (1962-1975)
MATERIAL DEFECT RELATED FLAWS
GE - FLAWS FOUND IN FIELD ROTORS
INITIAL FLAWSIZE
l ROTORFLAWS 20 0,25 - 2.5 INCHES
. a • UNCONTAINEDINCIDENTS 1 0.25 - 0.5 INCHES
TOTAL INDUSTRy - SAE AD HOC COMMITTEE(SATTAR)
• 1_7 UNCONTAINEDDISK INCIDENTS
- 19 (lqZ) HATERIALOeFEC'rRELATED
• 58 OF THESE WERESEVERITYCATEGORYIll AND IV
- 10 (26Z) MATERIALDEFECTRELATED
w qr., . , • r _ _m_ i b
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NDE EXPERIENCE
a
If. NDE IS A GOOD PROCESSCONTROL TOOL,
BUT IS NOT AN ADEQUATE FINAL SCREEN.
r
NDE DETECTION CAPABILITY
• 90_ PROBABILITY
.
SEMI,CIRCU._AR CRACK LENGTH (MILe)
50_CONFIDENCE 95Z CONF]DENCE
SYSTEM ..__,__.r;__ CRACK SIZE :
4
/ FP| q0 65 ,l _ •
4
EDDY CURRENT 10 25 '
• UL'iRASON|CS
9
- NEAR SURFACE (l/q') 25 50
- BULK(2"1 60 120 "
_2
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N,9.E._eJLOBJ..EB_
(ULTRASONIC INSPECTION)
[._UJ.PJ_- PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT PUSHED BEYOND LIMITS AT
HIGH SENSITIVITY
DISKS - SURFACE FINISH/HICROSTRUCTUflE PREVENTED HIGH SENSITI-
ViTY INSPECTION
OPERATOR- MOST SYSTEMS MANUAL OPERATION, I,Eo MANUAL SIGNAL
RECOGNITION/EVALUATION
I_ - (OPERATCg/EQUIPMENT/PART) REOUIRED TO OPERATE BEYOND
LIMITS
TYPICAL_E EXPERIENCE
ULTRASONIC INSPECTION
READINGS AS REPORTED BY OPERATOR
LOW SENSITIVITY HIGH SENSITIVITY
INSPECTION SOURCE AMP. Z • AMP. Z •
INITIAL SCAN PRODUCTION 20 85
/
REPEAT SCAN PRODUCTION ]0 80
O
NDT LAB PRODUCTION 8 35-55
NDT LAB ENGINEERING 10-_2 55-_0
80ZAMPLITUDE = SIDE OF 20 MIL DIAMETER HOLE
?
e DEFECT IN PREFERRED ORIENTATION FOR DETECTION
i 353
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: CROSS-SECTIONOF DISK SHOHING
LOCATIONOF FLAt/
_54
. I
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(90_ PROBABI=]TY/95_ CONFIDENCE)
PRODUCTION NEAR TERR GOAL LONG TERH GOAL
_LE_._TJ92L_O_E _
- FP! qO 25 "
EDDY CURRENT 10 5
ULTRASONICS 20 5
• HAJOR EFFORT AT GE TO IHPROVE ULTRASONICS
- TRANSDUCER
b
- PULSER/RECEIVER
- SIGNAL ANALYSIS
- COHPUTER AIDED CONTROL/EVALUATION _
7
GOAL: REHOVE OPERATOR JUDGEHENT FROH SYSTEH
#
!
GE ROTOR f_T_IAL INTEGRITY PERSPECTIVE
RECAP
t
m
l
I, _ INCREASE IN MATERIAL PROPERTIES PLUS INCREASE IN 1
LIFE DEIqANDS
; II, VERY LON INCIDENCE OF HATERIAL DEFECTS
Ill. flAINTAIN DESIGN MARGINS AND VERY HIGH RELIABILITY
•,,I ,e
,. •
• ME HAVE EXPERIENCED VERY FEtt HATERIALS RELATED DEFECT FAILURES,
• THE FACT iS ME ACHIEVE FAILURE PREVENTION BY flATERIALS
AND HANUFACTURING CONTROL .... JUST HAINTAIN IT,
"PREHIUH QUALITY e mTERIAL AND PROCESS SPECIFICATIONS
? - |
- " " " • _ - r '_r.,',_ ....i.x_il_z' _. _'._._"_'tk'z • ',._.4_m,7[Ia_IRrR_.._ '. ,._ . "ekZik_" ,;_"
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p_.,._ GOAL
• HAINTAIN HIGH CONFIDENCE IN ESTABLISHED PROCESSES
e PREVENT HATERIAL DEFECTS
CONTROLPROCESS- PREVENT PEVIATION
AUDIT SYSTEM - ADEQUATECONTROL/CORRECTIVEACTION
AUDIT PROCESS- UNIFORM/CONSISTANT PRACTICE DRAWING
a
INSPECT PRODUCT- DRAHING CONFORHANCE
- NDE AS A PROCESS CONTROLTOOL
: MAJOR EMPHASIS: EARLY PROBLEMRECOGNITION
P.Q. MATERIAL SYSTEM
IN-DEPTH CONTROLFOR CRITICAL ROTA'fING PARTS
• TRACEABILITY - ALL RAN HATERIAL : t'
• DOUBLEOR TRIPLE VACUURMELTING
_, • CONTROLLEDMELTING AND CONVERSION
k
# _ • BILLET AND FORGINGMULTIPLE NDE
. • FORGING AND HEAT TREATMENT
I FINISHED PART NDE
- APPROVEDVENDORLIST/REPORT CARD
- VENDORAGREEMENT- PROCESSCHANGEAPPROVAL
- DONN6RN)E VENDOR'- POOR PERFORf_MCE
- -/ ,, ,. .. " .':,-",_".'_",;.:_-;,k- ," --_, ,__::".: i, , , ,.., • ,,,
.... . % '. r - _t" " ""'_ ',
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TITANIUM BASE ALLOY
FLUOROSCOPIC INSPECTION
' t A I ,9 ' ,SE ;S
I I ! i _ L INELTING MELTING SOURCE INGOT PRODU_[CRITICAL VARIABLES p _,
- I oa /iD
GE APPROVAL U
I 'C . _.
¥ U/S INSPECTION 1 _"
INGOT CONVERSION 1 NACROETCH
L
AUDIT D
s t
• _
•_ ,l TO FORGER
i
! , _*_'.. ,:
T :
t "_, 0 •
L •
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. °
PREMIUM QUALITY TITANIUM ALLOY CONTROLS
0 MELT RAW MATERIAL/SOURCES
- T• SPONGE
- MASTER ALLOY
- REVERT ALLOY
M - TI DIOXIDE
- COMPACT WELDING
I
I MELT FURNACE CLEANLINESS
L
• MELT INTERRUPTIONS/PRELIMINARY AND FINAb CYCLES
L l VACUUM/WATER LEAK_
• REMELT ELECTRODE SLRFACE CLEANLINESS
@ INGOT CONVERSION PRACTICE
• BILLET ACCEPTANCEPLAN
- ULTRASONIC INSPECTION PLAN
- I_CROETCH BAR ENDS
- FORGE-DOWNPROPERTIES
•- //
q
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/PREMIUM QUALITY TITANIUM ALLOY CONTROLS
0 FORGING MULTIPLEMACROETCH
•" 0 FORGINGPROCESS
- PRE-HEAT
F
- UPSETRATIO
- HEATTREATMENT
0
- MICROSTRUCTURE
- MACROETCH
R
0 MECHANICALPROPERTIES
G - TENSILE
- FRACTURETOUGHNESS
E - LOWCYCLEFATIGUE
0 PROCESSDOCUMENTATION
R
0 TOTAL MATERIAL/PROCESSCONTROL ,,"_
" TRACEABILITY
- ACCOUNTABILITY
TYPICAL TITANIUM MELTINGPRACTICE
(SIMILAR PRACTICEFOR IRON AND t'NICKEL BAS ALLOYS)
%
TRIPLE VACUUMMELTED
| WELDEDCOMPACTS MELTEDTO 2q" DIAMETERELECTRODE
| 2q" DIAMETERELECTRODE MELTEDTO 30" DIAMETE_ELECTRODE
| 30" DIAMETERELECTRODE MELTEDTO 36" INGOTf
360
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A HORROR STORY
INCIDENT=
l STAGE 3-9 TX-6-2-4-2 SPOOL
- HARD ALPHA ZONE PLUS OXIDE INCLUSIONS
RESULT= A LATENT MELT RELATED HIGH OXYGEN ZONE PASSED
THRCUGH THE SYSTEM UNDETECTED,
STAGE 3-9 SPOOL CONfOUR
,
CI':NTERLI_n.
362
|
• . . ,, • .
' ' '"'* _ m,*4. ..... ,¢
1978002125-360
ENGINE INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
• PR[I,tARY CAUSE
TYPE [ OXYGENSTABILIZED HARD "ALPHAu
INCLUSION WIT:4 POROSITY
• FAILURE HECHANISH
CYCLIC CRACK PROPAGATIONFROMTHE INCLUSION
TO SPOOL SEPARATION
IB.Y.E.,_II.C,_T_
• HILL ON STRIKE
• POST STRIKE START-UP PROBLEMSIN INGOT CONVERSION
- HARD i..OHA INCLUSIONS
- CENTER BURST (POROSITY)
- LOW BILLET YIELDS (ULTRASONIC REJECTS)
- DELAYED SHIPHENTS
": • FORGERREQUESTEDTO CONVERT INGOTS - EXPEDITE DELIVERY
[ e AT HILL: OF TbIELVE INGOTS CONVERTEDAND INSPECTEDs
e
- 9 CONTAINED ULTRASONIC INDICATION
- 3 WENT TO FORGER- NO INDICATIONS IDENTIFIED BY
HIS ULTRASONIC INSPECTION
: - THE FAILED SPOOL CARE FROH ONE OF THESE THREE INGOTS
363
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INVESTIGATION CONCLU$1ON_:
• LOW PROCESS YIELDS NOT TRACKED BY MILL OR GE
• NO IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN
• PROCESS CHANGED AFTER STRIKE (?) START-UP PLAN (?)
• MATERIAL BYPASSED MILL ULTRASONIC INSPECTION -
FORGER PERFORMED (AN UNAPPROVED SOURCE FOR THIS
OPERATION)
i
LESSON LEARNED
!
l
VIOLATE A P,Q, CONTROLLED PROCESS,,, T
AND RISK AN INCIDENT OF SIGNIFICANT
"_. / PROPORTIONS.
4,
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PREMIUMQUALITYPIATER|ALTRACKRECORD
(1972THROUGH1976)
- POUNDS OF ALLOY
T[TAN[UR BASE
TOTAL PO BILLET PRODUCED 10,000,000 10,000,000
HEATS REJECTED AT MELTER 20,000 20,000
BILLET REJECTS AT RILL/FORGER 150,000 150,000
TOTAL PO PARTS PRODUCED 7,000 16,000
FORGING/ROTOR REJECTS 5 75
GE EXPERIENCE: ONLY ONE SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT
• NONEHHEN PO ROUTINE RIGOROUSLY FOLLONED.
RATERIAL PROCESS CONTROL IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY
ELEMENT FOR PREVENTION OF MATERIAL DEFECT RELATED
i'
/
J ROTOR FAILURES.
i,
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DISCUSSION
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
I have one question. Who enforces this procedure -- General Electric,
, or people that you have at the mill?
R. Duttweiler, GE-Cincinnati
It is all of them -- steel supplier people and our quality engineering
as well as resident people who visit and audit the mills. Every six months
we do an audit and every year we renew our agreement as to how things will
be processed.
A lot of enforcement is done by the vendor himself; he writes down the
rules that he will live by, and we simply audit against them. If he merely
depends on us to catch him, he is not doing his job. He is failing to do /
what we both need to assure premium quality. We have simply set up a self-
policing system.
One thing I'd like to add is that this system was forced by engineering /"
on the manufacturer, with great reluctance because manufacturing told us that
this would be an extremely expensive way to go. It really hasn't proved to be
the case. It has developed into an accepted discipline. At first it was
expected that these requirements would add an additional 8-10 per cent to raw
materials cost, but it has not amounted to anything near that figure in recent !
years.
.
J
£
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; NDE - A KEY TO ENGINE ROTOR LIFE PREDICTION '
by J. E. Doherty
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group
Co._ercial Products Div.
Middletown, Conn.
Abstract
.r
A key ingredient in the establishment of safe life times
for critical components is the means of reliably detect-
ing flaws which may potentially exist. Although current-
ly used NDE procedures are successful in detecting life
" limiting defects,the development of automated and computer
aided NDE technology will permit even greater assurance
of flight safety.
369
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!INTRODUCTION
The ability to predict and monitor the useful and safe lifetime of critical
components in turbine engines is a current requirement. A key ingredient in
the procedure for establishing the safe lifetimes for critical components is _he
means of reliably detecting potential flaws which may exist in these components.
As evidenced by component performance, currently used flaw detection procedures
are successfully screening out components with life limiting defects. New
developments in nondestructive evaluation (NDE) technology now being made will
permit the adoption of more strict flaw detection requirements thereby giving
even greater assurance of flight safety. The primary key to this advance in NDE
= technology is the adoption of automation and/or computer aided techniques which
will reduce or eliminate the dependence on human operators for the performance
of NDE procedures. This paper will indicate how these gains are being made by
showing how the sensitivity of inspection is operator dependent and by example
show how the introduction of automation can permit significant improvements in
inspection sensitivity.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF AN NDE SYSTEM
In the simplest easep an inspection syst_n can be described by two distribu-
/ tions - a defect and a noise or false defect distribution, and by two quantities
2 the inspection threshold and the inspection uncertainty. The defect and noise
distributions are simply the number of either present in a given population or the
likelihood of occurrence for a given size defect (indication); both distributions
are usually (but not alnys) monotonically decreasing functions with increasing
d_eet size. The inspection threshold is the discrimination level or decision
/
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fpoint which is set to differentiatebetween defects (indications)of different
sizes. A measure of how well a particular inspectionsystem can make discrimina-
tions is the inspection uncertainty. For example, if a system were sorting a
population of balls into boxes of white ones and boxes of black ones, there would
be nmnerous black balls in the white box and white balls in the black box if the
inspectionuncertaintywere large. If the inspectionwere perfect,with no uncer-
tainty, there would be no alien balls in either box.
It is clear that for an inspectionto perform satisfactorily,that is reliably,
it must have a low inspectionuncertaintyat the inspectionthreshold of interest.
_ Figure i shows schematicallyhow the defect and noise distributionsand the inspec- _'
tion _hreshold and uncertaintywould appear in a typical case.
DETERMINATIONOF INSPECTIONUNCERTAINTY
It is a practical problem of much interestto determine the true proportion of
I
defects of a given size that can be detectedby an NDE system. In particular, one
is usually most interestedin the defect size where the probabilityof detection !
" drops below some critical level. Current convention identifiesreliable inspec- _
tions as those where the probabilityof detection exceeds 90 percent at the inspec-
tion threshold of interest.
. An exact determination of the probability of detection would require a full A
/
knowledge of the statisticaldescription of _he inspectionsystem which only can
a
be obtain_ by making an infinite number of measurements. The best one can do is
to estimate the probability of detection and depending upon the procedure used, one
: _ can make this estimate with e_y degree of confidence. Current convention considers
estimates of the detectionprobabilitywhich have greater than 95 percent confi-
dence level to be acceptable.
During the last five years, the measurement of inspectionreliabilityhas
been one of the major interestsof NDE practitioners. It has been found that
proper measurements of inspectionreliabilityare difficultj expensive and are,
unfortunately,unique only to the specificapplication or case studied. To make
proper measurement of inspectionreliability_one must use: real flaws in real
parts, representativeinspectors,multiple sets of equipment,multiple reference
standards and unbiasedmeasurement techniques. The latter is most difficult of
all. Despite the difficulties,measurementsof minimum flaw sizes with 0.9 pro-
bability of detection at 95 percent confidence have been made for some specialized
cases. Typical results are shown in Figure 2 which summarizes the evaluation of
four different inspection procedures that wore used to find cracks near a fillet
in a round steel bar; as noted above these results apply only to this case. A
detailed scrutiny of these results and others like them show that the chief con-
tributor to the inspection uncertainty is the inspection operator. This is shown,
for example, in Table X which compares the effectiveness of six different operators
performing an eddy current inspection designed to detect small ( O.015" long)
crs_ks in a titani_ component. Analysis of this and other similar experiments
/ suggests that 75 .nercent or more of the source of inspection uncertainty is opera-
tot related. The message is clear - improved, more sensitive inspeetiens may be
had by reducing or eliminating the dependence on human inspection operators.
AUTOMATION - THE OPPORTUNITYF_ IMPROVED NDE
There is a concerted effort in the NDE field to develop automation and c_puter
aided inepeetion techniques. The expressed purpose of +,hese effects is to increase
/d
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inspection sensitivityof the currently used effective inspection systemsby in-
creasing the probability of detection for small defects. This is illustratedin
Fig. 3 which shows that a reduction in inspection uncertainty of an NDE system
lowers the defect size where the probability of detection drops below 90 percent.
This ability to detect smaller defects reliably is an improvement of inspection
sensitivity.
There are many examples which could be used to demonstratehow the intro-
duction of automation will permit improved NDE proceduresbut two which relate
to turbine disks seem to be most appropriate.
- CCMPUTER A_DED INSPECTIONOF NFA_ NET SHAPE DISKS
Fabrication techniques are currentlybeing developed to permit the manufac-
#=
ture of d_sks for gas turbine engines to shapes very close to their final shape.
These near net shape techniques will permit considerable cost savings over the
current techniques. To permit maximum cost savings, near net shape disk preforms
f
• must be only slightly larger than the final shape, thereby requiring improved re-
solution of defects near surfaces. In addition, increased sensitivityto smaller
4efects is required, since the new fabricationtechniqueswill permit the use of
._ / advanced alloys. A primary cost saving in near net fabrication approachesis
/
derived from the eliminationof machining operationsbefore ultrasonic inspection.
A
Accordingly,the advanced inspection syst_ must have the capability of contour
followingnon-regular surfaces while sti:tlmaintaining nore_icy of the ultrasonic
beam, since nea_ net shapes will, as a rule, possess tapered end curved surfaces.
An ultrasonic inspection system for near net turbine disk shapes is currently
under development at P_gA with the support of Air For_e funding. This system is an
I
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tautomated computer aided inspection system, Fig. 4. It has the ability to sense
and contour follow disk shapes with as-processed surfaces,while requiring only
a minimal pre-knowledgeof the shape under inspectinn. It has high sensitivity
ultrasonicsthat can resolve a 1/64 flat bottomed hole (FBH) 0.050 from the sur-
face.
The inspectionsystem has been configured about a small mini-computer and is
designed to minimize the dependence on human operators. Unlike conventionaldisk
inspection systems, this new system can detect and reoor_ the presence of indica-
tions with sizes much smallex,than those at the inspectionthreshold. This infor-
mation can be ordered into distributionssuch as number vs. size, as shown in
Fig. 5, which can be used to monitor the fabrication process or possibly eventually
could be used to estimatethe statisticallifetime of the part. Being computer
aided, this inspection system can recall at any future time the detailed inspection
/
records for any part if required in the event of a disk service problem. The system
has also been designed to permit the use of selective or variable rejection criteria
that can be tailored to the anticipated local stress levels in the component.
I
The eventual introductionof eo_puter aided and automated technology into pro-
auction inspectionwill permit a more detailed and sensitive inspection of turbine
disks because it has eliminatedthe major sources of operator generated inspection
_ sensitivity. In a_dltion, it offers significant_vantages over conventional
approaches,since it can collect order and store informationbeyon_ that JuDt re-
quired to make go-no-go deeisi_nJ.
! 375
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AUTOMATED BOLT AND TIEROD HOLE IITSPECTIONOF DISEHi i , i i
Occasionallyduring the static ferris wheel testing of disks, _ddy current
inspectxon of bolt holes and tier_i holes is occasionallyperformed along with
'_ the regular wink fluorescentpenetrant inspection. A potential a_vantage of eddy
current testing is that it can be performed in situ and does not require any dis-
mantling of the test apparatus. Unfortunately,most conventional eddy current
inspectionbeing manual inspectionshave larger inspectionuncertaintiesthan wink
penetrant inspectionsat the small defect sizes which are of interest in static
testing. For example, Fig. 6 shows the results of a conventionalmanual eddy
cux_ent inspection for axial cracks in two disk bolt holes. The figure shows the
eddy current scans of the circumferenceof the hole at nine equally ,paced loca-
,'r
tions through the hole. The _resence of a crack wou_ be indicated by rightward-
going peaks as seen in scan #5 of hole #5 and on this basis both holes wou_i be
J_ge_ to be cracked. In fact, wink penetrant inspectionshows hole #5 to contain
a very small crack r_l hole #9 to be uncracked.
Currently, P_gA is developing automated eddy current insp_tion techniques
T
for the evaluation of holes. One approach being used, shown in Fig. 7, places
the eddy current sensing _evice on the tip of a small rotating probe which is
': / automaticallyindexed through the hole. Inspection information is recorded on a
strip chart such that the results of each circumferentialscan sequectia_ fol-.
lows the previous one. The results of evaluations of holes 5 a_1 9 using t_As
automatic system are caaI_red with the manual scans an_ wink _enetrant results
• in Fig. 8. In the automatic system, the cir_umfere_ti_ scans are sI_ced 0.02"
a1_ a_ the presence of a e_ack is in_icated by an _ peak; the results of
the _ scans shown in Fig. 6 have been :_i_kedsequentiallyin Fig. 8 for coml_r_-
rive purl_ses.
376
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Figure 8 shows that unlike the manual inspection, the automatic inspection
properly distinguishesthe cracked hole from the uncracked one. In _ddition to
identifyingthe crack, the automatic insrection indicates that the crack has some
structureand that it has variable depth along its length. The use of other dis-
= plays and analysis techniques with automatic eddy current inspection, FiG. 9, will
eventually permit a quantitative detemination of crack length and depth, Pamething
which is not possible using wink penetrant inspection. Again, this example demon-
strates how the inspection sensitivity of a current inspection can be improved
using autcmatiantechniques.
COhEII_ION
Improvementin flight safety is a continuing goal and a key to establishing
1
flight safety is the reliable icspection of rotating cumponents for potential de-
fects. The dev_lopment of new automated and computer aided NDE techniqueswill
pel_nit in .uregsed flight safety margins by improving the reliability of already
reliable and effective "TE procedures.
_L
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_ Q UNCERTAINTY
PROBABILITY
DEFECTSIZE -
FigureL - Thedefectdistribution for typicalinspection. Thenoisedistribution
is lowat theinspectionthreshold,signifyinga practicalsignaltonoiseratioL
Ontheaveragethe inspection'hresholdhasthevalueindicated,howeverfor
a specificapplicationof theinspectiontheactualinspectionthresholdlies
somewherein thebandofinspectionuncertainty.
IVlal 0.06 to 0.08 '
Ultrasonic 0.06 to 0.07
Eddycurrent O.10 to O.12
_ FPI_ __0.14 to 0.16
_: Boeing- AFML Contract F33615-72-C-2202
r
FigureZ - Theresultsofthe measurementofminimumsizecracknearafillet
in a steelbarwith I1?probabilityd detectionat 95percentconfidence.The
cracklengthsaregivenin inches. It shouldbeemphasizedthat thesere-
sultsapplyonlyto thisspecialcaseandthatotherinspection1stemsin olt,er
applicationswill have(;;:ferentminimumdetectableflaws.
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Probability 
of 
detection 
Defect size - 
F q u r e  3. -The probability of detection at 95 percent confidence for different 
defect sizes for a typical NDE system. As the inspection uncertainty is 
reduced, the minimum reliably detectable defect decreases in size, and 
the reliability of detection at a given size increases. 
Figure 4. -The computer aided ultrasonic inspection system for near 
net shape disk This system wi l l  permit more sensitive inspection 
d turbine disks dur ing production. 
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Figure5. - Asummaryplotofthenumberofindicationsv indication
sizeforanultrasonicinspectionofadiskusinga computeraided
inspectionsystem.
- Scan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 "
Figure6. - Theresultsofa conventionalmanualeddycurrentinspection
d boltholes.Theeddycurrentscansthecircumferenced thehole
at0equallyspaced((11" apart)locations.Arkjhtwar_peakasin
scanno_5ofhole5indicatesacrack,Althoughtheresultsshow
' bethholestobecrackedonlyhole5 iscracked.
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Figure 7. -An apparatus for automatically eddy current scanning a hole. The eddy 
current probe rotates while it continuously indexes into the hole. 
Hole 5 Hole 9 
+I-1 in.-+ Wink 1-1 in.- -I 
Auto 
EC I 
Cracked 
0.005 inches deep 
I, 
Uncracked 
Flgure 6 - The comparison ol the inspection of tv holes uslrq manual eddy 
clrrent #Ink penetrant and automat c edoy cJr* ' technlaues Tne 
automatic correctly distinguishes ketweenthe cracked and uncracked 
hole. The scans 01 figure 6 have keen linkeo for cornprison. 
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Figure 9. - A two dimensional presentation of the results of a n  
automated eddy current  inspection. 
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APPLXCATION OF A FLIGHT-LINE DISK CRACK DETECTOR
TO A SMALL ENGINE
John P. Barranger
NASA L¢_2is Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio
A disk crack detector has been developed which is intended
to operate while in flight or at the flight line (ref.) The
detector is being applied to a small military engine for use as
a flight-line turbine crack monitor. The system consists of an
eddy current type sensor and its cables within the engine, ex-
ternal connecting cables, and a remotely located electrical +
capacitance-conductance bridge and signal analyzer. As the tur- !
bine spins, the rotor is monitored by the sensor for radial sur-
face cracks emanating from the interblade region of the rotor.
The sensor is a coil of insulated wize wound on a ceramic
bobbin mounted in the nozzle. It is located approximately
2 1/2 millimeters (3/32 inch) away from the face of the downstream
side of the first stage turbine wheel where experience has
shown cracks are likely to occur. The coil has I00 turns of
silver palladium ceramic coated wire with a coil inside diameter
/
of 3.18 millimeters (0.125 inch), an outside diameter of
12.7 millimeters (0.50 inch), and a length of 1.59 millimeters
(0.062 inch). The coil leads pass through cored nozzle vanes
: and are brazed to the sensor cables. The coll and toll leads
are cooled by air through the core passage in the vanes.
A commercial bridge is used in the monitoring system and is
F
designed to measure capacitance and conductance. By adding
+ 383 +
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designed to measure capacitance and conductance. By adding
capacitance in series with the sensor coil, the combined react-
ance is made capacitive. The bridge cable length is limited to
3 3/4 meters (12 feet) because of the decreased bridge sensitivity
resulting from the combination of high carrier frequency (IMHz)%
and excessive cable capacitance. The capacitance-conductance
bridge is self-balancing, automatically adjusting to changes in
average coil inductance _nd resistance caused by temperature ef-
fects and variations in disk-to-sensor spacing.
A test cell at Lewis is being prepared to evaluate the mon-
itor system under full scale engine conditions. Disks that
have been removed from service because of time expiration will
be installed in the test engine. Bench tests indicate that the
system is able to detect a crack 3 millimeters (I/8 inch} long
in these disks. This length is considerably shorter than the
critical crack length.
John P.: Flight Monitor for Jet Engine iReference: Barranger,
Disk Cracks and the Use of Critical Length Criterion of Fracture
Mechanics, NASA TN D-7483, November 1973
o
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!DISCUSSION
H. Garten, GE-Lynn
How big a crack do you think you can detect? Also must it be on the
surface?
%
J. Barranger, NASA-Lewis
The crack must be a minimum of I/8-inch long for this system. The
crack must be on the surface because this is a high frequency eddy current
type detector.
I have a co_ent stemming from a number of inquiries. Everyone's trying
to find that elusive crack that's always under the bolt head. This system
cannot detect the disk crack until it propagates ovt beyond the boundaries of
the bolt edge.
B.L. Koff, GE-Cincinnati
Is your plan to keep working until you can detect the crack that is i
under the bolt hole? What's your plan? |
J. Barran@er, NASA-Lewis
- The present plan is to finish this program and turn the results over to
the military. We do not plan to go any further beyond this program.
J
B.L. Koff, GE-Cincinnati
Do you plan to run this detector full time in the engine? Also, what
kin_ of aerodynamics losses do you ha_e with the step that you put in the
flow path? IJ. Barran_er, NASA-Lewis
I'll answer the second question first. If we talk only about cross-
sectional area, it's very small. For the total passage area, that step pro-
duced only a smalt change in the area. Concerning other aerodynamic situations,
we really have not looked at it very hard. The detector may be monitored full
time or may be monitoredperiodically. With regard to the testing program
/ since we're putting a disk with a crack in it, which is verboten in most test
_ programs, a high level of control will be exercised with continuous monLtoring. :
Unknown_uestioner
Why was this engine used for this crack detector study?
J. Barran_@r, NASA-Lewls
.% We are looking at this particular engine because of the average disk llfe
. aspects of it. The disks have beam taken out of service because someone says,
after so many hours this disk comes out, regardless, cracked or uncracked --
this is the standard procedure. We looked at the disks that were taken out
and found that there are cracks in some of the disks at the "end of llfe".
_5
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These are not critical cracks: that is, they are at least four times smaller
than critical and, according to the manufacturer, are in a low stress region.
What will be done with it in the future is again a matter of decision for the
people who are the users, that is, the military. If they want to extend the
program to its ultimate, one of these detectors would be installed on the
engines that they have in existence. The electronics equipment would be
ground based: it would be plugged in the side of the aircraft at the end of
a flight or every month or whenever the testing interval might be. Then the
decision would be made either to take a disk out earlier than its "end of life"
because a crack shows up, or as an alternative, to continue to run the disk
after the "end of life" (which is more risky) until a crack did show up. How-
ever, whether the average life would be less or greater than what it is now is
hard to say. But that part of the program is uncertain at this particular time.
G.J. Man_ano, NAPTC
Was that detector developed specifically for _hat application, or was it
a general program, and you're using this _articular engine as a test vehicle?
J. Barran_er, NASA-Lewis
It was primarily a study program. The particular engine being used just
happens to fit the test program needs.
S. Weiss, NASA-Lewis
: This has been a concept study which is being further investigated by the
Army.
W. Springer, Allison-GMC
The top of the disk is exposed to the gas flow pattern and a severe
thermal stress concentration exists. After rapid crack propagation, that crack
may become benign. Its growth rate drop off tremendously once the crack tip
gets below the high stress field.
For the future do you think that you will ever get this device working
for smaller cracks than an eighth of an inch and have it farther away from
the disk than ninety mils?
/ J. Barran_er, NASA-Lewis
• '_ The signal that I showed was a raw data signal, so without any further
processing, it was pretty clear the crack was there. I've not tried to increase
the sensitivity. I found that the blade root provides an undesirable signal,
and a crack very often looks like an extension of one of the blade signals.
To distinguish one from the other might be very difficult. In answer to the
first part of your question, I do not think that we can get a substantial
" improvement in the small crack sensitivity unless the sensor is positioned
very close to the disk. For the second part, the farther away you get, the
less sensitive it is. More sensitivity with distance implies making the coil
larger. However, as it becomes larger, a smaller fraction of the sensor area
is exposed to the crack region so it becomes less sensitive to the crack. Thus,
_, 386 P
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it is a balance between those two situations. I do not think that we will do
a whole lot better than this. But, I have not looked at the problem hard
enough to determine what the answer to that question really is.
J. Doherty, P&W
Just a general comment. It would seem from an operational point of view,
that you've chosen a very convenient problem: you know where the crack will be
before you start looking. If you don't know where the crack is beforehand, you
must have the engine full of sensors -- in every conceivable location. Many
of us who have engines in the field know that when we have cracks in components,
we must get those cracked parts out as fast as we can; we really don't have a
lot of time to go around and find out where the next crack might be.
J. Barranger, NASA-Lewis
Yes, you're right. In this particular example, the cracks are chronic,
which means that it is amenable to this sort of solution. If they're random,
that's a much more difficult situation.
i
J. Morellf, TWA
I am going to summarize some comments tomorrow morning to put the meeting
in perspective from an airline point of view. Quite honestly I would tend to
with the gentleman who just spoke here this morning from Pratt & Whitney,agree
that flying that kind of equipment is not the right way to go. But the thing
that is important to us, I would like to point out tomorrow, is the ability of
detecting cracks of any size installed in an engine. Because we quite honestly
# fall heir to problems that occur overnight and we're faced with a large fleet of .
engines and are faced with the problem of trying to segregate from those engines
• which are the ones we should worry about and which are all right. So I'm very
happy to see that work is being done in this area, because I feel it's extremely
important. But, perhaps, the fliqnt application is not the one that we would
choose as an airline, but instead something that could be done with the engine
installed on the airplane (and again to help isolate, because we have had
extremely good success in some applications), and I'd like to point that out
as we talk tomorrow.
S. Weiss, NASA-Lewis
When we first got into the rotor burst protection problem, we set up a
4 three-prong effort. The first thing that occurred to us was that you build
a better wheel, but if you succeed, _he designers concerned with increased
_ / performance will load it to its maximum and negate any safety benefits. Another
concept was also pursu_. That was to divert rotor fragments away from any vital
" parts of the airplane. Yet a third concept was to develop a system that would
warn the operator that he has a wheel that is going to fail, before it actually
does fail. This is the crack detector and it is not being developed as an NDE
device for inspection. We had hoped to lay the groundwork for development of
a sensor system that could be flluht certified for installation on an engine.
r Dr. Barringer suggested the idea of trying to modify eddy current devices
for installation in flight engines which would detect a crack of some reasonable
size. On the basis of fracture mechanics i_spection, a critical crack length
i
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criterion might be established. Continuous monitoring of the growth of a
detected crack, with such a device, would permit re_val of the wheel before
the crack length grew to a danger threshold.
B.L. Koff, GE-Cinc.
In industry, we need to have fundamentally sound ideas in order to obtain
funding and I doubt that such a program could gain support. We learn by doing
but the scheme must be (a) practical in the end result and (b) one that will be
accepted.
/
J
' l
1978002125-386
TURBINE DISKS FOR IMPI_OVED RELIABILITY
Albert Kaufm_m
NASA Lewis l{csearch Center
SUMMARY
The tre_d toward higher turbine-blade tip speeds and inlet gas temperatures makes
it increasingly diffict_t to design reliable turbine d_sks that can satisfy the life and per-
formance requirements of advanced commercial aircraft engines. Containment devices
to protect vital areas such as the passenger cabin, the fuel lines, and the fuel tanks
against high--energy disk fragments would impose a severe performance penalty on the
engine. The approach taken in this study was to use advanced disk structural concepts
to improve the cyclic lives and reliability of turbine disks. Analytical studies were con-
ducted under NASA contracts by the General Electric Company and Pratt & Whitney Air-. #
craft to evaluate bore--entry disks as potential replacements for the existing first-stage
turbine disks in the CF6-50 and JTSD-17 engines. Results of low-cycle fatigue, burst,
fracture mechanics, and fragment energy analyses are summarized for the advanced ?
disk designs and the existing disk designs with botb cgnventional and advanced disk ma-
terials. Other disk concepts such as composite, laminated, link, multibore, multidisk,
, and spline disks were also evaluated for the CF6-50 engine.
INTRODUCTION
A disk burst is one of the most catastrophic failures possible in an aircraft engine, ¢
Flight failures of disks in c ,mmerclal airliners have caused fires, rupture of fuel tanks, _
penetration of passenger cabins, wing damage, ingestion of disk fragments by other en-
gines, and aircraft control problems (ref. 1).
Aircraft engine companies generally endeavor to use conservative design practices
and modern quality control procedures in producing turbine disks. However, failures
occur because of design errors, undetected manufacturing defects, uncontrolIable oper-
'_ // ating factors, errors in engine maintenance and assembly, and ._aflur¢ of other engtnc
P c0mponente. To attempt to design turbiJ, disks to preclude failure from any of these
causes would result in prohibitively low allowable stresses. Containment devices to
protect vital areas of the aircraft against high-energy disk fragments would impose
severe performance penalties on the engine.
The approach taken in this program Was directed toward improving turbine disk re-
liability by using more advanced structural concepts to increase low-cycle fatigue life,
to Impede crack propagation, end to reduce fragmen: energies that could be gmerated
i
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, event of a disk _'ailure. This paper reports the results of NASA-sponsored ,'ma-
• '. ;at studies by the General Electric Company and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (refs. 2
and 3) to evaluate bore-entry disks as potential replacements for the r'dsth_g first.stage
turbine disks in the CF6-50 and JT8D-17 engincs, rcspcctiveiy; these engines were
selected because _f their extensive use in commercial passenger aircraft. Other con-
cepts such as composite, laminated, and muitidisk designs were also studied for the op-.
erating conditions of the CF6-50 engines.
The bore-entry disks were compared with the existing disks (henceforth called the
"standard disks") on the basis of cycles to crack initiation and overspeed capability for
initi_l:y unflawed disks and on the basis of cycles required to propagate initial flaws to
failure. Comparisons were a_so made of the avai!shle kinetic energies of possible burst
fragments. All of these eoml_ar. _ +is were also made for the standard disk with the ma-
terial of the bore-entry disk so that improvements resulting from changes in material
properties could be distinL Jhed from those resulting from st mtctural design changes.
#
DISK CONCEPTS
" CF6-50 Turbine Disk Designs _
I
" The standard disk and the disk concepts considered as potential replacements are
illustrated in figure 1. The standard disk (fig. l(a)) is mac.hined from an Inconel 718
(Inc-718) forging, Local bosses on both sides of the disk provide reinforcement around , !
the bolt holes to increase the low-cycle fatigue life at the hole rims. Cooling air from
. the compressor is channeled through the shaft, cools the disk bore, is pumped up
radially between the stage 1 and 2 rotors, Cools the aR side of the disk between the bolt +|
holes and rim, and then enters the blades through openings in the dovetails.
The bore-entry disk (fig. 1CoDis e two-part disk of integral construction. The two
disk halves are connected by radial webs I_r channeling coolant up the center of the disk
from the bore to the blades. Among the advantages of the bore-entry concept are ira-
// proved cooling effectiveness, reduced axial thermal gradients, and increased resis-
"_" tance to crack propagation ,Lsthe axial direction. One of the main attractions of the
bore-entry covcept for the CF6 program w:,.s that it lent itself to a redundant construc- ':
-t
tioa where the 6.isk would be overdesigned eo that if half was failing, the undamaged disk
half would be able to assume a larger portion of the load and sustain the damaged part;
however, this would require a substantial increase in total disk weight. The integral
bore-entry disk w_.,fld be fabricated from a single-piece forging of Ren_ 95 alloy with the
material between disk halves removed by elects_chemical machining.
The composite disk (fig. l(c)) uses high-strength filamentor wire hoops to provide
most of the load-carrying ability of the disk except at the dovetail attachments. The
"i 390
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hoops wouhl have t_ tje pretensioned in order to assure :m even load distribution among
the filamer, ts: this could be accomplishc_l by filament whl,ling, b.v interference fitting,
or by the selection of filament and matrLx matcrial._ so ihat the desired hoop pretension
would be applic_ by differential thermal cxp:msion tm¢!cr en.giae opcraling conditions.
In the laminated design (fig. l(dD, a disk is constructed by bolting together a large
number of sheet-metal lamInates. A stepwise variation in thickness provides more
laminates at the rim and bore but leaves gaps bet_veen laminates in the web region. In
the link design (fig. l(e)) a disk is constructed of pinned sheet-metal link segments.
Both the laminate and link concepts are directed toward low-cost fabrication, isolation
of propagating cracks, and generation of small burst fragments rather than toward im-
proving disk file.
The mult_oore disk (f_. 1(I)) separates the highly stressed bore region into a num-
ber of circum0 renl/al r:'.. in order to prevent a crack or flaw at ihe bore from propa-
gating axially. _&_.the ends of the ribs, the tangential stresses dae to centrifugal loading
would be less and, therefore, the crack propagation rate should be slower than at the
bore of the standard dlsk.
The purpose of the maltidisk design (fig. l(g)) is to obtain improved disk cooling
and to provide for a redundant construction by transference of loads from a failed disk
member to the undamaged ones through the bolts. The spline disk (fig. l(h)) is essen-
tially a t_,o-piece design where the members are coupled through splines on their center
faces. In order to counter the tendency of each disk-half to straighten out due to the
lack of axial symmetry, the splines would have to be radially Interlocked through pins.
The mech_mieal coupling of the multidisk and spline designs prevents cracks in one disk
member from propagating to another.
These concepts are described in more detail in reference 2.
JTSD-17 Turbine Disk Designs
The standard disk shown in figure 2(a) is machined from a Waspaloy forging. Cool-
ing air is bled from the combustion chamber liner and discharged at high velocity
/" through nozzles toward the front side of the disk near the rlm. The cooling air is de-
/ 'fvered to the blades through angled holes at the disk rim. These boles result In elllp-
tical exit openings with high stress concentrations; these are the limiting low-cycle
fatigue locations.
A spl/t-bonded, bore-entry coacept was selected as a possible replacement for the
• standard disk. As with the intagral bore-entry disk (flg. llb)) for thc CF6-50 turbine,
"- cooling air would be/ntroduced at the bore, would be pumped up radially through chan-
•nels formed by radial webe, and would enter the blades through openings in the bases.
The two halves of the bonded bore_.entry disk would be fabricated from separate forginp
'* 391 I
1 '1--o ;
1978002125-389
of Astl_oloy _m'Jdiffusion brazed together at tile center surfaces of the radial webs.
I)ovetail broaching :u_dfinal machining operations would be performed on the bonded disk
:_.<._,.mbly. "l'hc cmpilasis in file design! of the bolltled bort,-eiltlT _lisl_ was on implx)ving
the cyclic life without pro_iding rcvJundancy or increasing the disk weight.
DESIGN CONDITIONS
Desig., properties of the materials for the standard and bore-entry disks are pro-
sentcd in table I. The simplified flight cycles used for the cyclic heat transfer and
stress analyses are shown in figure 3 for the CF6-50 engine and in figure 4 for the
JT8D-17 engine. The flight cycle shown in figure 4 was the cycle used in the original
design of the first-stage turbine disk for the JTSD-17 engine. The analytical methods
are discussed in references 2 to 4.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses of CF6..50 Disk Concepts
..
The results of preliminary analyses of the seven candidate design disk omcepta are
summarized in table II. Two of the designs, the laminated and link disks, proved to
have excessive mechanical stresses and to be unsuitable for the CF6 operating condi-
tions. The multibore design exhibited high transient thermal stresses in the region
above the bore rims; therefore, the desired benefit of this design in retarding the prop-
agaUon of rib flaws was not fully realized. Analysis of the.multidisk design under var-
ious failure conditions revealed that the bolts could not contain a failed outer disk and |
that a crack in a center disk would reach critical length before the load could be red/s-
tributed to the undamaged members.
Only the bore-entry, composite, and spline disks appeared suitable for the CF6-50
turbine disk applications. From the standpoint of strength-to-density ratio, the compo-
site disk was the most promising concept. However, the composite design is fqrthest
removed from the current state-of-the-art of fabrication and material processing tech-
/) nology of any of the. concepts considered. Because of the considerable fabrication de-
• /
velopment that would be required, the composite disk was not further considered. The
, spline disk presented special problems in analysis became the load distribution among
the splines is dependent on the fabrication tolerances and it is not readily apparmt how
the loading would be rec_stributcd should one disk-half fall. The integral construction
:. of the bore-emtry disk gives more assurance that the loading due to a failed disk mere..
ber would be. more evenly redistributed on the undamaged member. The integral bore..
392
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entry concept was, therefol'e, selectc_l for more detailc_! study to replace tile CF6-50
st,-mdard disk.
Analyses of CF6-50 Stmldard :rod Bore-EntlT Disks
The rim and bore average temperature responses during tile flight cycle of the stan-
dard and bore-entry disks are shoi_ in figure 5. Average effective stresses are also
indicated at the start and end of takeoff, climb, cruise, and thrust reversal on descent.
In both disks the maximum rim and bore temperatures occurred at the end of takeoff and
climb, respectivelyi the maximum stresses also occurred in the bore at the end of
climb.
Bore temperatures in the bore-entry disk are only slightly lower than bore-
temperatures in the standard disk since the bore is cooled in both cases. Rim tempera-
tures were somewhat higher in the bore-entry disk because the coolant picks up some
heat from the center faces of the disk, whereas the coolant only comes into contact with
the sides of the standard disk near the rim.
Figure 6 shows the predicted cyclic lives to crack initiation in the initially tmflawed
standard and bore-entry disks. The limiting fatigue life of 30 000 cycles in the Inc-718
standard disk was at the aft dovetail post rabbet, where the side plate is fastened to the
disk. This location was not further considered in the study because fragment generation
due to failure would be limited to the dovetail post and adjacent blades. The next most
critical location in the Inc-718 standard disk was at the bore with a predicted crack ini-
tiation time of 63 000 cycles. The initial FAA certified life of the first-stage turbine
disk was 7800 cycles based on one-th/rd of the rain/mum design life for the original de-
sign cycle, which was somewhat different from the simplified cycle used in this study;
" this FAA approved life is subject to increase as the result of ground tests of three fleet
leader engine.c.
Calculated crack initiation lives for the Ren(.• 95 standard and bore-entry disks were
over 100 000 cycles. Since the crack initiation analyses were based on minimum guar-
anteed material properties, It is evident that even the standard disk is very conserva-
/ tively designed provided the design conditions are not exceeded and the disks are inl-
" _ tially unflawed.
The cyclic lives for cracks propagating from initial semielltptleal surface flaws
" 0.635 centimeter (0.250 in.) by 0.211 centimeter (0.083 in.) to critical crack size are
shown in figure 7 for the most critic.al locations in the three disks. Manufacturing flaws
of this size should be readily detectable by modem nondestructive evaluation tecluflques.
;_ Ilowever, In the past, large defects in turbine disks have occasionally escaped detection
through human error and have caused problems in some military engines in flight,
The most critical locations for flaws were at the dovetail slot bottom in the ino-?18
i
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st-mdard disk and at the bore in the lk:n6 95 stmld:ird :rod boro--entry ,lisl.s. Although
the bore-entry disk showed an improvement in th,, minimum cr:tcK p_lmgation life of
inure th:m 300 pcrcc.nt as comp:tl't.d ;_ith tht: h,c-TlS .-;t.,ndard disk. i):trt of this increase
w:ns due to the superior strength properties of the Itch0 95 alloy. If the effect of differ-
ent materials was eliminated by comparing the bore-flawed boro-entry _d Rcn6 95
standard disks, the improvement in crack propagation life resulting solely from the
structural change was 136 percent,
The crack propagation lives given in figure 7 for the inc-718 standard disk with a
dovetail slot bottom flaw and the bore-entry disk with a bore flaw are only 5 and 20 per-
cent of the FAA certified life of the disk. However, the probability of such large flaws
occurring at critical locations and passing modern inspection procedures is statistically
remote. Of greater significance is that a substantial improvement in the crack propaga-
tion life is added insurance against sudden catastrophic failure due to unforeseen design,
manufacturing, maintenance, or operating problems. The overspeed burst margins of
the bore-entry disk were 18 and 11 percent greater than for the inc-718 and Ren_ 95
standard disks, respectively.
The redundant construction of the bore-entry disk resulted in an increase in weight
of 66 percent over the standard disk. This extra weight is equivalent to an increase of
0.29 percent in installed specific fuel consumption (SFC) for an average DC10-30 air-
: craft flight.
The extra ¢lisk weight could also be added to the standard disk design to reduce the
centrifugal stresses due to the blade loads. However, this mechanical stress reduction
would probably be offset by the increased transient thermal stresses resulting from the
slower thermal response of the bulkier disk. Also, a heavier standard disk would lack
the redundancy of the bore-entry disk and would generate even higher fragment energies
from a burst disl_.
Some possible .°ragment patterns resulting from manufacturing flaws are illustrated
in table IH.. The available kinetic energies that would be generated from these failures
are also indicated. The highest energy fragments are caused by failures initiating at
and propagating radially from the bore, as shown by the 120° disk and blade fragment
'_ J" pattern for the standard disk in table III. However, the redundant construction of the
integral bore-entry disk would enable the undamaged member to contain such a failed
L, part. The only possibility of a segment separating in this way would be if the radial
failure propagated through a web to the opposite disk face; however, this is highly un-
likely because the total thickness for all the webs is only 20 percent of the bore eircum-
:'- ference and, as one web starter _ falling, its load would be transferred to adjacent webs.
" The most likely mode of fragment generation is a rim fragment resulting from defects
or crack initiation sites at the dovetail slot bottom or bolt hole rim. Based on spin pit
e_crience, the rim-initiated crack would result in the loss of three dovetail posts and
394
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four blades, as shown in table Ill. "l'ho [r:l._mcnt cttc.rgy of tile I_orc-cntry disk rim
fragment was only :_bout 10 percent of the 120° (li._k so,intact that was :ts,_uluctl to l)e
generated [l_m a I)orc dcicrt m tile _t_uitl:,rd disk.
Analyses of JT8D-17 Stmldard and Bore--Entry Disks
The average temperature responses for the JT8D-17 turbine disks in figure 8 show
consistently lower bore and rim temperatures throughout the cycle in the bore.entry
disk as compared with the standard disk. The lower temperatures in the bore.entry
disk were the result of its superit.-r cooling effectiveness and the use of cooling air bled
from the compressor midstage. Maximum temperatures and stresses occurred at the
end of takeoff and climb, respectively.
Predicted cyclic lives for the initially unflawed standard and bore-entry disks are
presented in figure 9. The FAA-certified life of the Waspaloy standard disk is 16 000
cycles based on the limiting law-cycle fatigue life at the exit of the cooling air hole.
These results indic,_,te an improvement in the cyclic crack initiation life of the Astroloy
bore--entry disk of 88 percent over the Waspaloy standard disk e__.d67 percent over the
Astroloy standard disk. The most critical location in the bore-entry disk was in the
bore region at the entrance to the cooling air channel.
¢
• Defects and manufacturing flaws in the JT8D-17 turbine disks were considered for
the critical locations indicated in figure 10. Subsurface flaws of 0.119 centimeter
(0.047 in. ) in diameter were assumed in the bore and web regions for all three disks_
this diameter was selected because it is at tb,e threshold of detectability by ultrasonic
inspection. The web flaws shown in figure 10 were at the radius of maximum radial
stress in the standard disks and at the radius of maximum axi,-d stress at the bond sulk-
face in the bore-entry disks. The surface flaws at the disk rim or bore were assumed
to be 0.081 centimeter (0.032 in.) in length.
The most critical location in the Waspaloy standard disk for a flaw was at the exit
of the cooling air hole with a predicted crack propagation life of 2900 cycles. Substi-
tuting Astroloy properUes for the Waspaloy reduced the calculated crack propagation
,/ life to 1150 cycles because of the lower ductility. However, there a,c indications that
_' if the crack propagation data had included hold-time effects, the crack propagation life
of tim Astroloy standard disk would have been superior to that of the Waspaloy standard
disk. This would also mean that the values given in figure I0 for the bore-entry disk
are too low.
: The calculated improvement in the minimum crack propagation life of the bore-
, entry disk over the Waspaloy standard disk was 124 percent. This improvement is sig-
nificant in increasing the capability of the disk to survive uncontrollable factors that
might result in catastrophic ffiilure of conventionally designed disks. There was a
r
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slight reduction in file overspecd burst margin of tile borc_entl 3' disk as compared with
the standard disk because tile overall disk weight was kept con._t_mt and that portion of it
clue to tile radi:d webs was of small structu r:d imlJortmwe.
A substantial reduction in fragment energs" is shown in table III for the JTSD-17
bonded bore-entry disk even though it was not designed for redundancy. This impl_ave-
ment would result from the confinement of the fragmentation ftx)m a bore flaw to one
dis!¢ half; the other half would probably experience failure at the rim from the increased
blade loading.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some advanced turbine-disk structural concepts have been analytically studied as
potential replacements for the existing first-stage turbine disks in the CF6-50 and
" JT8D-17 engines. An integral bore-entry design was selected for more detailed evalua-
tion for the CF6-50 engine as a remit of preliminary analyses of seven disk concepts in-
including composite, laminated, and muttidisk designs. The integral bore-entry turbine
disk was designed to improve disk life and to prevent high-energy fragmentation by using /
redundant construction at the expense of an increase in disk weight. _:
A split-bonded, bore-entry design was selected for evaluation for the JTSD-17 _-
gine. This bore-entry disk was designed to improve disk life without redundance or an .
increase in disk weight, j
Cyclic thermal, stress, and fracture mechanics analyses of the bore-entry and
standard disks demonstrated that substantial improvements in the cyclic lives of both
• initially unflawed and flawed disks could be achieved with the bore-entry disk designs.
The benefits of the advanced disk designs are influenced by differences in design philos-
+ ophy, disk cooling method, fabrication procedure, and engine operating characteristics.
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TABLE II. - RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF CF6-50 DISK CONCEPTS
Disk concepts Advantages Disadvantages
Bore entry Redundancy, improved thermal Increased weight to provide re-
response, longer life dundant design
i
Composite Reduced stress levels, longer Limited material posstbilittee,
cyclic life fabrication development re-
quired
Jl J
Laminated Redundancy, low fragment Excessive weight, high stresses
energy, low cost at bolts and bolt holes, thermal
mismatches between laminates
Link Redundancy, low fragment Excessive link stresses, diffi-
energy, low cost cult to seal disk to prevent
coolant leakage
J m iI
Multibore Ribs prevent axial flow High transient thermal stresses
propagation at bore at rib outer diameter
1Vlultidisk Improved thermal response, Increased weight, bolts would
some redundancy fail ff outer disk failed, no load
: shift ff inner disk failed
|ll
"" /4 Spline Redundancy, longer life Increased weight to provide re-
dundant design, difficult to
•_ analyze load shift with one failed
disk
i|
¥
t
' i
J
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TABLE III. - FRAGMENT ENERGIES OF TURBINE DISK DESIGNS
Disk design Fragment pattern Available kinetic energy. .
J
Initial flaw _ i
CF6-50 standard disk 20° 1 172 500
[ | -, s
CF6-50 integral bore- 110 500 :,
entry disk
Initial flaw - ... "|
J
Initialflaw \
JTRD-17 standard disk 0° 678 600 ".i
entry disk
_ ,,/_ Front h Rear half _
¢
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DISCUSSION
J.H. Gerstle, Boein_
With respect to that bonded bore entry disk, it is a fortunate thing from
an airframer's point of view that turbine disk failure fragments tend to
always stay in the plane of rotation. If you remember Denis McCarthy's figure,
he showed a dispersion of about +3 degrees. We looked into it and saw something
very similar: very narrow dis_rsion angles. I wonder if you would care to
comment on if you had such a split disk design, whether the pieces would tend
to fly out of the plane, which would gain us a little bit in reduced fragment
energy, but from a configuration point of view the problem would be worse.
A. Kaufman, N_A-Lewis
Well, I really cannot comme_ntmuch of that; that is kind of speculative.
This isn't really answering your question but it's somewhat similar to it. One
of the reasons that there is a disagreement between General Electric and PWA
over whether you should bond disks or make them integrally is that GE is more
worried about the bonded concept. I don't say this is right or wrong; but,
they feel that a bonded disk is very likely to have an unbonded area which
would propagate as you pile on cycles and create an uns_mnetrical stress dis-
tribution. This would put some bending compenent on the disk, whereas an
integral disk is more likely to be loaded uniformly and is more likely to do
what your analysis predicts it will; itOs more dependable. Pratt & Whitney
seems to believe that this isn't a concern. I guess they have run some tests
on this bonded design, but I don't think the tests are extensive enough to
really set this concern to rest.
D.T. Poland, Lockheed-Calif.
One of the considerations in redundant structure is to have a safe-load
life after you've experienced a failure so that safe operation will continue i
until we discover the failure. This means having a sufficient safe llfe to
carry you between inspection periods so you can find cracks and failures on
a scheduled inspection of the airframe and engines. I was wondering what
considerations you had taken into account in this redundant design philosophy
to allow for discovery of a failure in one of the redundant parts.
A. Kaufman, NASA-Lewi s
This involved a little personal disagreement I have with the redundant
• j
deslgnthatGE did. I think it's a little over-redundant. The way they
designed it was that Ir case of a failure, the undamaged disk could contain
the failed part, and thus complete the operational life for which the disk was
initially designed. I'm not sure that's not a dangerous concept because that
could mean that the pilot would not be aware of the failure of part of the disk
and could carry that failed part along. It seems to me that you want to have
) some redundancy but not too much. It would seen to me that the ideal redundant
construction should be. une in which you could contain the failed part long enough
to get the airplane down to the ground, but by rubbing or some other means the
pilot would have some warning that something is wrong. If you overdesign it so
i 409!
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it has a long life, the operator could be containing a failed part for
thousands of cycles between overhauls, and then it could let go unexpectedly.
I hope I've answered your question.
Unknown Speaker
I think it's worthwhile to point out that these pilots are very sensitive
to any situation that happens. If you lose a piece of disk I do not think ther_
is much doubt that he will not know it.
A. Kaufman, NASA-Lewis
In that redundant design if you initiate a crack in the bore, you're not
going to lose a piece of disk. What you say is true if you lose a piece near
the rim. But, I'm concerned that you may initiate a radial crack which may go
up an inch or so and then be contained on the failed part. I don't think they
have really wrung through that analysis. I'd be afraid that the pilot might
not be aware of it, and the thing could come apart somewhere between overhauls.
So, I think, a small amount of redundancy is what you want to aim for, and you
don't want.that crack to ride along in the aircraft too long.
G.L. Gunstone, CAA-UK
_ It's quite a thought, Mr. Chairman, that in the whole airplane, the disks
- and the shafts in the engines are the only parts which are single-element items,
failure of which is potentially catastrophic. On the engine side, we are 20
or 30 years behind the aircraft people in that particular respect. I think that
getting redundancy or fail-safe systems is about the only solution I see as valid
unless we adopt the other types of approaches we've talked about (that is, making
the aircraft withstand the debris). If we're going actually to prevent the disks
, from failing in their own right, this is about the only way I see of it being
possible.
J.C. Wallin, BAC
I just want to follow up briefly on the comments of the last two speakers.
Following airframe practice, it is not going to be any good having redundancy in i
engines unless you have the inspection methods to go with it, so that you can
detect the cracks before they become catastrophic. The way we use redundancy
in the airframe structure is to have routine inspections which will pick up the
flaws so you can do something about them before they get out of hand.
; A. Kaufman, NASA-Lewis4
% I think we're talking of a redundant construction that when you get that
plane down you're going to have a fairly good-size crack, maybe an inch long,
. maybe longer. There's always a possibil_ty the failed part will be hidden but
I would think (that aside) the inspector should be able to detect it readily.
- J.T. Dixon v P&W-Florlda
What the man from GE said, it's hard for me to believe, first off, that
you can contain that portion with the estimated big eccentric load that you
have there. But, if you do and if you can, .Idon't think you're going to
worry about the pilot knowing. You're going to have such large deflection
that those blades are going to contact the vanes, unless you're going to
410
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increase engine length, and you add extra weight for extra engine length. So,
I don't think you have to worry about excessive redundancy. A failure will be
picked up pretty quick.
A. Kaufman, NASA-Lewis
It may not be detected readily but I can see what you're saying: if that
flaw propagates really extensively, this will redistribute the stresses and
throw an eccentric load on the disk. But suppose that the flaw grows to just
an inch from the bore, I'm not sure you're going to get that much of an eccentric
load that it is going to be felt.
4
SOME AIRLINE EXPERIENCE IN PREVENTING
ENGINE ROTOR FAILURES
John J. Morelli
Director of Power Plant Maintenance*
_ Trans World Airlines, Inc. '
Kansas City, Mo.
We have spent many hours discussing the disk and blade containment problems and
have heard the viewpoints of the regulatory agencies, the engine manufacturers,
and the airframe manufacturers.
J
The airlines' viewpoint has yet to be expressed, and I will take that on since
through some misfortune of mine, I am the only airline representative here.
I have learned a great deal from the information presented here. The most
important being, that no matter who accumulated and presented the data, there
was virtual agreement with respect to the number of serious incidents of non-
containment.
I would, however, hate to leave here having you think that it was a stroke of
luck, or the will of God, that has kept the non-contalnment problem at such
' / a low level that loss of life or aircraft has b_,en remote or non-existant overj
the past 13 to 15 years.)
The other side of the coLn which must be talked to is that the alrllnes, with /
4
the assistance of the ang_ne manufacturers, have achieved excellent control
over the type of problems which lead to an u.contal.ed £ailure--and have in
fact, avoided many potential problem.
i *Now retired. ' ' i
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I would not like to hazard a guess what the incident rate might look like if
we had sat back and failed to respond or recognize incipient problems.
I can cite a few examples from memory--the JT4 engine developed a siege of
third turbine blade failures which threw shrapnel out the tailpipe and into
the wing flaps because most of the failures occurred on takeoff. I am sure
that the statistics shown here included some JT4 damage incidents which
occurred early in that period. I can tell you that this problem was effectively
controlled with a very sophisticated tool, consisting of a broom stick with a
: rubber hose on the end of it. I don't know how many of you have heard of the +
"broom stick check", but it was a rather famous check across the industry. We
+
_ did nothing more than put this broom stick up the tailpipe against the turbine
blades while a mechanic turned the compressor. A clicking sound meant a loose /
; turbine blade. Three clicks meant three loose blades, which was the limit we
q
established for having the engine changed. We probably removed lO0 wheels due _
+
to this problem, but I am certain you would not find an in-flight failure in
the statistics since initiation of the "broom stick check". We even took a further
step, we found that we could lower the back of the engine, take the exhaust case i
+with the thrust reverser off, change the wheel while the engine was still on-the-
wing, and get the job done in less time than it took us to change the engine.+
/ Another problem that would have made headlines if left uncontrolled, was a
deflection problem on the second stage nozzle guide vanes on the JT9D engine.
In this case the inner platform would deflect into the second stage disk, scoring
k
it, and causing a disk rupture. We attacked this problem with the help of
Pratt and Whitney and some others in the industry, by taking X-rays of the affected
area, using a radlolotlve isotope installed in the turbine shaft opposite the fi_m
which was wrapped 8zoqnd the outside of the englne. The photo permitted us to
measure and monitor the gap between the two parts and to remove the engine when +
,i
, _, a given point was reached.
t
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Again, we did not have a single failure that surely would have fallen into
the "catastropic category". This type of control came about because of the
initiative that we and others in the industry have taken and continue to
take to avoid these kinds of problems.
The JT3D N1 Compressor rear hub failure is another excellent example. I bet
there isn't anyone in the room who has heard of or has recognized that there
has been a serious cracking problem with this hub over the past three to four
years. This one wasn't easy to control, because it was so difficult to get
to, being located between the N1 and N2 compressors with no exterior borescope
holes readily available. We did, none-the-less, develop a good control system
by inserting an eddy current probe on a long handle thru the N1 gearbox and
compressor shaft. It took the finesse of a brain surgeon to detect a crack in /
such a difficult area, but once we mastered the technique we avoided having a
single hub failure.
The last one that comes to mind is the RB211 problem which caused burn thru
and release of the first stage nozzle guide vane. In addition to the safety
aspects of this problem was the fact that the nozzle guide vane could cause I
downstream damage to the tune of about three to four hundred thousand dollars
worth of turbine parts. In this case we simply used frequent borescope
'_ inspections through borescope holes that were strategically located to monitor
z _ and measure the rate of burning.
,_ If my memory were better I could reach back for more examples, but gentlemen,
if you multiply the TWA experience by the number of alrlines, I believe you
,. would have to acknowledge that we have pretty good control and have, in fact,
%
minimized our exposure. You must understand, we do not wait for a spectacular
failure to occur before reacting. We are constantly on the look out for
incipient problems anytime an engine goes thru our engine shops. Additionally,
o
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we trade experience with other airlines and with the engine manufacturers.
Once a problem is identified, we establish a plan for the engines that are
in service to avoid any inflight failures. It is our aim to develop the
technology necessary to cull out the suspect engines while they are on the
aircraft. To do so is vital, because there is no airline in the world that
could put 400 engines on the ground and take them off to determine if they
have a problem. So it is imperative that we categorically develop ways and
means of finding problem engines quickly as a control and stop gap measure.
It takes two to three years to cycle a given modification in a sizeable
airline fleet--therefore these inspection measures are the only means of
avoiding an economic catastrophy.
Quite honestly, I think we have pushed our diagnostic capability to a near
limit. We need some new innovations. We need new holes in different places
on the engines. We need some creative thinking that allows us to have greater
visability within the engines and to test for problems that may be incipient.
We are somewhat more fortunate on the Jumbo Jets because at the insistence of
the airlines, and by the good graces of the manufacturers, we do have a generous
group of borescope holes, in addition to a modular concept of the major engine
components, which allows for quick and more effective response in the field
•i / than we have with the older model jet engines. This is one of the reasons
I
I get extremely nervous and extremely disturbed when I hear we are considering
wrapping boiler plate around engines for better containment. It is my opinion
that this is going the wrong way because, as I have stated, in order to control
our problems, we must be able to see them--it is the problems we _annot see
historically, that have hurt us.
i
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I would like to continue my sales pitch for just a minute, since I am not
certain that many in the industry recognize the job of the failure detection
that the airlines have had in effect for a number of years. These procedures
in fact allow us to anticipate and remove 85 percent of the engine failures
long before they reach a critical stage. We can conveniently schedule the removal
at our discretion, and in many cases maintenance and/or flight crews are not
aware of the developing problems.
The first of these tools is an engine in-flight data analysis program developed
twelve to thirteen years ago with the assistance of Pratt and Whitney. It
involves a computer process which is nothing more than a gas path deterioration
indicator• The data which is put into the computer daily is corrected to standard
,i
day conditions and is compared with a normal gas generator• The deviation for _,
all engine parameters is then plotted. We simply look for the swing or trends
; in the data and it is possible to examine i000 flying engines in 1% hours, picking
¢_t those that appear to have a problem. ._
Spectographic analysis is another limited, but useful tool that can detect i
impending failures in some cases as far off as three to four months in advance.
We have for a number of years also been testing the AIDS system, which I'm
sure some of you An the industry have heard about. We are the only domestic
/ airline in the world who has decided to invest several millign dollars in the
4
installation of this equipment in our jumbo jet aircraft in order to capture
4
dynamic information on not only the normal engine parameters which are observed
by the flight engineers, but also into other areas of the engine to sample new ,
parameters that we may someday find useful in furthering our engine failure
detection capability. Unfortunately, we are not a research department, and
we must limit the amount of Engineering we put into this kind of thing, since
i
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we are basically in the business of carrying passengers.
We have made some great strides, but with the help of the type people
available in this room, we could literally turn the world over in terms
of advancing our diagnostic capability. This is one of the reasons I was
pleased to hear John Barringer, yesterday, telling us about trying to
: install a crack detector in an operating engine. As I mentioned, the
approach was wrong, but the ideas was beautiful! We don't necessarily need
to build the diagnostics within the engine, since the environment is too
hostile. What is needed is the ability to look inside the engine. I'm sure
there are many innovative ways you gentlemen can think of to do thi_. I'm
quite proud of an industry that can see 84 percent of its failures befure
j-
they occur; so the 15 percent remaining can be a very fertile area for all
:_ of us to work in.
Aside from this,. I certainly think we need to continue studying the trajectory
of uncontained failures that do occur as it is obvicus the risk of uncontained
failures will be with us forever, irrespective of what containment approach we
take. So therefore, we still need to learn as much as we can when a failure
occurs so the airframe manufacturer, who apparently has done a fine job up
to this point, can improve on locating vital systems.
t
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APPENDIX A - AGENDA
Tuesday_ Harch 29_ 1977
INTRODUCTORYREHARKSAND HEETING OBJECTIVES: S. Weiss, NASA-Lewis
Session 1: PROBLEHDEFINITION_ DESIGN CONSIDERATIONSa OBJECTIVES,
AND APPROACHES
Chairman: J. H. Euders, FAA
1.1 A.K. Forney, FAA: Federal Aviation Association's Approach to
Engine Rotor Integrity
1.2 G.L. Gunstone, CAA-UK: Ensine Non-Contain_ent -- the UK CAA Viev
1.3 S.A. oSattar, P&W-UTC: Aircraft Engine Containment m SAE Coumtttee
Findinss
1.4 R.B. McCormick, Boeing: Rotor Burst Protection Criteria and
I_plications
1.5 J.C. Waliin, BAC: Engine Non-Containment -- UK Risk Assessment :
Kethods
Session 2: ROTORBURST PROTECTION- STATE OF THE ART
Chairman: J. H. Gerstle, Boeing
2.1 D. HcCarthy, Rolls-Royce Ltd. : Types of Rotor Failure and Charac-
teristics of Fragments
2.2 N. _ O'Connor, Jr., F_D-Douslas: Blade Fra_ent Energy Analysis
2.3 J.E. Eliot, Lockheed-Cal.: Designing the L-1011 to Minimize
Rotor Failure Effects
2.4 N.A. OtConnor, Jr., NcD-D: Approaches to Rotor Fragment Protection
2.$ D. ¥. Haskell, Army-BRL: Metallic Armor for Ballistic Protection
from Steel Fragments
/
Wednesday_ March 30_ 1977
2.6 G.J. _, NAPTC: Rotor Burst Protection Program _ Experimenta-
tion to Provide Guidelines for the Design of
Turbine Rotor Burst Fragment Containment Rinp
_..7 E.k. Wttwer, NIT: Analysis of Simple 2-D and 3-D Metal Structures
Subjected to Fragment Impact
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2.8 R.J. Brlstow, Boeing: Development of Fiber Shields for Engine
Containment
2.9 A.T. Weaver, P&W-UTC: Kevlar for Blade Containment
2.10 D. Roylance, NIT: N_erical Analyses of Impact in Woven Textile
Structures
2.11 J.H. Cerstle, Boeing: Analysis of Methods for FJevlar Shield Re-
sponse to Rotor Fragments
2.12 P.B. Cardner, Norton Co. : Ceramic Conposite Protection for Turbine
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